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PREF

CE

The new interest in Islamic Philosophy, which began about
a century ago , has gained momentum in our times .

This field of

study has attracted scholars in a number of disciplines .

The

Orientalist seeks to ascertain the original contribution of Islamic
philosophy and the nature and ext ent of its influence on Western
thinking .

The Classicist searches this rather unexploited philo-

sophical mine in the hope of finding material that would add to his
knowledge of the heritage of Greece , and his efforts have not been
in vain .

The Medievalist studies Islamic philosophy in an attempt

to shed more light on the impact of hellenlstlc thought upon the
monotheistic religions as well as on the interaction that took place
between these religions .

Contemporary Muslim thinkers also have

increasingly been devoting their energies to research in Islamic
philosophy and have made significant contributions .

Numerous works

that were neglected or lost for centuries are being rediscovered in
libraries of the Middle East , northwestern Africa and Europe .

Un-

fortunately , much of this new material cannot be studied innnediately
as lt has to be first edited and translated .
It ls the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest
way to this primary work of translation as well as to the equally
important task of philosophic analysis .

III

The major part of the present

work consists of a translation of al- Kindl •s ''Treatise on First
Philosophy" which .is, as~fnr a·s we Kno.w , the first Metaphysics written
by a Muslim philosopher .

The Treatise is one of a collection of

philosophic essays by al- Kindi which was discovered in Istanbul
four decades ago .

The bracketed subtitles in the translation were

added by the present writer for the sake of clarity .

In the left

margin , the number s 97- 162 refer to the pages , and the numbers S,
10 , 15 and 20 to the lines , in the Arabic text which was edited and
published in Cairo in 1950 and a copy of which has been placed at
the end of this dissertation for the convenience of the reader .

The

translati on is introduced by an account of the philosoph i cal and
theologi cal situation in the early part of the Ninth Century A. D. ,
a biographical sketch of al - Kindl and a discussion of the content
of this metaphys i cal work .

The Introduction is conc luded with an

evaluation of the Treatise and al - Kindi ' s philosophic position .

Documen-

tation takes the form of extensive notes which are followed by a glossary
of philosophical terms used in the Treatise .
I wish to express my deep gratitude to The Oropsie College for
the teaching fellowship that was granted me and the opportunity to
study at this outstanding Graduate School .

Special thanks are ex-

tended to Or . Federico Corriente, Or . Israel Efros and Or . Theodor
H. Gaster who read this dissertation and whose suggestions were most
helpful .

v.

The inspiration and assistance received from Or . Lawrence

Berman, under whom the present work was begun when he was on the

IV

faculty of Dropsle College, is very much appreciated.

A word of

personal thanks goes also to Or . S . D. Golteln of the University
of Pennsylvania under whom I had the privilege to study and whose
competent guidance and helpful stimulation will always be treasured .
Finally, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife, Alna,
for her constant support and encouragement .

Fuad N. Nucho
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I NTR ODU CT I ON

1.

The Phi i osophical and Theolbgical Background
a.

The Impact of Greek Thought
The culture in the countries conquered by Islam in the

Seventh Century was essentially hellenistic.

The military victories

of Alexander the Great some thousand years earlier had paved the
way for the spread of Greek ideas and ideals in the Mediterranean
world and the Middle East.

The process of hellenizatlon was

particularly enhanced by the Greek centers that were established
in Egypt, Syria and Persia.

The great cosmopolitan city of

Alexandria played a leading role in stimulati~g widespread interest in,
and preoccupation with, Greek philosophy and science.

It was here

that the Hellenic or purely Greek culture interacted and became
infused with Eastern thought and the resultant Hellenistic civilization emerged.

Greek became the language of learning and was

most instrumental in molding the world of that day into a wider
cultural tmity.

Under the aegis of the Roman and Byzantine empires,

the influence of Hellenism continued to color the thinking and life
of the inhabitants of Western Asia and the Mediterranean countries.
Beginning with the Third Century A.D., a new version of

1

2

hellenistic thought, Neo-Platonism, made its appearance.

This

powerful philosophic system was destined to dominate the speculative
arena of the Middle Ages.

Plotlnus (205? - 270 A.O.), the founder

of Neo-Platonism, revived the ancient Greek philosophy but gave
it a religious bent.

His fundamental doctrine consists of the

derivation of the world from One supreme entity through a process
of emanation.

In the words of Dr. Richard Kroner, Plotlnus "out•

Platonized Plato" 111\d ttdared to fulfill the highest task of all
speculations to understand the plurality of being out of its
unity, to derive all the contents of thought out of their primary
ground." 1

In the En.neads, Plotinus wrote&

"The One is not absent

from anything, and yet it ls separated from all things, so that
it ls present and yet not present with them. " 2
Because of its philosophic or rather metaphysical monotheism
and its epistemological mysticism, Neo-Platontsm found positive
response in Christianity and, later on, also in Islam.

It was

instrumental in the conversion of Augustine to the Christian faith
and influential in the shaping of his theology.

The Neo-Platonic

system attracted also the minds of pagan thinkers who discovered
in it a religious mood that satisfied their deep spiritual longing.

For our purposes ln the present study, we shall follow
hellenistic philosophy as it was taken up by the Syrian Christians

3

because lt ls this stream whlch eventually leads into Islamic
thought.

The general bent of philosophy among the Syrian Christians

was Neo-Platonic.

'Ibis was due to the influence of the Syrian

disciples of Plotinus, namely, Porphyry and Jamblichus.

While

Porphyry (230 • 300 A.O.) helped popularize Neo-Platonism by
stressing and developing its religious elements, Jamblichus (t • 330 A.D.)
cast it into politheistic theological forms. 3

The transplanting of

Neo-Platonism in Syria did not find any opposition because Hellenism
had been naturalized in that region.

As Bertold Spuler ttas pointed

out, the christological controversies in the Eastern Church, which
eventually led to its division into Orthodox State and Monophysite
(Jacobltes) and Nestorian churches, indirectly encouraged the further
cultivation of Greek philosophy. 4

Particularly the Monophysites

and Nestorians sought in Greek philosophy logical proofs for their
theological self-defence against the Byzantine Church.

Especially

in the Aristotelian writings, which they translated into Syriac,
they found the necessary logical ammunition to hold their own theological grotmd.
The type of philosophy cultivated by the Syrian Christians was
· ·a .· Neo-Platonic version of Aristotellanlsm.

was devoted to Plato.

Two

Hardly any attention

of the outstanding Aristotelian commenta-

tors were the Nestorian Ammonius and the Jacobite John Philoponus.
The books of the

Organon and the Metaphysics of the Greek master

4

were translated into Syriac.

For some time, part of the Etmeads

of Plotinus were thought to be the work of Aristotle and was known
as "The Theology of Aristotle."

Porphyry's Isagogue was also

attributed to .Aristotle.
The Greek heritage, moreover, found an agreeable home in
Political intolerance and religious persecution in the

Persia.

Fifth and Sixth Centuries forced the Monophysites and, more so,
the Nestorians to move deeper into the Middle East.

They established

themselves in Mesopotamia and Persia where they continued their
theological and philosophical activities under the tolerant Sassanid
rule.

The persecution of the Emperor Justinian of all non-Christians

led to the closing down in 529 A.O. of the Athenian phllosophlcal

school. 5

Its scholars, among whom were arlstotelian commentators

and Neo-Platonists, found refuge in Persia where they were patronized
by the Sassanid King Chosroes (Anu-Shirwln, 531-579 A.D.).

Although

most of them returned to Greece after several years when conditions
improved, during their stay in Persia they helped lay down the
ground work for continued philosophic development.

Translations of

Greek philosophic and medical works into Persian were encouraged
and financed by King Chosroes.
was coined.

A Persian philosophic terminology

The Syrian scholar Uranius, who was attached to the

royal court, translated considerable works of both Plato and Aristotle
into Persian. 6

The Nestorians on the whole excelled in medicine.

The

5

reputation that some of them gained was due to their medical
rather than philosophical achievements.

The works of Galen and

Hippocrates also appeared in Persian.

b. The Abbasid Cultural Renaissance
At the beginning of the Ninth Century A.D., Baghdad was basking
in the limelight of a Golden Age under the reputable Abbasid caliphate
of Hlriin al-Rashid (786-809 A.D.).
subdued.

The Byzantine rulers had been

Peace and order had been established in North Africa.

Through

H.lrun•s political and military skill, the Arab Empire enjoyed a large
measure of internal tranquility.

Through his ingenious administrative

ability, the legendary caliph stimulated economic activity and encouraged foreign trade.
center.

Baghdad developed into a vital shipping

Wealth poured into it from numerous provinces of the Empire

as well as from foreign lands.
Through the wise leadership of Hariin, himself and educated
man, economic prosperity was made to serve constructive ends.

An

era of culture and learning was ushered in and a magnificent civi•
lization began to flourish.

Architecture experienced a great boom.

Being himself well-versed in religion and literature, HAriln made
his court the center of culture and scholarship.

He initiated

discussion and debate on a high intellectual level.

Medicine,

7

in these fields were entertained at the court where they engaged
in discussion, debate and exchange of ideas.

Being himself gifted

in, and addicted to, poetry, al-Ma'miin generously patronized the
leading poets and stimulated a literary output that was soon to
become a permarumt part of Arab heritage.
Al•V~•mun•s reign also marked the appearance of the great
collectors of tradition (~adTt!l), notably al-Bu!miri, as well as
a host of grammarians, philosophers, historians and theologians.
An institute for advanced study and research and a large library

(bayt al-~ikmah) were founded in Baghdad.

An observatory was also

constructed in the plains of Tadmur. 8
Increasingly, al-Ma'mun became fascinated by Greek philosophy
and science.

Agents were sent out into all directions to search for

and collect the writings of Greek philosophers, physicians, historians
and geometrl.cians.

A competent staff of translators, under the

leadership of the Nestorian Christian Hunayn ibn Ishaq (807-877 A.O.)

•

•

was subsidized by the public treasury for the task of translating the
whole corpus of Greek knowledge into Arabic.

This valuable under-

taking was carried out chiefly by Christians, Jews and Persians.

At

times, when the Greek original was not available, the translation
was made from the Syriac version.
in mathematics and astronomy.

Special interest was cultivated

The works of Euclid and Ptolemy were

translated by al-~ajjaj Ibn Yusuf Ibn Ma~ar for al-Ma 1 mun, who had

8

an understanding for the practical application of astronomy. 9
Suppllmentary material was borrowed from Indian sources.

The Indian

astronomical book, Sindhind, had been translated for al-MansQr by
lbrahTm al-Fazari. 10 At the request of al-Ma'mun, Muhammad al-fil!.awarizmi prepared the first independent book in algebra. 11
The most striking feature of the first half of the Ninth
Century was a spirit of intellectual freedom and tolerance which
encouraged philosophic curiosity and scientific objectivity.

Freedom

of inquiry and discussion aroused the pursuit of every kind of know•
ledge.

Through this open-minded attitude and ideal atmosphere for

learning, the frontiers of investigation and research were extended
into many directions.
as Dr.

s.

In this climate of tolerance and objectivity,

D. Goitein has indicated, the deep-seated interest in

religion gave birth to the new science of Comparative Religion, as
exemplified in al-~hrastanl's work, 'lbe Religions and Philosophic
Schools (al-Mllal wa'l-Nihal). 12 This "broad tolerance within its

•

community," ln the words of H. A. R. Gibb, grew out of "the character
of Islam as a strong, self-confident, conquering faith." 13
The Abbasid cultural renaissance, which began in Baghdad,
spread to many parts of the Arab Empire.

Older centers of learning

such as the rival cities of al-Kufa and al-Basra continued to
•
flourish. New centers were established at strategic points through•
out the empire.

Outstanding poets like Abu Nuwas,

bu-•1-'Atahiya

9

and al-Mutanabbi added luster of magnificent poetry to this Golden
Age.

A

flood of writings in history, geography, biography, lexico-

graphy, rhetoric, zoology, botany and other fields of knowledge made
its appearance.
Al-Ma'mun•s brother and successor, al-Mu'tasim (833-842),

•

showed special enthusiasm for architecture.

He built a new palace

outside Baghdad and surrounded it with elaborate gardens and called
it "surra man ra'a" (he will be delighted who beholds •it•).

He

also built new canals and erected numerous magnificent structures

including some magnificent mosques.

Al-Mu'tasim's reign, however,

•

marks the beginning of the political decline of Abbasid glory.

c. Faith and Reason in Early Islam
The conflict between faith and reason in early Islam revolved
around the problem of predestination and free will.

The influence

of Christianity and Hellenistic thought were, no doubt, important
factors in the development of the controversy.

However, the initial

differences of opinion as to whether man's decisions and actions
were predestined or were the product of his own free will were
aroused by contradictory statements in the Koran itself regarding

this matter.

Both the advocates of predestination and the defenders

of the freedom of the will were able to claim scriptural bases for

10

their views.

Metaphysical determinism is unequivocally expressed,

for instance, in the following passagesl
Allah will open the heart of him whom He intends
to guide in the right path, and close the heart of
him whom He intends to lead to err.14
It is not for a soul to believe except by the
permission of Allah.is
He leadeth astray whomever He pleaseth and guideth
unto Himself whomever He pleaseth.16
Man's freedom of choice and action, on the other hand, is
indicated in utterances as
We showed them the right way, but they chose error
above guidance.17
Truth is from your Lord, so let him who pl~ases
believe, and let him who pleases disbelieve. 1
We vouchsafed them also guidance, but to guidance did
they prefer blindness.1 9
These contradictory views are most probably the result of
Muhammad's own position which underwent a change from a belief in
free will during his Meccan period to that of predestination after
the Hegira. 20
As A. J. Wensinck has pointed out, "the debates on predestination

inaugurated rationalism in Islam.tt 21

The earliest defenders of reason

and free will were the !Q!arljites, whose thinking found expression in
their political doctrine concerning the ~llafah (succession).

They

upheld the democratic principle of election on the basis of qualifi-

11

cation rather than by automatic hereditary succession.

Any Muslim,

who possessed the necessary qualifications, the !S!!_arijites insisted,
should be eligible for election to the role of leadership in the
Muslim commtmity.

They maintained that the free choice of the whole

commtmity serves as a channel to God's wt11. 22
The !2J_arijite political theory soon led to theological debates
as the Muslim connntmity was compelled to define its stand on matters
concerning who is a Muslim, who is saved or damned and what is the
role of faith and works in the divine act of salvation.

The liberal-

ism of the !2J_arijites was vigorously opposed by the Murji'ites who
stressed the supremacy of faith and predestination over against reason
and free will.

The Murji'ites refused to pass judgment on behavior

and left this matter exclusively to God. 23
conception of faith.

This sect advanced a static

It was of the opinion that the faith of the

Muslim cannot be impaired by evil acts and declared conduct and
practice as secondary, but not essential, to faith.
The controversy over the primacy of faith or works took a
strictly theological direction as soon as the ontological question
was raised whether the Muslim's faith and works were the creation
of God or the product of man's free will.

The conflict was now

taken up by the Qadarites and the Jabarites.

The former restricted

'qadar' (God's decree, predestination) and asserted that man ls the
author of his own decisions and actions and, consequently, ls respon-

12

sible for his conduct. 24

The Jabarites, on the other hand, persisted

in the belief that divine predestination encompasses also the choices
and acts of man's will.

'n1eir position was in line with that of the

Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-Swna), who did not hesitate to

condemn the rational method in religion as innovation (bid'ah) and,
hence, as a dangerous and misleading approach to religious knowledge.
The Qadarites did not survive for long as a sect, but their
ideas were adopted and elaborated by their immediate followers, the
Mu'tazilites, who seceded from the Orthodox Muslims and worked out
a type of speculative theology.

'n1is new movement started out, as

H. A. R. Gibb has shown, as a reaction against the extremism of both
fil!.arijltes and Murji 1 ites. 25

It advocated the conviction that the

Muslim who commits a grave sin does not completely lose his status
and becomes an tmbeliever, as the !S,harijites said, nor does he remain
a believer, as the Murjl 1 ites thought.

Instead, the Mu•tazllites

designated for the sinful Muslim an "Intermediate Position" (almanzilah bayn al-manzilatayn).

26

This description applied also to

their own theological position as being intermediate between the
!!:!_arijites and the Murjl 1 ltes.

They did not accept the former•s

stress on "workstt and the Latter's emphasis on "faith" and, instead,
underscored the importance of both works and faith.
The Mu•tazilites became the champions of human freedom and

13

responsibility in Islam.

Thereby they sought to safeguard the

nature of God as Infinite Justice.

They argued that the determinism

of predestination violates Divine Justice, for it would mean that
God holds man accountable for decisions an d actions which he performs
by Divine decree.

The Mu'tazilites reasoned that God would not

punish man for deeds he ls predestined to carry out.

The fact that

Divine rewards and punishments are inevitable implies that man is
the author of his decisions and acts.

In their defence of God's

Justice and in their proclamation of a theology that would not
accept any relation between God and evil, the Mu'tazilites referred
to the frequent use of the epithets "the Compassionate, the Merciful"
in the Koran and quoted scriptural passages to support their assertion:
God will not burden any soul beyond its power. It
shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired, and it shall
bear the evil for the acquirement of which lt laboured.27
God is not unjust towards His servants. 28
The Mu'tazilites did not restrict the all-ambraclng power
of God by their stress on Divine Justice.

It ls God who gives man

the power and the freedom of choice, but the nature of the choice
itself between good and evil ls entirely left to ma.n's will.

How-

ever, man must face the necessary consequences of his responsible
freedom.
The Orthodox Muslims reacted vehemently to the Mu•tazlllte
doctrine of free will.

In the first ~lace, letting man have •power'

14

over his own actions, they believed, would make him the •creator•
of his own acts and this would mean a theological dualism that
encroaches on God's almighty power.

Moreover, the Orthodox Muslims

interpreted the Mu•tazllite emphasis on free will as implying a
restriction on Divine freedom and power.

For them, God ls an

absolute Monarch whose freedom cannot be limited b~ any external
agency. 29

The Mu'tazilltes were also accused of making reason

(al-'aql),rather than revelation(wahy), the highest norm.

•

To

quote al-§hahrastlnl,
The principle of the Mu'tazllites is justice in
accordance with what reason postulates from wisdom, that
ls, producing acts in the way of what ls right and
salutary. There is no decree from eternity; God has
ordered and prohibited and promised and menaced by noneternal speech. Accordingly, he who ls saved deserves
reward on account of his own act$• This is postulated
by reason as applied to Wlsdom. 30
In their epistemology, the Mu'tazilltes vested reason with
the supervisory prerogative over all objects of knowledge and
derived the necessity of moral behavior from rational insight
rather than revealed trutho 31
The question of human freedom and Divine Justice led also
to that of Divine Essence and Atributes.

The Mu'tazilltes were

not only advocates of Divine Justice but also of Divine Unity.

Hence, they called themselves 'the People of Unity and Justice•
(ahl al-tawhtd a•l-'adl).
•

Their defence of the Unity of God was

15

first directed against the metaphysical dualism of the Manichaeans
and the trinitarian doctrine of the Christians.

It was quite

probably their struggle on these two fronts that the Mu 'tazilites
were first brought into contact with Greek logic and philosophy,
a contact that was soon to usher the cultural renaissance of the
Abbasids spearheaded by the translation of Greek works into Arabic.
Within Islam, the Mu'tazilite emphasis on God's Unity took
the form of ridding the concept of God from the anthropomorphism
of the Orthodox believers.

The Mu'tazilites vigorously rejected

the belief that God will be literally seen by the faithful Muslims
in heaven and so made every effort to explain away scriptural
passages that speak of God's face, eyes, hands and throne.

This

anthropomorphism, they argued, would mean that God is limited to
one place and this implies that He ls finite.

The Mu'tazllite con-

viction that God is pure Spirit made them oppose the Orthodox
belief in the divine attributes which, in their view, constitutes
a plurality and, therefore, ls a violation of Divine Unity.

They

radically denied that God possesses any personal qualities (sifit

•

dhatlyyah,'..!l!a~{yyah) except eternity.

al- ~hrastan~ wrltess

The common belief of the sect of the Mu'tazllites
ls, that Allah is eternal (qadfm) and that eternity ts
the most peculiar description of His essence. They
absolutely reject all other eternal qualities, saying:
It ls by virtue of His essence that He has knowledge,
power and life; not because they are eternal qualities
or ideas inherent in Him. For if the qualities should

16

partake of His eternity, which ls His most peculiar
description, they would partake of His divinity•••
and they agree upon this, that will and heariog and
sight are not ideas inherent in His essence. 32
A logical consequence of the Mu'tazillte rejection of the
eternity of the divine attributes was their denial of the
eternity of the Koran.

Orthodox Islam believed that the Koran,

as the speech (kalam) of God, was uncreated and eternal.

It ls

''a glorious Koran in a preserved tablet'' (lawh mahfuz). 33

The

•

• •

Koran received and communicated by Muhammad was believed to be a
copy of the original tablet preserved in heaven from eternity.
The Mu'tazilltes saw in the doctrine of the eternity of the Koran
tthe ontological implication of something other than God co-existing
with Him before creation.

This meant, in their view, a dualism

that ¥iolates the absolute Oneness of God.

To guard the Divine

Unity, the Mu•tazilites argued strongly that the Koran was created.
They referred to the Koranic verse "We have made it (ja'alnihu)

an Arabic Korantt 34 in support of their assertion, but the core of
their argument rested heavily on the logic and dialectic (kalam)
of Greek philosophy.
The rationalism of the Mu'tazilites and their theo-philosophical position, particularly their dogma that the Koran was created in
time, were enthusiastically adopted and popularized by the Abbasid
chaliph al-Ma'mun.

The doctrine of the non-eternity of the Koran

17

was decreed by him as an article of faith in 833 and leading
theologians w~re forced to subscribe to it.
inquisition followed.
in intolerance.

A period of fanatical

The movement that began in liberalism ended

However, it was the adoption of the Mu'tazilite

creed by al-Ma 1 mun and his brother and successor al-Mu 1 tasim that

•

encouraged the translation and study of Greek science and philosophy.
The Mu'tazilites• influence and power began to wane during the rule
of al-Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.), who reversed the policy of his
predecessors and upheld the theological position of Orthodox Islam.
Though the set-back of the Mu'tazllites ultimately led to their
final defeat, the movement succeeded in laving its rationalistic
imprint on Islamic theology.

2. The Treatise on First Philosophy
a. Al-Kindi's Life and Work
35 where his
Al-Kindl was born around 801 A.O. in al-Kufah,
father, Ishaq lbn al-Sabbah, was governor under Hirun al-Rashtd.
•
•
•
His family belonged to, and provided leadership for, the influential
Arabian tribe Klndah.

Al•Aw'ath lbn Qais, one of al-Klndl's

ancestors, along with a delegation from his tribe, had adopted
Islam and pledged allegiance in person to the prophet Muhammad. 36
During the caliphate of 'Omar, the tribe of Kindah moved from
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,Arabia and resettled in the newly founded city of al-Kufah ln
southern Iraq.
In the source material that ls at our disposal at the present,
there is little information about al-Kindl's boyhood and early
upbrining.

Orphaned when he was still a child, he was reared in

the intellectual atmosphere of al-Kufah.

As is commonly known, al~

Kufah and its rival city al-Basrah were the great centers of Islamic

•

learning and culture.

It ls quite possible that al-Kindl acquired

part of his formal education in al-Basrah. 37 The curriculum at the

•

time consisted chiefly of memorization of the Koran and mastery of
Arabic grammar and literature.

Soon al-Kindl began to devote him-

self to the study of Islamic law (fiqh) and the new discipline of
dialectical theology (kallm).

His maturing years, however, brough

about a passionate interest in the natural sciences, medicine and
philosophy.
In order to pursue these fields of learning, al-Kindl went
to Baghdad, where Greek and Persian studies were beginning to
attract brilliant minds and where the atmosphere of religious and
intellectual freedom stimulated scientific inquiry and research.
We do not know the teachers under whom al - Kindl studied.

There

ls no evidence that he acquired a knowledge of the Greek language,
but it ls very likely that he became proficient in Syriac .

T. J.
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de Boer's statement that in Baghdad, al-Kindl "came to put a
higher value upon Persian civilization and Greek wisdom than upon
old Arab virtue and the Muslim faith"

38

may be true of his early

years ln the Abbasid capital.

Al-Kindi's philosophic interest and outstanding scholarship
brought him to the attention of al-Ma'mOn, the great patron of culture
and learning.

Al-Kindl was attached to the ruler's court and con-

tributed no little to the activity of translating Greek works into
Arable and probably in a supervisory capacity.

This important work

of translation was done from original sources and, when these were
lacking, then from Syriac versions.

Al-Kindl also engaged in

revising existing Arable translations such as the Ermeads of Plotlnus.
Al - QlftI, an early biographer, reports that "many philosophical books

•

were translated by al-Kindl who clarified their difficulties and

summarized their theories. 039
Al-Kindl was highly esteemed by al-Ma'mun, his brother and
successor al-Mu'tasim and the latter's son Al;unad, whose tutor he
became.

40

•

"Al-Kindl and his writings," Ibn Nabatah wrote, "embellished

the empire of al-Mu'taslm." 41

•

Al-Kindl became to be known as "The

Philosopher of the Arabs" (fay:lasuf al-'Arab).

He continued to

provide scholarly leadership during the rule of al-Mutawakkil.

How-

ever, it was during the reign of this caliph that misfortune befell
al-Kindl.

The philosopher's prominent position ln the court, we
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are told by Ibn abl Usalbl'ah,

42.

•

aroused the envy of the sons of

Musa lbn fil}akir, Mu~ammad and Ahmad, whose conspiracy against him
brought the displeasure of the caliph upon him.

Al-Kindi was

punished and his huge library was confiscated and transported to
al-Basrah where it was stacked and designated "the Kindian Library."

•

Not very long afterwards, however, the conspiracy was discovered
and al-Kindi's books were returned to him.

In connection with this

incident, the fact must be borne in mind that under al•Mutawakkil,
as lt was mentioned earlier, Orthodoxy in Islam regained the upper
hand and, consequently, al-Kindl, with his Mu'tazilite leanings,
was no longer welcomed at the court as he had been under the
liberal caliphs al-~..a•miin and al-Mu'tasim •

•

The works credited to al-Kindl by the earliest biographer,
lbn al-Nadim, 43 indicate that he was an encyclopedic writer with
rare competence in numerous fields of knowledge.

The 268 titles

of essays listed by Ibn al-NadTm cover a wide range of subjects
such as logic, philosophy, music, psychology, physics, mathematics,
ethics, politics and astronomy.
scholarly output was lost.

Unfortunately, most of this

A few of his scientific works were

translated into Latin and had some influence on medieval European
thought.

Girolamo Cardanus, the medieval historian, considered

al-Kindl one of the twelve greatest minds in the history of human
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thought. 44
The recognition of al-Kindl as an original and profound
thinker has gained increasing support since the discovery of a
collection of his essays by Hellmut Ritter in Istanbul libraries.
The philosophic treatises in this collection wer e edited and
published in two volumes (1950, 1953) by Professor Mu~ammad Abu
Rtdah (Cairo) under the heading Rasa'il al-Kin dl al-falsafiyyah
(Al-Kindl ' s Philosophic Essays)• 45

Al - Kindl ' s works vary in their length and they are often
addressed to the reigning caliph or to some close fr i end.

At times,

the intr oduct ion and the conclusion disclose that the treatise was
written in reply to some inquiry directed to him .

Al - Kindl re~

peatedly states in his essays that he writes concisely and with
due awareness and consideration of the degree of intellectual
maturity of his reader .
There ls no ev idence that al-Kindl was actively engaged in
teaching, except as the private tutor of al-Mu'tasim ' s son Ahmad.

•

•

No doubt, he participated ln the discussions and debates that took
place in the presence of the caliph.

A contemporary of al- Kindl, the

Mu•tazllite al-Ja~l~, a well-kno-wn humorist, mentions in h i s ~ ·~
(t.0~ Mts·e.r$ (Kltab al- Bu!!!_ala ' ) that al-Kindl" was notorious for his

thrlftiness. 46

As Abu Rldah has pointed out, the context in which

this reference occurs is not explicit as to whether al-Kindi, the
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philosopher, ls actually meant. 47

In the first part of his article,

"Al-Kindl als Llterat," Or. Franz Rosenthal addresses himself to this
non-complimentary trait of al-Kindi's personality, which came down in
the oral tradition and was recorded by several writers, and questions
the authentic reliability of this characterization. 48

At any rate, the

impression the reader gets from al-Kindl's writings seems to be expressive of the author's generous nature and his readiness to share
especially the fruits of his mind.
fl

daf' al-ahzan"
•

In his ethical treatise "Al-hilah

•

(The Cure and Prevention of Sorrows), al-Kindl

specifically urges men not to be enslaved by their material needs and
possessions and declares that happiness ls dependent more on the
acquisition of intellectual rather than material riches. 49
It ls most likely that in the pursuit of his intellectual
endeavors, a.1 -Kindi lived aloof from soehty.

Around his comfortable

house ln suburban Baghdad, he had a garden in which he reared a variety
of strange and rare animals.

Al-Qiftl relates that al-Kindl resided

•

in the vicinity of a wealthy merchant who did not know that al-Kindl
was a great physician.

The merchant's son was afflicted by some

serious malady which no physician could cure.

Informed by someone

that the prominent philosopher, who lived in his neighborhood, was
also a capable physician, the merchant took his son to al-Kindl who

cured him through musical therapy. 50

According to alQifti also, 51

•

al-Kindl tried in vain to heal himself from some illness from
which he died probably at the age of seventy-two (c. 873 A. O.).
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A "Millenium of Baghdad and al-Kindl" was celebrated in the Iraqian

capital in December 1962 at which a number of papers covering various
aspects of this first Muslim philosopher's thought were read. 52

b. Philosophy, Truth and Religion
Al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" is the longest of
his extant works.

It was addressed to the Abbasid caliph al-

Mu'tasim who succeeded al-Ma'mun in 833 A.O. and ruled in Baghdad

•

until 842 A.O.

The complimentary words directed to the caliph at

the opening of the Treatise express a mood which is indicative of
the close relationship which al-Kindl had to his patron and the
high esteem which was accorded him at the court.

This is also

substantiated by the fact that "the Bhilosopher of the Arabs 0 was
granted the privilege to be the tutor of al-Mu'tasim•s son Ahmad •

•
Al-Kindl enjoyed an honorable status at the palace also during the
reign of al-Ma'mun who entrusted him with a role of leadership in
the task of introducing Greek philosophy and science to the Islamic
world.
At the very end of the "Treatise on First Philosophy," al•
Kindl points out that it was his intention to ttcontinue our discussion
with what would naturally follow."

53

The editorial note with which

the work closes states that Part I has been completed (tamma al-

24

juz• al-awwal).

It ls a matter of speculation whether the continua-

tion of this philosophic work was completed and lost or whether the
projected plans, for some personal or political reason, never
54
materialized.
Whatever the case may have been, the present work,
fortunately, constitutes an integrated whole and it• significance
as most probably the first philosophic essay in medieval Islam ls
invaluable.
The first chapter of the Treatise deals with the nature of
philosophy and its relation to truth and religion.

Philosophy,

as the highest and noblest of man's arts (fina•at), ls defined as

-

.

the knowledge of the nature of things ('lm al-ashia' bihaqa'iqlha)
as far as this ls possible to man .

55

seeks to know the truth about things.

In other words, philosophy
To the question "How can

we be sure that the truth we seek does exist?" al-Kindl replies&
Simply by sheer necessity does the truth exist, for if the truth
ls identical with the nature of things, and inasmuch as we know
by empirical experience that things exist, lt follows that these
things must have a real nature which is the object of our philosophic quest.

56

The knowledge acquired by philosophy, al-Kindl emphasizes,
is not an end in itself.

It is for this reason that he hastens to

link knowledge of the truth with ethics.

In his theoretical know-

ledge ('lm), the philosopher's objective ls to attain the truth
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(isabat al-haqq).

•

•

In his practical knowledge (•amal), he seeks

to live in accordance with the truth (al-'amal bl'l-haqq). 57 This

•

stress on the practical implications of philosophy, which al-Kindl
places at the outset of his discourse, ls highly significant.
Aristotle had considered theoretical contemplation (theorla) as
the highest and noblest activity of man. 58 Apparently, al-Kindl ls
not in agreement with this exaltation of •theoria' as an end in
itself.

In a senso, he anticipates Kant in stressing the primacy

of "practical reason" as we shall have occasion to elaborate later
on.
Then al-Kindl proceeds by underscoring the Greek ontological
keynote that the search for the truth ls inseparable from the search

for causes. 59 This prepares the way for his definition of First
Philosophy as the knowledge of the Primary Truth which l's the cause
of all knowledge and of all truths . 60

Knowledge of the Primary

Truth (al-I;aqq al-awwal) is identical with knowledge of the First
Cause ('lm alJillah al-ula). 61 The perfect philosopher ls he who
devotes himself to the attainment of this supreme goal.

This

ultimate Truth, which First Philosophy or Metaphysics seeks to reach,
is the cause of the existence and maintenance of all things.
Al-Kindl concludes this ontological prelude with a reference
to the four Aristotelian causes, the material, formal, efficient
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and flnal. 62 This is followed by a brief discussion of "the four
scientific inqulrles"(al-matalib al-'ilmiyyah): "Whether" inquires

•

about the existence or non-existence of a thing.
to find the genus of an existent •

'1 What" attempts

.,Which" seeks to identify its

species, and "why'' searches for its final cause or purpose. 63
In our effort to know the truth, al-Kindl reminds us, we must
keep in mind that truth ls universal ln character.
all barriers.

It transcends

Ther e can be no monopoly on the truth.

Men often

violate and crucify the truth by the narrowness of their minds.

We

should never hesitate to assimilate the truth regardless of the
source from which it may come to us. 64
that we do so.

Sheer necessity demands

For during the brief span of life, a person's

acquisition of the truth can only be fragmentary.
in their search for the truth.

Men must cooperate

'lbey must gratefully remember that

the bequest of truth they inherited has been the result of serious
search and tireless research of many generations.

Indeed, we are

duty-bound to acknowledge our debt to those who have contributed,
in whatever small way, to the fund of knowledge, to say nothing of our debt to
those who have done so in a large measure.

Those who have shared

with us the harvest of their minds have thereby facilitated our
investigation and attainment of the truth.

They have become our

intellectual in-laws (ansab) and partners (!!!,uraka') in knowledge. 65
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Al-Kindl is quite severe in his criticism of the men of
religion who reject all philosophical pursuits, the knowledge of
things as they are, and who jump to the conclusion that all philosophical preoccupation ls nothing 1:iut heresy (kufr) . 66 Al-Kindl •s
obvious liberal i sm leads hi m to use very strong language in his
attack against the Orthodox traditionalists with their fanatic
fundamentalism .

He describes them as perverters of the truth and

traders of religion and enemies of all that is refined and noble. 67
Al-Kindi ' s universalistic attitude toward the truth gui ded
him in his methodology .

His method of research seeks first to

review in a comprehensive manner what has been said about the subject
under investigation .

After that he proceeds to complete and discuss

what had not been elaborated by others . Hti pledges his reader the
necessary sensitivity and regard to the prevalent usages of the
Arabic language and t he literary style of the times . 68
Before this introductory chapter ls concluded, al-Kindl underscores the importance of philosophical knowledge as a vital instrument
for attaining religious truth.

In fact, he considers theology ( i iUm

al-rububiyyah), knowledge of Divine Unity ('lm al-wa~daniyyah) and
ethics ('lm al-fadt lah) as falling within the scope of philosophy •

•
He goes on to assert, however, that the knowledge concerning the

Divinity and Unity of God, which ls attained by the philosopher is

69
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not different from that revealed directly by God to His prophets.
'
But this r.evelat:
i on to the few does not In any

70

way null lfy or

minimize the Importance of the philosophical channel for the
realization of Divine Truth.

The philosophical method, al-Kindl

insists, ls a precious possession (qunyah naf!sah) which it ls our
duty (wajlb) to use and not to lose. 71

Even those who are opposed

to philosophy will find themselves compelled by logical necessity
to avail themselves of its services.

For their objections to it

are invalid unless they are supported by demonstrative proof which
ls itself a part of the philosophic knowledge they reject . 72
It has become evident in the course of this first chapter that
al-Kindl wrote his First Philosophy with the purpose of substantiating
and defending both the reality and Divinity of God against two
particular enemies .

Re was engaged in a battle on two fronts.

On

the one hand, as alluded to above, al-Klndl's attack was directed
to the Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-sunnah) who vigorously opposed
the infiltration of philosophy into Islam and the use of the logical
method in matters of faith.

their fanatical adherence to the doctrine

of predestination made them intolerant, in a very aggressive manner,
of the Mu'tazillte stress on freedom and responsibility.

Their

fundamentalistic understanding of the Koran, the Mu'tazilltes believed,
was a perversion of religion and a distortion of the reality of God.
The Orthodox doctrine of reward and punishment and the denial of man's
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freedom of choice and responsibility was an encroachment on God's
Justice.

Al-Kindl was determined to defend the freedom of man,

particularly the freedom to use his mind in matters of religion.
He attempted in his First Philosophy to show the Orthodox traditionalists the futility of their literalism and the validity of philosophical
knowledge as a path to religious truth.
On the other hand, al-Kindl was equally concerned about the

danger to which his Islamic faith was subjected by the assaults of the
unbelievers ; (al-kafirun) and the threat to the Divine Unity cfeated
by the dualism of the Manichaeans and the trinitarian doctrine of the
Christians.

To the unbelievers he wanted to prove, t by means of the

same dialectic they themselves used, the existence and reality of God.
With respect to the Manichaeans and Christians, it was al-Kindi's
intention in this metaphysical essay to vindicate the truth of the
basic Mu'tazilite doctrine of Divine Unity.

These concerns find

expression in the very last section of this first chapter of First
Philosophy where al-Kindl appeals to divine support and asks God
"to prove His lordship and elucidate His Unity'' and grant him the
guidance that he may "refute by logical arguments (bujtJ) the stub-

•

born· unbelievers$ whose godlessness and shamefulness we seek to
dispel, and the defects and ill-effects of their religious beliefs
we attempt to reveat.•• 73
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c. Theory of Knowledge
Before starting his metaphysical inquiry, al-Kindl lays down
the necessary epistemolog ical foundations.

The first half of the

second chapter is devoted to this matter.

The theory of knowledge

delineated in this~~nt~ deals primarily with the channels and
nature of cognition.
Man

acquires knowledge through two avenues: his sense organs

and his mind.

Corresponding to these two channels are the two modes

of cognition (wujud)t perception (wujud ~lssiY'tind conception (wujud
•aqll) 75

Our sense perception is a function of our physical nature.

It is direct and Immediate.

The world we come to know through the

senses ls the temporary world of phenomena which ls constantly in
flux.

Knowledge gained by the senses, al - Kindl points out, ls far

removed from the true nature of things because it ls a knowledge of
the appearance

only.

and necessary function .

Nevertheless, sense perception performs a vital
It supplies us with a consi derable part of

the raw material which our mind organizes and utilizes, ln the form
of images, for its specific task.

For al-Kindl, the world of phenomena

does not reveal the nature of things but, unlike Plato, he consi ders
lt a real world.
We have been equipped to know not only through our senses but
also through our minds.

The objects of our conceptual cognition are
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76
universal realities and rational principles. Knowledge obtained
by the mind is nearer to the true nature of things than knowledge
gained by the senses.

What we perceive through the senses are particular

things (al-a!!!ia' al-juz'iyyah) which are material.

- ·

individual (ashkhas)beings and things of the spe cies.

These are the
What we

conceive by our minds are the universals (al-kulliyynt) such as the
genera (ajnas) and the species (anwa•). 77
Al-Kindl argues quite strongly and convincingly against extreme
empiricism which contends that all knowledge is acquired through the
senses.

He would agree with Kant that all knowledge begins with

sense perception, but not with Locke that all knowledge comes from
empirical experience.

There are realities which we know directly

through our minds , such as the fact that the states of being (huwa)
and non-being (li huwa) cannot be attributed to an object simultaneous1Y• 80

At one point, al - Kindl turns to outer space to illus trate

his ~rguMent and makes the statement that outside the All (jism alkull) there ls nothing at all neither a void (!!!,ala') nor occupied

•

space (mala').

81

The truth or falsity of this proposition cannot

be verified by empirical observation.
this problem.

Only our mind can deal with

We conceive the truth of this assertion logically and

ln the following manner:

If space, whether empty or occupied, 1~ere

to exist outside the All, which is the totality of being, then what
we conceive to be the All could not possibly be the All at all, for
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the All must contain all existence.

Al-Kindl goes on to advance

two logical arguments ln support of his premise .

He demonstrates

first that space and lts content are inseparable entities.

Secondly,

he shows t hat infinity cannot be an actuality because then it would
be limited and ceases to be infinity.

Therefore, he concludes,

beyond the All there ls nothing at all.

This ls a logical necessity

and can be conceived only by the mind. 82
Al-Kindl discusses the nature of cognition very briefly in the
present context.

Of the mutable world of phenomena which is perceived

by the senses only images are retained by the imagination (al-mu~awwirah)
which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (hiff)for eventual use

•

by the mlnd. 83

'While sensory objects require the medium (mutawassit)

•

of images .ln:·order to be apprehended, conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the instrumentality of images because it is represented by concepts which are grasped directly by the mind.

'lhe

concepts have no material existence although the presence of material
objects may help us in their acquisition.

But this does not mean,

al-Kindl hastens to add, that the concepts or the universals are
abstracted from material phenomena because they never align themselves
with the materia1 . 8 4
The attainment of knowledge through perception and conception,
through the senses and the mind, al-Kindl emphasizes, renders our
knowledge of the truth easy in certain respects and difficult in

33

others - easy when we know that these two channels of cognition
are applicable to two corresponding orders of reality, difficult
when we ignore thls distinction and try to use the one channel
or the other for the acquisition of all knowledge.

He who seeks

to know the universals through empirical experience, al-Kindl
warns , will be disappointed for his efforts will be in vain.

His

predicament would be similar to that of a bat in daylight unable
to see what ls perfectly visible to us. 85
Al -Kindl would be critical of the attempts of certain
disciplines today which try to be scientific by imitating physical
science in its empirical method.

It ls because of the confusion

of methods of investigation, says al-Kindl, that many thinkers ln
his day were puzzled whenever they directed their inquiries to
metaphysical fields of knowledge and tried to apply the scientific
method in this higher order of reality.

We should not use, for

instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism ln theology, discursive reasoning in physics or demonstrative proof in rhetoric. 86
Other aspects of al-Kindi 's epistemology appear in some of
his other works particularly in his ttTreatlse on the Intellect"
(risalah fl al-'aql)

and the "Treatise on the Nature of Sleep and

Dreams" (risalah fl mahiyyat al -nawm wa-al -ru'ya) •87

The imagination

(al-musawwlrah) has a vital role in his theory of knowledge.

•

faculty works continuously.

This

During the waking hours, its energies
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are divided between the senses and the mind rendering its services
to both perception and conception.

During sleep, when perception

ceases, it serves the mind exclusively.

Dreaming is a form of

88
thinking. The highest receiving station in al - Kindi's epistemology,

however, is intuition which he designates as inspiration (ilham)
and revelation (wahi). 89

•

d. From Cosmology to Ontology
Al-Kindl defines physics as "the science of that which moves"
('ilm kull mutaharrik) and metaphysics as "the science of that which

•

does not move" ('ilm ma la yataharrak). 90

•

The rest of the second

chapter is devoted to a philosophical analysis of the terms 'Eternal '
(azalt), 'Infinite' (.s!!_ayr mutanahi), '·Time' (zarnan), 'Motion'

(harakah) and 'Change' (tabaddul) •
•
What is the nature of the Eternal?

In the first place, it is

that which is always Being (huwa) and never non-Being (laysa). 91
The Eternal , moreover, is self-sufficient, immutable and has no cause.
It is not made of matter and has no form.
has no genus .

It is not a species and

The Eternal ha s no ontological development because it

is itself absolutely perfect.

It is not a body and, therefore, it

is innnune to corruption and passing away.

These qualities of the

Eternal are established by means of a strictly logical argument which
systematically posits the opposite and shows the contradictions that ensue.
Al-Kindl then goes on to demonstrate that the Infinite can
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never be actual.
actuality.

92

It ls impossible for a body to be infinite in

The truth of this matter ls demonstrated by strictly

mathematical arguments which al-Kindl also advances in some of his
other philosophical essays, particularly ttThe Proof of the Finltitude
of the Universe''

(I~a~

tanahi jlrm al-'alam); 3 °Fi ma'iyyat

ma

li

yumkin an yakun la nihayah lahu wama alladhi yuqalu • la nihayah lahu"'
(On the Nature of that wh ich cannot possibly be Infinite, and that

which is called Inflnlte), 94 and "Fl wa~dlniyyat Allah wa-tanahi jirm
al-'alam" (On the Oneness of God and the finitude of the Unlverse). 95
Having established the basic f~ct that anything that ls
quantitative is necessarily finite, al-Kindl proceeds now to prove
that Time and Motion are quantitative entitles and, therefore, finite.
This is followed by a penetrating analysis of the nature and interdependence of Time and Motton and their rel ation to Change.

The

arguments presented are reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of
these categories ln his Physics .

The famous Aritotelian definition

of Time as "the number of motlon" 96 ls stated and the various forms
of Motion such as the locomotive, qualitative (transformation - istihalah) and quantitative (increase and decrease - rubuw, idmihlal)
•
• •
are described.

A more elaborate analysis of these matters is found

in al - Kindl 1 s essay "Ibanah 'an al-'illah al-fa'ilah 11•'1-kaun
wa-' 1-fasad'' (EKposition of the Active Cause of coming into being
and passing away). 97
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After showing that Change is nothing but a form of Motion,
and that Ttme and Motion are ontologically inseparable from •magnitudes' or 'bodies', al-Kindl goes on to refute the belief that the
universe was first at rest before it was set in motion.

If this

belief were true impossible contradictions would be the result.
These contradictions would follow regardless whether the universe

were assumed to have been eternal or whether it was brought about
out of nothing.

If an eternal universe were first at rest and then

moved, it would imply that something eternal underwent a change. But
that which is eternal ls immutable, as it was demonstrated earlier.
We know that the universe ls in motion and an eternal universe must
have been eternally ln motion.

If we assume, on the other hand, that

the universe came into being out of nothing, then the very process
of its generation must have involved movement, for generation ls a
form of motion.

'lhe existence of the universe, in this case, could

not have preceded its process of generation, but must itself be
identical with that process.

This means that the universe could

not have possibly existed without being in motion. 98 The conclusion
that ls reached from this discussion ls that the universe, motion and
time never preceded each other in existence.

They are co-existents.

Al-Kindl has so far set the logical stage for a final act that
must be performed before he can move into the heart of his metaphysics.
Through a winding but consistent series of proofs, he attempts to
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demonstrate the fact that the world, the cosmos, cannot be etemal
and Infinite.

The existence (inniyyah) of the universe is, of

necessity, finite and must have had a beginning.

99

In this, of

course, al-Kindl is diametrically opposed to Aristotle with his
doctrine of the eternity of the world.

He undertakes to prove this

by more than one way, he says, in order to assist those who speculate
ln this field to acquire added skill ln their effort to penetrate
the frontiers of this field of knowledge.
The crux of the philosophical argument for the non-eternity
and flnitude of the universe revolves around the refutation of the
theory that time can be infinite in actuality.

Al - Kindl attempts to

show that Time is finite in both of its dimensions, the past and
the futur.

Time ls a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah) •

•

This means it has a part, that ls, the present (al-an) which is
common to both past and future.

The present marks the end of the

past and the beginning of the future.

The present renders both the

past and the future as finite because it defines the end of the one
and the beginning of the other.

The addition of two definite periods

of time does not and cannot result in infinite time.

By implication,

the duration of corporeal bodies cannot be infinite.

From this follows

that a body, whether it is a single object or the body of the All
(jism al-kull), the universe, cannot be eternal.JOO
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e. Existence, ltssence and Causality
As a Muslim advocating the Mu•tazilite theo-philosophical
position which stressed the Justice and Unity of God and the doctrine
of human freedom and responsibility, al-Kindl is basically concerned
in his Treatise on First Philosophy with the problem of proving
philosophically both the Existence and Oneness of
the nature of Divine Oneness .

God and expounding

The discussion so far was only a pre-.

paratlon for dealing effectively with this objective.

He had earlier

established the inevitable necessity of philosophi c Itn-owl'.:e,¢ge as a tool
for attaining Divine Truth but without minimizing the epistemological
importance of intuition and revelation in this matter .

Man has the

freedom to use his reason in the search for truth in general, and
religious truth is no exception.

The fact that the Muslim creed

stipulates that God had revealed Himself earlier to other nations
gave all knowledge and truth a universalistic quality.

This meant a

divine sanction of their assimilation by the Muslim regardless of the
source from which they may come.

Moreover, al-Kindl's logical arguments

in the previous chapter have led to the conclusion that the universe
ls not eternal and infinite.
fore, a cause .

It must have had a beginning and, there-

B\Jt before he can search for that cau~e, he must first

prove that it cannot have possibly been the cause of itself .
his innnediate task at the opening of the third chapter .
be the cause (·'t- llah) of its own generation?

'l'his ls

can a thing
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Al-Kindl proceeds to answer this question by making a hypothetical distinction between existence and essence and describing
the possible condlt~Qns ~that would result if we had the one (existence
or essence) with or without the other.

'!lhis is done in order to

determine whether or not there can be a causal relationship between
the existence and essence of one single object. 101
Of course, the question of causality does not arise if a thing
had neither existence nor essence, for it would be simply non~existent,
and it goes without saying that the cause-effect ('illah wa-ma'lul)
applies only to existing things.

Al-Kindl disposes quickly with other

hypothetical situations which would not involve the problem of causality.
'llhls is the case when a thing ls assumed of having existence without
essence or essence without existence.

This assumption ls absurd because

such a thing cannot possibly exist unless it has both existence and
essence.

The maxim is posited at this point that the existence and

essence of a thing are identical.
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The field of causal relationship ls

thus narrowed down to things that have both existence and essence.
a thing that exists and has essence be the cause of itself?

Can

If this

were possible then it would mean that a thing can generate its own

essence.

In other words, a thing would be the cause and its essence

the effect.

But this would be a contradiction of the logical necessity

that the effect is invariably other than the cause.

Therefore the

conclusion must be drawn that if a thing ls identical with the cause
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and its essence is identical with the effect, then the essence can
no longer be the thing itself .

To state the matter differently, if

a thing were the cause of its own essence,~hen -lt follows that that
thing and its essence are two different things.

~ut we know by

empirical experience that a thing and lts essence are the same thing.
Therefore, it has been demonstrated, that a thing cannot be the cause
of itself .

It cannot bring itself into being.

It must have a cause

outside itself . 103

There ls still one matt r to be ascertained before al - Kindl
can turn to the ma i n topic of his metaphysics, the One and the Many,
and can inquire int o the nature of the Pr i mary Cause of all that exists .
This pertains to an analysis of substance (jawhar) and its relation to
the problem of meaning (ma •na) .
has mean l qg .

Philosophy seeks to know that which

Meaningfu l words are either general , universal (kulli)

or particular (juz • i).

Being the knowledge of the true nature of things,

philosophy ls not so much concerned with the particular, which cannot
be fully known , but rather inquires into the universal which ls whole
and not fragmentary and whose real nature ls accessible to knowledge .
Again, the universal , the general , is either essential (dhatl) or

non- essential (ghalr dhatl)

That which ls essential in a thing, like

life in all living beings, ls also called substantial, and the substance
makes the very existence (qiwam) of a thing possible . 104
Moreover, it is the integrative substance (al-jawhar al•j!mi')
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that unifies things and makes them wholes and thereby gives them
their forms and genera.

The differentiatlve substance (al-jawhar

al-mufarriq), on the other hand, accounts for the unique features
in beings and things such as the rational (al-natiq) among living

•

beings.

It ls called differentia (fasl) because it differentiates

•

things and sets them apart from each other. 105
Metaphysics deals with that which ls universal and substantial
and not with that which ls particular and non-essential or accidental

('ara11).

The existence of the accidental such as property (~aiiah),

like the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey, is contingent
on the substance which it predicates (mawdu' lahu) and on which its

•

existence and continuance (E,habat) depends. W6

f . Unity, Plurality and First Cause
Although essentially a religious book, the Koran deals with
metaphysical and existential problems that are commonly shared by
both religion and philosophy.

Its teachings encompass basic theo-

logical and philosophical areas such as the nature of Ultimate
Reality, the world and its relation to

God, the origin and destiny

of man, the problem of predestination and free will, the ethical
and ontological conflict of good and evil, truth and error, appearance
and reality, change and permanence, space and time and the certainty
of knowledge.
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The Koran, needless to say, ls not always clear about these
matters.

It is often possible to derive deductively contradictory

views on these issues as it was shown above, , for •instance, concerning
the problem of predestination and free will.

Practical difficulties

relative the "!!!_llafah" (succession) and the nature and scope of "alummah'' (Islamic community) raised quite early in Islam theological
questions which pressed for answers.

It was only natural that differences

of opinion with respect to doctrinal interpretation of Koranic teachings
should arise and, consequently, various schools of thought should
develop.
The fact must be stressed that Arable philosophy had its own
original problems because it ls not, as ls commonly asserted, merely
a repetition and reworking of Greek ideas.
of originality and spontaneity.

There is in it an element

Prior to its encounter with Greek

thought, philosophical inquiry in Islam revolved around the problem
of causality.

In this, the focus of attention was directed to the

question of creation with the primary emphasis placed on the relation
of

God to the world .

This is one of the basic issues which was

raised early in Islamic thought.

The Koranic concept of the

0

Preserved

Tablet" (al-lawh al-mahfuz), for example, implled the eternity of

•

the sacred Book.

•

•

If this were true, then it would mean that something

other than God co-existed with Him from eternity.

Moreover, the

creation of objects in time by an eternal, unchangeable Will seemed
to be a contradiction ·.t o: the intellectual Muslim, for this was inter-
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prated by him as indicative of a change in the Divine Will .

No

wonder, the oldest Mu~~azilites tried to solve this problem by

-

.

conceiving of the Koranic terms •khalaqa , " '1 bara" and "sana 'a" (to
create, generate, make) in such a way

· as , not to refer to creation

but rather to causality - First Cause - not in time but in essence. 107
Another philosophic problem that arose quite early in Islam was
related to the Divine attributes (siflt) of which the Koran speaks

•

which tended to suggest a plurality.

How to reconcile this plurality

with God's absolute unity presented intellectual difficulties which
demanded solutions.
'Dhe influx into Islam of many converts from older religious
traditions, chiefly Judaie, Christian and Persian, served to sharpen
the focus on these theological and philosophical problems and to
intensify the urgency for resolving them.

For these converts were

formerly adherents of religions that had dealt with these same issues
in a systematic fashion, and not a few of them brought along, as a
part of their intellectual cargo, the very epistemological and
metaphysical ways of thinking which Islam itself desperately needed.
Among these converts were those who had absorbed hellenistic learning
and were experienced in applying the philosophical method to religious
inquiry.

They now set out to use their Greek philosophical knowledge

for the vindication of their new Islamic faith.
How can plurality, which we encounter in the world , proceed
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from God without the implication that plurality is also present
in the Divine essence?

It is to this difficult question that

al-Kindl addresses himself in his metaphysics.

He attempts to

demonstrate the fact that plurality in the creation does not affect
the Oneness of the Divine essence.

Indeed, he goes much further.

He seeks to prove that without the existence of the True One (alwa~ld al-~aqq), the Creator who is the absolute One, there can be
no plurality in the world at all.

He tries to show that the endless

multipli~ity of beings and things cannot be explained unless there
ls a Cause which is essentially One.
Al-Kindl ushers the period in Islamic philosophy during which
Greek philosophy was believed to provide the solution to the fundamental
problem of harmonizing faith and reason.

It was he who was the first

to introduce into Islamic thought the Neo-Platonlc concept of emanation
(fayd)

•
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as a middle way in his effort to reconcile the Koranic

teaching about creation out of nothing and the Aristotelian doctrine
of an eternal world.
Al - Kindl begins this maj or part of his First Philosophy which
deals with the relationship of the One and the Many with an investigation of the general characteristics of Unity or Oneness.

Unity

is, first of all, continuity which ls found in diverse things.
individual being or thing may be described as "one."

Any

This applies

to both natural and man-made objects such as a tree and a house.
The tree ls "one", a unity, by natural continuity.

The structure

of a house has "one•• form by means of accidental continuity brought
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about by craftsmanship.
cation of its parts.

The house became ''one" through the unifi-

But unity is not only descriptive of the house

as a whole but also of the individual parts of it, for each part
constitutes "one" part.

This ls true regardless whether the whole

has similar parts, as in the case of a body of water, or whether it
has dissimilar parts, as lt ls true of the body of a living belng . 109
The unity that exists in all individual things, however, is
not an absolute unity because individual things are divisible .
means that it i s a unity by c ircumstantial necessity.

This

In other words ,

the unity which we find in all pr edicables ls not essential but
accidental .

And whatever is acc i dental in a t hing is an effect upon

it which is the result of a cause other than the thing itself . 110
Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in one object must exist
essentially in another which is necessarily the cause of its accidental
existence.

It follows that the unity that is present in the predicables

accidentally must have its cause in another source in which unity exists
essentially .

This line of thinking leads al - Kindl to postulate the

existence of the True One (al - wa9id al - 1:;aqq) in which unity exists
essentially because it is not derived from anything else . 111

Al-Kindi's next move ls to examine the predicables and all
that is related to them and demonstrates at great length that they
all partake of both unity and plurality .

Systematically, he sets

forth all the contradictions which would result if only unity or
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plurality were to exist in them.

If the predicables partook of

plurality to the exclusion of unity, then there could be, for instance,
no contrariety or similarity and there cannot be one thing connnon to
all of them.
motion.

They would have to be simultaneously at rest and in

But by empirical experience we know that contrariety and

similarity are f•cts, that the predicables have one thing ln common
and they are in motion.

Nine such contradictions are advanced as

proofs for the fact that the predicables cannot partake solely of
plurality.
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In a similar detailed argument, al-Kindl also proves that the
predicables and all that is related to them cannot partake of unity
without plurality.

Another set of nine contradictions would ensue. 113

If they partook of unity only, they would have no differences and no
shapes and there can be neither movement nor rest.

But things do have

differences and shapes and are in motion.
On

the basis of these two series of proofs, al-Kindl concludes

that both unity and plurality are present in the predicables.

It ls

in the very nature of things to be •one' and •many', to be wholes and
have parts, to partake of unity and plurality.
cannot exist separately.

Unity and plurality

Their existence is interdependent.
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This

interdependence, moreover, cannot be attributed to chance (ba~t) and
coincidence (ittifaq) because this would imply that unity and plurality
must have existed separately, and this has already been proven to be

lm.
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possible.

The interdependence of unity and plurality, therefore,

must have a cause.

It cannot be self-caused because this would lead

to an infinite chain of causes and it has been shown that nothing
can be infinite in actuality.

'Dhe interdependent co-existence of

unity and plurality in the predicables must, consequently, be attributed
to an external cause, a cause that ls transcendent and ontologically
prior to both unity and plurality.
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This ls the First Cause which

ls nobler and more ancient than all things.
itself be either a unity or a plurality.

This First Cause must

If lt were a plurality, it

would also comprise unity, inasmuch as plurality consists of unities.
This would mean that the First Cause ls both unity and plurality.

This

possibility must be ruled out because it would be identical to saying
that a thllng ls the cause of itself and lt was demonstrated that this
ls impossible.
plurality.

Unity and plurality camot be the cause of unity and

Hence, the only possibility that remains ls that the First

Cause is mere Unity, One only (wahid faqat).
•
•

It ls vold of plurality. 116

g. The Nature of Divine Unity
Having established the existence of God ln terms of a First
Cause that ls mere Oneness and pure Unity, al-Kindl devotes now the
final part of his metaphysics to elucidate the nature of Divine Unity.
In the light of what has been said so far, the Divine Oneness or Unity
must be very much unlike the unity that exists in the predicables.
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What are its distinctive features?

In what sense is lt the True

One (al-wahld al - haqq)?

•

•

The fourth chapter ls devoted to this metaphysical problem.
Al-Kindl begins the investigat i on with a comparative analysis of the
two terms "the relative" and ''the absolute" (al-qawl bi-al•ldafah

•

wa-al-qawl al-mursal).
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Thereby he seeks to demonstrate the relati-

vity of all descriptive terms and that the only exception to this ls
the term "Onett as it ls applied to the "True One" which alone is used
ln the absolute sense.
or "smalltt as such.
object may be

11

There ls nothing, for instance, that ls

It is so only ln r..el a t1.on to another thing .

0

1arge"
An

larger" than one object and "smallertt than another.

The

same is true of other magnitudes such as "longtt and "short," "many" and
"few. "

They can be used only in a relative sense.
Al-Kindl attempts, not without certain difficulties, to prove

that the magnitude

11 smallness 11

as such cannot exist.

These difficulties

are created by the number "one" as the smallest number.

His only way

out is to subscribe to the view that "one" is not a number and that,
therefore, "two'' is the smallest number.

a·u t the "two" is the smallest

number only in a relative, not in an absolute, sense. 118 This is so
because the quality of smallness characterizes it only the moment lt
ls considered in relation to, or compared with, a larger number.
Before al - Kindl concludes that One is not a number, he advances
numerous arguments for and against the idea that One is not a number.
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If One were a number, then it would have to be a certain quan!.ty,
and anything that is quantitative is divisible.
the Ckle ls not divisible.

But by definition

The One should not be confused with the

matter which it qualifies and on which it bestows oneness .

When we

say •one house,' for instance, it ls the house that is material and
not the •one . •

The house 1s divisible but the •one' is indivisible.

The •one• ls not a composite (murakkab) like the 'two . •
(basTt) , for it ls composed of nothing else.
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It is simple

The One is the

constituent element of number, for numbers are aggregates of •ones•,
but the One itself is not a number .

A number is a magnitude of •ones•

or units (wahdaniyyat), a total sum, a putting together of units •
•
' Two ' is the beginning of number and in relation to other numbers is
the smallest because it ls the sum of two units while the others are
sums of more than two units.
Having demonstrated the fact that Unity, which constitutes the
essence of the True One, is exclusively absolute, al-Kindl takes up
the task now to prove that the True One is neither species nor genus.
Comparisons can be made among things of the same genus .

The True One

cannot be compared with anything else because it has no genus.
which is without genus is eternal, as it was shown before.

That

The True

One, consequently, is eternal.
From this al-Kindl goes on to establish that the True One is
not compounded of form and matter and that it ls not a predicable.
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Because plurality exists in motion, the True One cannot be motion.
Inasmuch as thought in the soul moves from some images to others and
from one passion to another, it follows that that both motion and
plurality exist in the soul.

Therefore, the True One cannot be a

soui. 121 After a brief discussion in which ls shown how the soul
becomes rational ('aqilah), that ls, acquires an intellect ('aql ) by
means of its union (itti id) with the species and genera of things,
that is, their universals, al-Kindl draws the conclusion that the
True One cannot also be intellect simply because the universals which
constitute the content of the intellect are a plurality.
What, then, ls the nature of the True One?
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Negatively, it ls

not substance, genus , species, individual, differentia, property,
accident, motion , time, space, subject, predicate , whole, part , soul
or intellect.

It is void of matter, form, quantity, quality and relation.

Positively, the True One ls the Absolute One (al-waQid al-mursal) and

..

nothing but Pure Oneness (wahdah
mahd) . 123
•

.

-

The True One is the One-

Itself (al-wahid bi-al-dhat) which never partakes of plurality in any
form.124

It ls indivisible in any manner.

Th

True One, moreover,

ls the First Cause (awwal ' illah) of the unity and plurality which is
found ln all individual things. 125

The Unity or Oneness of the Primary

True One (al-wa~id al-~aqq al-awwal) is identical with its own Being.
The True One never partakes of plurality although it is the
source of all plurality, for plurality ls nothing but the aggregate
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of unities (jama•at wahdaniyyat).

•

Without the Unity of the True

One there can be no plurality ln existing things whatsoever.

The

accidental unity and plurality in every existent (rnutahawwi) are
the effect of the First aause, the True One.

Thus the emanation

(fayd) of unity and, wi th it, plurality from the Pria-ry True One
•
ls equivalent to the process of coming into being (tahawwl). 126
An individual thing comes into being when it acquires its unity from

the True One.

It, then, becomes a created thing (mubda').

The Primary

True One, therefore, ls the Cause of creation ('illat al-ibda'). 127
It ls the Active Agent (al-fa'il), the (First) Mover (al-muharrik)

•

which accounts for the beginning of motion.

Consequently, the Primary

True One, which sets the process of generation in motion ls both the
Primary Creator (al-mubdl' al-al-1Wal) and Sustainer {al-mumsik) of all
that exists.

128

The True One created the world ex nihllo.

3. Evaluations and Conclusions
a. Epistemological Realism
By accepting both perception and conception as necessary avenues
of cognition, al-Kindl was advocating an epistemological realism that
enabled him to bridge the gulf between empiricism and rationalism.
He thus reconciles the empiricism of

rlstotle and the rationalism

of Plato, and vefore so doing he reconciled Plato and Plato by uniting
Plato's Idea of the Good and the personality of the mythical demlurge,
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t he world-architect of the Timaeus, into One Creator-God who is
as ideal as the Idea but as personal and active as the demiurge,
and yet a Creator-God who is neither so intellectual nor so mythical
as Plato's concepts are.

Moreover, through his epistemological realism and through his
emphasis on the application of philosophic knowledge, al-Kindl was
able to solve to an appreciable degree the antinomies of faith and
reason, God and the world, the world and man.

This solution was not

a speculative deduction, as metaphysical systems have offered, but
rather . moral and quasi-mystical.

The purpose of theoretical know-

ledge, he says, is to attain the truth.

The purpose of practical

knowledge is to live in accordance with the truth.

He makes the same

distinction between the "acquired intellectt1 (al-'aql al - mustafad)
and the "practical intellect" (al-'aql al -zahir) !29

•

In this emphasis,

al-Kindl can claim affinity to <ant who insisted on the primacy of
''practical reason° rather than "pure reason."

This ethical affinity

arises out of significant epistemological similarities in both alKindi and Kant.
ism.

Both bridged the gap between empiricism and rational-

Both recognized that it ls the mind which imposes on the un-

organized and often chaotic raw material of sensory perception certain
form or order.

In other words, the mind is not a mere passive re-

cipient of impressions but an active instrument that turns the flux
of sense data into meaningful order.

The structure or constitution

of the mind is revealed in the finished product of the cognitive
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process .

Reality, as we know it, is more made than given; it ls

a construct rather than a datum .

All that makes the world coherent

and meaningful comes from what Kant calls "the transcendental understanding" and of what al - Kindl calls "The True One. n
Through his universal conception of truth, al - Kindl was able
to graft Greek philosophy , particularly its Nee- Platonic form, unto
Islamic thought but without doing violence to his religion .

Having

placed intuition at the top of his epistemological hierarchy, he was
able to maintain the primacy of faith .
service of Muhammad .

Aristotle was put in the

Reason was made to bow to religious faith in

al - Kindi ' s metaphysics .

What Julius Guttmann says about Philo that

he "adheres to the Jewish concept of revelation and regards the
Torah as the complete and absolute vehicle of God ' s truth'tl30 is
also true of al- Kindl in his high regard to revelation and the Koran .
Like Philo , he sought to bring together the two forms of truth , namely ,
human knowledge and divine knowledge .

£plstemological similarities

are strikingly conspicuous between al - Kindl and the great Jewish
philosopher, Saadia .

Saadia , who was born about a decade after al-

Klndi ' s death, also thought that "the task of philosophy was merely
to provide rational proof of what was already known through revelation . ul31
Al - Kindi's contribution to Islam resembles that of St . Augustine
to Christianity .

Both strove for a philosophic knowledge of their beliefs.
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Both were able to harmonize philosophy and religion and both gave
religious faith the primacy in that harmony.

Both stressed the

fact that the highest religious truth cannot be attained by reason
and can only be rec eived with the prerequisite illumination and
purification .

Al - Kindi and St. Augustine were both influenced by

Neo-Platonbm ancl each of them replaced the state of ecstasy to which
Pl otinus appealed with religious faith .

Both did not permit their

respective religions to be suffocated by Greek philosophy.

In the

words of Dr . Richard Walzer, ''in al - Kindl we find a balance unique
in early Islam between an 'advanced ' theology, based on reasoned
interpretation of revelation, and a philosophy which aimed at utilizing
the totality of our obviously limited human faculties in the under•
standing of God , the universe and man himself

.••P 2

In his eplstemologiva l emphasis on the primacy of religious
faith and revelation , al - Kindl differed from all later Islamic philosophers .

Al-Farabi (870 - 950 A. O. ) enthroned reason on a pedestal . ,- :.

and gave revelation a secondary place .

He asserted the prima cy of

philosophy over religion and yet never ceased to be a devout Muslim.
"The Second Teacher" (second to Aristotle , as al - Farabl came to be
known),attempted to refor mulate the Islamic religious tradition from
the point of view of philosophy and he did this in a way that was
not offensive to his fellow Muslims .
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"Philosophy is prior to religion

in time," al - Farabi writes ln "The Attainment of Happiness" (tahs!l

••

al-sa'adah) and "religion ls an imitation of philosophyV 3 'tn his
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opinion, philosophy and religion must be united in the function
of the philosopher as supreme ruler and lawgiver.

The ruler...

philosopher must be able to teach all citizens and thus enable them
to achieve the happiness or perfection he is capable of attaining
by nature .
The psychological process of cognition is briefly discussed
by al-Kindi at the end of his "Treatise on First Philosophy" as well
as in his ''Treatise on the Intellect.n 135
phenomena is not simply to copy it .

To know the world of

The soul comes to know the

exterior world because the forms of this world are potentially in
the soul .

The soul knows when it becomes one with the object of

its cognition .
world .

The same is true of cognition of the immaterial

Its concepts are potentially in the soul before they are

known through conception . 136
here is obvious .

The Neo- Platonic influence on al-Kindl

However, he differed from Neo- Platonism in con-

ceivi ng of this "innateness" of the truth in the soul as merely
potential rather than actual as the Neo-Platonists had asserted . 137
In this, one is tempted to say, al - Kindl has some affinity to the
seventeenth century German philosopher Leibniz, who thought that
the soul (as every monad) knows the world because it is the world .
The ideas or representations in the soul, according to Leibniz, are
not always conscious , not always distinct and clear .
they become clear and conscious in the sou1 . 138

Through cognition,
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In his "Treatise on the Intellect" (risalah fi al-1aql)~
which was translated into Latin and played a significant role in
Medieval philosophy, al-Kindl designates four types of intellect.
He accepts

ristotle's distinction between the 'passive• and the

•active• intellect.

The •passive• ls the potential which resembles

matter that becomes all things.

The •active• intellect ls analogous

to the efficient cause which makes all things.

The •active• intellect,

in other words, makes the 'passive• intellect become what it apprehends.
lexander of Aphrodlsias had added to these two the intellectus habitus
or adeptus which al-Kindl adopts but divides into two, and this ls his
original contribution to the doctrine of the Intellect& nthe acquired
intellect" (al-'aql al-mustafad) and "the apparent or practical intellect"
(al-'aql al•iahir). 139

The purpose of the former is strictly theoretical,

namely, to know reality, and that of the latter is ethical, namely, to
put the "acquired" knowledge into practice.

b. Metaphysical

bsolutism

One of the oldest and most difficult problems with which the
philosophic mind has wrestled pertains to the relation of the One and
the Many.

Granted that Ultimate Reality ls One, how can we understand

the plurality of being out of its unity?

How can the multiplicity of

things have come out of One supreme entity?
what ls the relation of God and the world?

In theological terms,
How could the endless

varieties and diversities of beings and things in the universe have
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been derived from One

single Ultimate Unity?

Subsidiary problems

are the relations of Being and non-Being, the eternal and the temporal,
the absolute and the relative.

Indeed, these and many other philosophic

problems are facets of the basic issue of the One and the Many.
The first extensive discussion of the relation of the One and
the Many appears in Plato's Parmenides in which Flato agrees with the
historical Parmenides in recognizing the distinction between the really
real and the seemingly real, but disagrees with him on conceiving of
the Existent as One only.
would lead to nihilism.

In Plato's opinion, if this were true it

For him, the Existent is the world 0£ Ideas

with its manifoldness and in the Dialogue, therefore, Plato attempts
to show that the One and the Many are compatible with each other. 140
The problem of the One and the Many was brought into sharper
focus by the conflict between Aristotelian and the Stole philosophies.
While Aristotle maintained the transcendence of God, the Stoic philosophers stressed the immanence of God.

The problem became more

accentuated as the religious dualism became more pronounced.

As Wlndel•

band has pointed out, the dissatisfaction with contrasting God as
Spirit with matter led to the tendency "to raise the divine being
above all that can be experienced and above every definite content,

--

-

and thus to make God who ls above the world also a God above mind
or splrlt.n 141

--

The concept-ion of God as complete absence of all qualities
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makes its debut in Judaism in the philosophic system of Philo who
elevated the lnflnlte God far above the finite world and devested
Hlm of all the predicates known to the human mlnd.

The Chrlstlan

Apologists who were influenced by Philo, particularly Justln, 142 also
indulged in this "negative theology" which was the result of widening
considerably the gap between the One and the Many.
It ls this same tendency to overexalt the Divine Unity above
everything else that we encounter in Neo-Platonlsm in even more
exaggerated form.

For Plotlnus, God ls the absolutely transcendent

Being, who ls perfect Unity above reason.

God ls conceived by him

as the Principle which contains plurality ln lts Unity. 143 "Before
the manifold, .. l?lotlnus writes, "there must be the One, that from
which the manifold rlsess in all numerical series, the unit ls the
flrst." 144 In the words of Phlllppus V. Pistorius, "from the teleology
of the universe Plotinus postulates a governing unity, which ln some
way must be the author or basis of all existence. 11145

The One ls

the First who is infinite, formless and precedes all thought and
being.

Plotinus identified the One with Plato's Good as the absolute

beginning and end of all things.
And how does multiplicity proceed from this supreme Unity?
is the relation of the True One to the Many?

What

The world is generated

from the One, says Plotinus, by a process of emanation.

"'lbe One,

being perfect, overflows; and this superabundance produces a thing
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different from it."

146

In relation to the world, which ls its over-

flowing by-products, the True One ls the highest Good, the Power and
the Force which upholds everything It brings Into being.

Plotlnus

compares the activity of the One with that of the light which does
not suffer at all ln its own essence as lt shines into the darkness.
This ls the philosophic stream in which al-Kindl navigates in
his First Philosophy.

It is a Neo-Platonic stream into which mighty

tributaries of Greek philosophers, chiefly of Plato and Aristotle,
flow but which also has a strong undercurrent of Islamic religious
thought.

Al-Kindl displays a thorough knowledge of the great philo-

sophers whose views and arguments he utilizes in order to strengthen
his own theo-phllosophlc position on which he stands firmly.
As Marmura and Rist have clearly shown, 147 in his effort to
prove the existence of both unity and plurality in the predicables,
al-Kindl is much indebted to Plato's Parmenides which he regards not
so much as a metaphysical but rather as a dialectical resource.

Thus

he utilizes the numerous arguments in the Parmenides for his own
purposes and yet without surrendering his originality.

This is first

evident in the general ontological approach to the antimonies.

While

Plato asks negatively as to what would happen to the "Many" if the "Onett
did not exist, al-Kindl proceeds positively by putting the questions
"Because the "Many" exist what are the consequences for Unity?"
ls also a marked difference In their eplstemologles.

There

Plato tends to
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be strictly rational in his method.
ls both rational and empirical.
experience.

Al-Kindl, on the other hand,

He appeals to both logic and

Often our empirical experience affirms what logical

deduction negates.

For instance, plurality without unity, says al•

Klndi, would logically lead to the conclusion of the impossibility
of knowledge.

"But knowledge does exist," he goes on to say, "our

assumption that it does not exist is a contradiction of the facts.n 148
Al-Kindl leans quite heavily on Plato's Philebus when he attempts
to establish the existence of both unity and plurality in all things
and the theory that it ls the One who bestows unity on all existences.
Plato calls lt "a marvel of nature••• that one should be many or many
one" and that "the one ls many and infinite, and the many are only one." 149
He considered the knowledge "that whatever things are said to be are

composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted
in them," as

"a gift of heaven." 150 Plato divides all things tinto

four classes: the finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the
cause of the union.
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He refers, on the one hand, to this union of

the One and the Many as "being a birth into true b e i ng, ul52 and, on
the other hand, he says earlier in the Dialogue that "this union of
them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but ls, as I believe,
an everlasting quality of thought itself."

153

Al-Kindl seems to be

much clearer about the derivation of the unity in all things from the
True One.

The process occurs in time.

things will disintegrate into chaos.

Without this unity, says Plato,
Without this unity, insists al-Klndi1
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things will simply cease to exist.
Al-Klndl's understanding of the process by which the world
comes into being out of the True One ls thoroughly Neo-Platonic.
As it was already indicated, he adopts the Neo-Platonlc concept of
emanation (fay~) to explain the process of generation.

However, he

does not accept the Neo-Platonic intermediaries through which the
emanation takes place.

In other words, al-Kindl rejected the Neo-

Platonlc Godhead which consists of the transcendent One, t h e ~
or Intellectual Principle which reflects the image of the One and
from which the Soul proceeds and from which the world emanates. 154
He recognizes only the True One as the Godhead from whom all things
flow directly.

God alone ls the Creator and Sustainer of the world.

In this way, al-Kindl adapted the Neo-Platonic speculative system
to his monotheistic faith.
As to the nature of the True One as not being genus or species
or any of the predicables, al-Kindl used the traditional Neo-Platonlc
view.

Negative theological descriptions of the True One suited the

Muslim philosopher in his effort to draw a sharp line between the
creation and its Creator.

The sharp distinction between the two was

expressed by him through the theory that while all things partake of
unity accidentally, unity is present in the True One essentially.
No doubt, the Metaphysics of al-Kindl shows the powerful influence
of Aristotle.

"The Philosopher of the Arabs" shows a remarkable
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knowledge of Aristotle's wrltlngs especially the Organon, De Anlma,
Physics and Metaphysics.

One of al-Klndl's essays is devoted to

''the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and what ls required for the
Attainment of Philosophy" (Fi kammlyyat kutub AristutalTs wa-ma yuhtaj
ilalhi fl tahstl al-falsafah).

••
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•

•

•

Major dicta and themes of Arltotle's

philosophy appear in al-Kindi's Metaphysics and the debt ls gratefully
acknowledged.

In his argument that the co-existence of both unity

and plurality In the predicables implies a Transcendent Cause, alKindl utilizes the Aristotelian maxim that infinite regress of the
cause-effect sequence ls Impossible.
pertain

Aristotelian theories such as

to the relation of potentiality and actuality, that infinity

can never be actuality, and the law of contradiction that "the same
attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same

time and in the same respect," as well as the analysis of causes,
substance, time, space, motion and change b~ Aristotle are all
extensively used in al-Kindl's First Philosophy.
The famous Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world
was unconditionally rejected by al-Kindl.

He maintained that the

movement of the world ls not co-eternal with the First Cause, the
Unmoved Mover, the True One.
alone ls eternal.

Being ls finite and not eternal.

God

Al-Kindl's solution to the problem of infinity

ls based on strictly mathematical foundations.

The basic Islamic

dogma that God ls the Creator~ nlhllo and that He ls the Sustainer
of all that He has created are vigorously reaffirmed by al-Kindl.
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This ls the view that prevailed in Islamic philosophy, despite the
pro-Aristotelianism of Ibn stna and Ibn Ru~d with respect to the
eternity of the world, a view that was reaffirmed by the great alGhazall in the eleventh century.

Most of the outstanding Medieval Jewish philosophers took a
similar stand and defended the biblical tradition of creation out of
nothing by the One True God.

The

ristotelian doctrine of the eternity

of the world was the first of thirteen theories which Saadla refuted
in the first treatise of his important work The Book of Beliefs and
- •

_. )156

Opinions (kitab al-amanat wa-al-l'tiqadat.

Some of the proofs he

advances are of Mu'tazilite origin and, therefore, resemble those used
by al-Kindl.

The same ls true of the arguments which Saadia develops

to prove the existence and Oneness of God in the second chapter on
''The Unity of

God.n

Striking similarities may be observed also

between al-Kindl and Bahya lbn Bakuda who was born in the latter part
of the eleventh century and lived in Spain as a judge (dayyan) ln the
Jewish community.

His first attack in his "Book of Guidance to the

Duties of the Heart (kltlb al•hldayah ila fara'ld al•qulub) in defence

•

of God's existence and Unity ls directed to the dahrlyyah (materialism)
which advocated the eternity of the world .

His prrof~ which are

similar to those of the mutakalllmun(dialectlcal theologians) of Islam,
are chiefly teleological.

Like al-Kindl, Bahya was influenced by

Nao-Platonism and thus like him asserts, through a purely conceptual
deduction, that unity (of God) precedes plurality (of the world). 157
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He echoes al-Kindl and the Neo-Platonic tradition when he writes&
"The True One cannot be described with an attitude which necessitates
plurality, change, subdivision or transformation in any way." 158
An additional reference must be made in this comparative

religious thought, namely, to the great Jewish philosopher Moses
Maimonides (1135-1204).

There are significant resemblances between

al-Kindl and Maimonides not only in their common disagreement with
the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world but also in
a number of related matters such as in their efforts to reconcile
philosophy and revelation, their conceiving of philosophic knowledge
as a means for appropriating the content of revelation and regarding
their philosophic task of doing so as a religious one, and indeed in
their lntellectualist conception of faith .

However , the two philosophers

differ sharply in their attitude and reaction to the Neo- Platonic
Aristotelian ontological process of emanation.

While al-Kindl seems

to acquiesce with it and incorporates it into his Metaphysics without
any reservation, Maimonides makes lt the target of his attack as he
finds it in fundamental opposition to the Jewish doctrine of creation.
For him, the question whether the world was eternal or created was
b~sically a question whether the cosmos emanated from God by necessity
or whether it was freely created by Hlm. 159

In the words of Guttmann,

"Maimonides• discussion of this problem is guided by the desire to
replace the Aristotelian system of necessity by a system of freedom
compatible with divine sovereignty, and in keeping with the voluntaristic
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character of the Jewish idea of God.«

160

As a Mu'tazilite thinker, it was natural that al-Kindl should
adhere to the Islamic teaching of a creation ex nihilo and thus
boldly oppose one of the most basic ideas of Greek philosophy that
being can never come out of non-being.

Thus in this decisive issue,

al-Kindl the philosopher bows to al-Kindl the theologian.

He is in

full agreement with his Islamic faith on this fundamental tenet and
in this respect differs from all the important Islamic philosophers
who came after him .

The element of emanation that al-Kindl injected

into the creative act of God is balanced by his conception of the
True One, the Creator and Sustainer, as having life and Will.
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This

means that emanation ls not the work ef a blind necessity but of a
Divine Will.

It is the result of a free creative act.

162

Unlike al-Kindl, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd adopted the
Neo-Platonic theory of an eternal creation.

Al-Farabi tried to solve

the problem of the One and Many by his Theory of the Ten Intelligences.
God is the One who ls Necessary by Himself.
knows Himself and can be known. 163

He is an Intelligence,

From this Necessary One flows the

first intelligence which is the first step toward plurality.

The chain

of emanations continues until the tenth intelligence from which emanate
the human soul and the four elements.

164

.

Al:Faratit extolled the

intellect so highly that revelation was rendered unnecessary.

His was

a religion of the mind in the light of which he set out to draw the
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blueprints of the ideal society. 165

Both Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd

assimilate the Neo-Platonic ontology and stress the primacy of reason
in their metaphys.1.c,U -. syttems but not without certain modifications .

.

-

It was al - Ghazali, known as the Deferrder of Islam (huj jat al - Is Him),
who about a century before Ibn Rushd reaffirmed the doctrine of creation
by God~ nlhllo and the primacy of religion and revelation over
philosophy and reason . 166 "In the struggle in Islam between Philosophy
and Theology,•• writes Simon Van Den Bergh, "Philosophy was defeated ,
and the final blow to the philosophers was given in Ghazali's attack
(in his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers - tahafut al - falasifah)
on Philosophy which i n substance is incorporated in Averroes' book
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence - tahafut al-tahafut) and which he
tries to refute . " 167
In conclusion , it may be said that al - Kindi ' s First Philosophy
constitutes, as far as we know, the first systematic effort to weave
Greek philosophy into the religious thought of Islam within the framework of Mu'tazilite theology .
expounds a Metaphysical

In it "the Philosopher of the

rabs"

bsolutism for the purpose of defending the

theological position of the Mu'tazilites in general and their dogma
of the Divine Unity (al-taw~Id) in particular.

The Mu'tazilites, who

called themselves The People of Justice and Unity (ahl al-'adl wa- altaw~Id), directed their attack against the unbelievers, the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity, the dualism of the Man icheans and the llteralkm
artd

arith~opomprpbl sm of the Traditional Orthodox Muslims.

Al-Kindl's
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Metaphysics contains philosophical ammunition for the fight against
these enemies of true Islam.

God ls conceived as

bsolute Oneness, the

creative Source of all unity and plurality in the world, who endowed
man with a mind to be used freely ln the attainment of Dlvlne Truth.
The work gives evidence of the author's original and logical mind
which is able to assimilate philosophical ideas and dialectical methods
and to use them for religious ends.

To quote Professor Ahmad Fouad

11-Ehwany, "al.;.JUrrdi opened the door for the philosophical interpreta•
tion of the Qur'an, and thereby brought about an accord between religion
and phllosophy.n 168

Indeed, al-Kindl •s First Philosophy ls the first

attempt in Islam to harmonize faith and reason, speculation and revelation, religion and philosophy, an objective that continued to be a
major characteristic of :rs.lam.fa: philosophy.

As the first Muslim philo-

sopher or,perhaps more accurately, philosopher of religion, al - Kindl
pioneered in the difficult task of translating Greek works into Arabic,
probably in a supervisory capacity, and, therefore, in coining a :fiew
169
Arabic philosophical terminology.
Through his Epistemological Realism also, which gave validity
to knowledge acquired by perception, conception and intuition, alKindl exercised a considerable influence on later Islamic philosophers
as well as on Medieval Jewish and Christian philosophical theologians.
His treatises on the Intellect and Prophecy initiated a series on these
same subjects by the other Islamic philosophers.

As mentioned above,
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his "Treatise on the Intellect" was translated into Latin and had
some impact on Medieval philosophy.

With al-Farabl (known as the

Second Teacher - al-mu'allim al -~ni - second to Aristotle), al-Kindl
can rightly claim to be one of the founders of Islamic philosophy.
w'hile al-Kindl may be compared with St . Augustine in Christianity,
as noted earlier, al-Farabi resembles St . Thomas Acquinas ln whose
philosophical theology Aristotle conquers Plato .
Professor Richard ~alz'err.s? outstanding work in Classical and
Islamic philosophy has shed considerable light on the value of the
new material in the field of Islamic philosophic thought for the
history of Greek philosophy.

It is thanks to al-Kindl, for instance,

that we possess today the only remnant of an ancient commentary on
Aristotle by Plotinus.

Mistakenly known then as The Theology of

Aristotle, this document was translated into Arable, at al-Klndi 1s
request, for the benefit of his royal pupil Ahmad, the son of alMu 1tas lm.170

•

In the same context, Walzer writes:

We are indebted to al- Kindl, as to many other Arabic
philosophers, for new material for the history of Greek
philosophy . The arguments he uses are not always to be
traced in such Neo-Platonic works as we possess in the
original Greek, and so add to our knowledge of NeoPlatonism, and treatises on the soul on Neo-Platonlc
lines have yielded new fragments of a lost dialogue, the
Eudemus, written at a period when he still adhered to
Plato's theory of the immortality of the sou1.171

TR NSIATION
CH.APTER I

L- KINDI'S TREAT I SE ON FIRST PHILOS PHY
Addressed to al - Mu•tasim bi -Allah
•
97

Unto you , who are the son of the noblest masters and the bonds
of happin ess , may God grant a long life .

He who adheres to your

counsel shall be blessed in time and etern ity .

May God adorn you with

all the robes of virtue and purify you from all the stains of vice .

(PHILOS

PHY AND

TRUTH)

Among man ' s arts, philosophy occupies the highest rank and noblest
5

position .

It may be defined as the knowledge of the nature of things

as far a s t h is is possible to man .

In his theoretical knowledge ( 1 ilm) ,

the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth (isabat al - haqq) . In
•
•
his practical knowledge ( 1 ama l), he seeks to live ln accordance with
the truth (al - 1 amal bl - al - haqq).

•

We must bear ln mind , however, that

our philosophic preoccupation is not an eternal activity , for i t comes
to an end and we abandon it once we reach the truth .
It must emphatically be stated that the search for the truth
ls inseparable from the search for causes .
and maintenance of everything is the trut h .
(inniyyah) has reality .
10

The cause of the existence
Anything that has existence

Consequently, the truth exists by sheer

necessity simply because there are existent beings and things .
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(THE SIGNIFICANCE F METAPHYSICS)
98

The noblest philosophy, exceeding any other in importance,
is First Philosophy.

Ry First Philosophy I mean knowledge of the

primary Truth which is the cause of all truth.

The perfect and

noblest philosopher is he who achieves full knowledge of this highest
101

Truth; for knowledge of the cause is nobler than knowledge of the
effect .

We acquire full knowledge of every intelligible when we gain

complete knowledge of its cause .

A cause may be material, formal,

efficient, that is, initiator of motion, or final, namely, identical
with the purpose for which an object exists.

(THE FOUR SCIENTIFIC INQUIRIES)
5

The scientific inquiries are four, as we have established
elsewhere in our philosophic statements:
or "why."

"whether," "what,"

"Whether" inquires solely about existence .

must have a genus, and "what" searches for that genus.
10

for the species .

0

which"

An existant

"Which" looks

"What" and "Which" together seek to find the kind .

"Why" inquires into the final cause, for it aims at knowing the
absolute cause.
(GENUS AND

SPECIES)

It is quite evident that the moment we know the matter of which
a thing is made, we also become cognizant of its genus .

Similarly,

when we comprehend the form of an object, we gain knowledge of its

7l

kind; and knowledge of the kind implies knowledge of the species.
An object ls defined when its material, formal and final causes are

known, and to define an object ls to know its ·nature.

(KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE)

15

Knowledge of the First Cause·

has properly been called First

Philosophy, for it is the source of all other philosophic knowledge.
It is first in nobleness , in genus, in certainty of cognition.

It

is first in time, for it is the cause of time.

(INDEBTEDNESS ACKNO

102

EOOED)

The truth makes it imperative that we refrain from depreciating
those from whom we have benefited even if it were in a modest way in
small matters, not to speak of those who have enriched us in a large
measure in significant areas of endeavor.

Those who do not attain the

whole truth but do share with us the fruits of their minds become our
lntellectual in-laws and partners.

Their contributions have paved

for us the way to discover a great deal of knowledge which eluded
5

them.

As it was observed by great non-Arab philosophers before us,

no seeker of the truth worthy of the name has ever attained complete
knowledge solely by his own efforts.

Of course, there are those

whose search yields nothing, while others have to be content with
finding fragments of knowledge .

However, the partial knowledge obtained

by various minds, when assembled, does add up to a picture that is

72

meaningful and valuable.
10

We are duty-bound, therefore, to show our genuine gratitude
to all those who have contributed in any manner, whether modestly or
generously to the growing heritage of knowledge.

By imparting to us

the harvest of their thinking, they have thereby facilitated our
investigation of the facts that are still hidden from us.

Their

discoveries have become stepping-stones on which we were able to
move forward on the path of truth.

Without the efforts of those who

have gone before us, we could not have possibly acquired, within the
brief span of our lives and research, the entire wealth of knowledge
we found at our disposal at the beginning of our journey.

This

accumulated fund of knowledge indeed accelerated our progress in
finding answers to the problems we set out to solve .
15

We must always

gratefully remember that the capital of truth we inherited has been
the result of serious search and tireless research of many generations.
It goes without saying that no one person during a lifetime of
concentrated intellectual activity can gain as much knowledge as may
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be gathered through the cooperative effort over the years.

It was

Aristotle, t he leading Greek philosopher, who rightly said that we
must never neglect to thank the parents of those who contribute to
the common treasury of truth for they are the cause of their being
and, indirectly, enhance our attainment of the truth.
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(UNIVERSAL V. LIDITY OF THE TRUTH)

We should not hesitate to appreciate and assimilate the truth
5

regardless of the source from which it may come to us.

We should

not be ashamed to receive it from those who differ from us in their
race and belief.

Truth is universal and transcends all barriers.

Any honest seeker of it is entitled to it.

Truth being to him the

highest value, he will naturally honor all discoverers and transmitters
of the truth.

Obviously, truth never degrades us.

On

the contrary,

it constantly and consistently ennobles us.

(METHODOLOGY)
We do well, therefore, as -we endeavo·r - to.. per·fecbr our:. ·sp.epies whlch . 1s;••1n Hn_e wl th·· the truth.,

to adopt in the present study the

same principle that has guided us in all our investigations.
10

We shall

begin by stating in a comprehensive and lucid manner what the ancients
had said on the subject.

Then we shall proceed to discuss, to the best

of our ability, the areas which require further elaboration.

This

we shall undertake with due regard to the present usages of the Arabic
language and of the literary style in our times.

And whenever necessary,

we shall give a detailed analysis of that which is complex and ambiguous
in order to safeguard ourselves against the possible misinterpretation
of those of our contemporaries who claim to be thinkers, but who in
fact are not worthy of the name because they are hopelessly alienated
15

from the truth.

They are void of the qualities which adorn the men of
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independent thought.

Instead of upholding the truth, they crucify

it by the narrowness of their minds.
104

These enemies of the truth

diligently pursue that which is common and passionately appropriate
that which is mediocre.

The poisonous envy which permeates their

animal natures blinds them to the light of truth.

It makes them

look down at all who excel in the very virtues which they themselves
lack.

These men misrepresent the truth and are the enemies of all

that is refined and noble .
5

Their primary concern is to guard the

positions which they have illicitly created, unworthily occupied
and efficiently use to rule and dominate.
(THE TRADERS OF RELIGION)

Unfortunately, these perverters of the truth are nothing but
traders of religion .

Having sold their religion, they are left

without a religion, for what is sold ls no longer owned.

A trader

in religion, therefore, is inevitably an irreligious man .

Moreover,

he who refuses to acquire the knowledge about the true nature of
things and calls

tnos·e

who do .so unbe:l.by.ers

should not claim to be

a man of reli gion .

(THE SCOPE OF KN0-1LEDGE AND REVELATION)

Knowledge of the nature of things or things as they actually
are implies the knowledge of divine truth and divine unity.

It

encompasses ethics ('lm al-fa9tlah) and acquaintance with all that is
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useful and with the means of acquiring it .

Indeed, knowledge of

the truth demands that we steer away from all that is harmful and
10

guard ourselves from it .

All these facts we learn from the true

prophets who communicated them to us from God , may His praise be
exalted.
The true messengers of God - may they be blessed - have surely
professed the lordship of God alone .

They have ·1ndeeac~~rer·r~d the

necessity of abiding in the virtues that are acceptable to Him , and
of avoiding the vices :wh lch c~t J;'a_d i_c t~. t he~v i r t pes i n their es sence .
It is our dut y, therefore , to adhere to, and spend our every
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effort in pursuit of, the truth for the reasons mentioned above and
which we are about to expound .

(THE NECESSITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEOOE)

Even those who are opposed to acquiring it (knowledge of the
nature of things= philosophy), will be compelled by logical necessity
to yield to it .

For their attitude toward philosophical knowledge

must inevitably take one of two direct ions, namely , that its acquisition
ls either necessary or unnecessary .
5

If they say that it is necessary ,

then they would impose upon themselves the obligation of acquiring it .
On

the other hand , if they should say that philosophical knowledge is

not necessary, then they will find it necessary to support their state•
ment by a demonstrative proof .

But the very giving of a demonstrative

proof ls itself a part of the philosophic knowledge which they reject .
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They must, therefore, appropriate this valuable possession (knowledge
of the nature of things or philosophy), if not willingly, then by sheer
necessity.

(THE NEED FOR DIVINE SUPPORT)
10

We call upon Him who has full knowledge of our secret thoughts
and is aware of our endeavors to prove His lordship and elucidate His
unity, to refute by logical argument the stubborn atheists, whose godlesness and and shamefulness we seek to dispel, and the defects and illeffects of their religious beliefs we attempt to reveal,

beseeching

Him to shield us and all true believers with His protecting care and
to enable us by His great power to reach the goal which we have set
before us, namely, the victory of truth and truthfulness .
15

We pray Hirn

to help us reach the spiritual altitude of those whose intentions and
acti ons are acceptable to Him and to whom He graciously granted success
in life and triumph over those who have disregarded His grace and
ignored His truth .
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CHAPTER
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II

Having introduced our discussion with some pertinent facts,
we s ha ll proceed now to set forth our thesis in a systematic way .

There are two kinds of cogn ition (wujud) by which man acquires
knowledge .

The first is sense perception which is easily accessible

to us but far removed from the true nature of t h ings .

5

operate the moment we are born .

It begins to

We share it wi th all members of our

species as well as with the animal world in general .

Our cogn ition

through the sense organs is direct, immediate and of brief duration
because the objects of our perception are in a state of flux , constantly undergoing change of location , quantity and quality .
occurs in the direction and speed of their movement .
may increase or decrease .

The change

Their quantities

At one moment they may be equal to each

other, at another moment be unequal . Their qua lities may change and
thus become stronger or weaker, resembling each other at one time and
differing from each other at another .
10

phenomena , always in flux .

Such is the mutable world of

Its images are retained by the imagination

(muf awwirah) which , in turn , deposits them into the memory (~i~) .
The objects of our sense perception are reta ined as images in man ' s
s oul .

Because they have no permanence in existence, their true nature

eludes us even though they are very near to our sen_,s·~ organs by which
107

they are perceived immediately.

All that is perceived is invariably

material (hayul t ) and ls inevitably corporeal (jirm) .
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(THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PA.RTICUlAR)

The other source of cognition, which is nearer to the true
nature of things (tabi 1 ah), but not as easily accessible to us (as

•

sense perception) is knowledge obtained by the mind (wujud al-'aql)
or conception.

It is not without a reason that our knowledge is

acquired through two channels, the senses and the mind .

For the objects

of our cognition are both universal (kulliyyah) and particular (juz•iyyah).
By universal we mean the genera (ajna$) of the species (anwa•), and

-- .

the species of individual beings and things (ashkhas).
5

By particulars

we mean the individual beings and things of the species.
Particular things that are material are perceived by the senses.
Their genera and species, however, are not accessible through perception .
They cannot be known by sense perception bQt rather by one of the
developed faculties of the soul, namely, that which makes us human
(al-insaniyyah), known as man 's intellect (al-'aql al -ins!n t).

While

individual things are perceived by the senses, the images of these
10

perceived objects which appear in the soul belong to the faculty which
uses the sense organs.

However, concepts signifying species and all

other universals cannot be represented by images in the soul because
images always presuppose empirical experience.

The reality of such

concepts is ascertained in the soul by means of primary, rational
principles (al- 1 awa 1 il al-'qliyyah al-ma'qulah).
necessity.

This ls a logical

Being (huw~ and non-being (la huwa),for instance, are

states that cannot be attributed to one object simultaneously.
108

This

type of cognition is the function of the soul and not the senses.
is true by sheer necessity.

Conceptual knowledge does not require

This
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a medium (mutawa$$lt).

It cannot be represented by images in the

~

soul because a concept has no color, sound, taste, smell and cannot
be touched .

Conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the i nstru-

men tality of images (idr!k l! mlthall) .
That which is material (hayul!nT) ls capable of being represented
5

by images through sensation in the soul .

The non-material (1! hayulann

may be found in conjunction with the material .

An example of this is

the form ~akl) which is identified by means of the color because it
corresponds to the area covered by that color .

But it is only acciden-

tally that the form is recognized by means of visual perception (alhisSal - basarl) because it is equivalent to the periphery the object
•
•
that ls perceived by the visual sense .
It may be supposed t hat t he form ls represented in the soul as
an after-effect (lahlqah) of our total sensory perception, an after -

•

effect that we experience immediately following our perception of the
color .
10

This sensation is identical with the periphery of the color

which we perceive as the form .

But, it must be stressed , our cognition

of the periphery as identical with the form is a mental process which
has occurred only accidentally by means of sense perception .

In

reality, the form is not perceived (but rather conceived by the mind) .

All universals have no material existence although the presence of
material objects may lead us to conceive them .

This does not mean that

the universal is abstracted from material phenomena because it never
aligns itself with the material.

It never appears in the soul as an
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image and we should not suppose that it does .
109

This fact we must

admit, for we are led to it by necessity .

(CONCEPTU L COGNITION ILLUSTRAT®)
Let us consider the statement that outside the totality of
being, the All (jism al - kull), there can be no existence of any space,
either empty (~ala') or occupied (mala').
empty space nor a body at all .

We mean there can be neither

This assumption can have no representa-

tion (by images) in the soul because "no void and no occupied space"
are things that cannot be perceived by our senses .

Their experience

cannot follow any sense perception and thus appear in the soul as an
image even if this were only a supposition .

That such a space, empty

or occupied, does not exist beyond the All is a truth conceived by the
5

mind by logical necessity by means of premises which we wish to point
out .
ffy the void (al -!!!ala ' ) is commonly understood a vacant space,
a space without any occupant (mutamakkin).

But a space and its content

are constructs, that is, they are not separate entities .

By necessity

(idtirlran), The existence of space implies that it is a space for

••

something .

It must inevitably have a content .

By the same token, an

object is invariably found somewhere, in some place.
space without a content is inconceivable .
10

Therefore, a

Although the void is defined

as an empty space, we must conclude that the absolute void (al-~ala'
al-mu~laq) cannot possibly have any existence (wujud).
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Moreover , if the content of space is corporeal, then it follows
that the corporeality of the All (jism al-kull) would be either infinite or finite in quantity .

But it is axiomatic that nothing can

be infinite (la'rd.hayaea lahii) in actuality (bi-al-fi ' l) as we shall
15

show after a while .

Therefore, we must conclude, the corporeality of

the All cannot be infinite in quantity.
there can be nothing at all .

This means that beyond the All

Because if there were , then this additional

content would have to be corporeal .

Logically, we will then have to

assume that beyond this content there ls more content and so on ad
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finltum (bila nlhayah) .

This wou~d necessitate the existence of a

corporeal object that ls infinite in quantity.
to be an actuality .

This is a logical contradiction and cannot be true .

Therefore, we conc lude that beyond the corporeal
at all .
5

Thus infinity will have

11 there is nothing

For, as we have demonstrated , beyond it there can be no space

or anything corporeal filling that space .
(wajib i~~lrftran) .

This ls necessarily so

For this conclusion there can be no image in the

soul because by logical necessity this reality is conceived only by
the mind (wujud ''1:llJ) .
Whoever seeks to know metaphysical (fawq al - tabi'ah) realities,
•
which are incorporeal and have no material associations (tuqarin al hayull), will never find images or replicas of them in the soul .
physical truths can be known only by intellectual investigation
(al - abl]ath, al- ' aqliyyah) .

Meta-
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10

Commit to your memory this basic premise (muqaddimah) that it
may be your guide in the search for all truths and a light dispelling
from your intellectual vision the darkness of ignorance and the sorrow
of perplexity .

May God keep you in all the virtues and guard you from

all the vices .

(EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS)
The use of these two channels of cognition (perception and conception) renders (our attainment of) the truth easy in certain respects,
difficult in others .

The intelligibles, for instance, can be compre-

hended only by the mind .

He who seeks to know them as images (of

empirical experience) will do so in vain .

His predicament would be

similar to that of a bat in daylight unable to see what is perfectly
visible to us .
15

It is for this reason that many speculati ve thinkers (na,irt!tn)
have been puzzled whenever they have directed their inquiries to
metaphysical matters .

Their problem lies in searching for metaphysical

images in their soul and thus applying the method they are accustomed
to but which is applicable only to sensory knowledge .

This is certainly

an immature approach, namely, to use the short- cut of the familiar
means to reach all ends .

Naturally, the process of learning is

facilitated when the subject matter has a resemblance to what is already
familiar .

This fact may be substantiated by the speed with which speech-

making, letter- writing, story- telling and poetry are learnt, for they
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are all areas which involve the ability of speaking and relating
which is acquired early in life .
These thinkers have also encountered difficulties in their
investigation of physical phenomena due to their application of the
111

mathematical method which must be restricted to the non- material .
For the corporeal , the physical, is subject to change, such as motion .
Nature (tabI •ah), on the other hand, is the primary cause ( ' illah

•

awwaliyyah) of motion and rest .
All that is natural must be material .

The mathematical method

cannot be applied for the investigation of natural phenomena .
5

being immaterial, may be applied to that which is not natural .

Mathematics,
Its use

in the natural sciences will yield no results and is bound to be confus i ng .
It is i mperative, therefore , that anyone who is engaged in research
in one of the sciences should inquire first about the cause of the subject
matter investigated by that particular field.

Our search for the cause

of natural objects , for instance , would lead us back to the first natural
principles (awa'il al - tab t• ah) which account for all motion .

•

We conclude,

therefore, that the natural applies to everything that is in motion .
10

Natural science or physics , then , is the science of all that is in motion .
Metaphysics, by contrast , deals with that which is not in motion, for
nothing can ever be the cause of its own coming into being ( ' illat kawn
datihi), as we shall explain later .

•

Thus the cause of motion cannot be

motion, and the cause of a moving object (mutaharrik) cannot be a moving

•

84

object.

Metaphysics is, then, the realm of that which is motionless.

The knowledge of metaphysical realities, we conclude, is the knowledge
of that which does not move.

(METHODS OF INVESTIGATION)
Demonstrative knowledge (wujud burhani) should not be sought in
15

every inquiry, for not every intellectual problem can be solved by
demonstration.
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This is so because not all things can be proven true.

There are demonstrative proofs for certain things, but we cannot prove
the proof itself.

If this were possible, then the chain of establishing

demonstrative evidence would go on

infinitely.

This would mean that

nothing at all could be proven true and thus nothing at all could be
known , because a thing is known only when we can trace its beginning.
Thus knowledge of any kind would be an impossibility.

If we want to

know, for example, what is man, who is a living, thinking and dying
being, and we did not understand what is meant by the terms
5

0

1iving,

thinking and dying ,'' we obviously would not know what man is.
Similarly, persuasion (iqna') should not be used as a tool for
establishing facts in mathematical sciences (al-'ulum al-riyadiyyah) •

•

Demonstrative proof should be our method in this area.

If we used

persuasion in mathematics, then our knowledge would be mere opinion
(~inniyyah) and cannot be scientific(~ilmiyyah) •
•
Moreover, analytical speculation (naJar tamytzl) into a field
of knowledge requires particular method of investigation and verification
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that may not be applicable to other fields.
10

Overlooking this episte-

mological necessity and the indiscriminate use of methods, whether it
be the persuasive, comparative, objective, empirical or discursive,
have led many analytical thinkers astray in the pursuit of knowledge
in their respective fields.

The refusal to make distinctions between

the various objects of knowledge and the arbitrary and perslstant
adherence to one method of investigation, regardless of the subject
matter of knowledge, account for the failure of many to acquire any
knowledge.

The method of inquiry that must be adopted is determined

by the area of knowledge that is pursued.

15

We should not use, for

instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology (al-'!lm
al-ilahi), discursive reasoning (al-jawarni' al-fikriyyah) in the
inquiry about first natural principles, demonstrative proof in rhetoric
(balaghah) or for substantiating another proof .

If we take this basic

matter into consideration, the goals of our search and research become
accessible.

On

the other hand , if we disregard this fundamental truth,

we will lose sight of our aims and fail to realize our objec~ives.
Having indicated these guideposts well in advance, we shall now
20

introduce the essentials (of metaphysics) which we need in this art.

(THE CONCEPT OF THE ETERNAL)
113

The Eternal (al-azali) is that which is never Non- Being (laysa)
but is Being (huwa) in the absolute sense (mutlaqan).
of the Eternal has no ontological development.

The existence (hawiyyah)

The Eternal is that which

86

is self-sufficient and has no cause.

It is not object, predicate,

has no agent and no end - we mean that for which it exists - for there
are no primary causes other than these .
5

Moreover, the Eternal has no genus (jins), for if it had a genus
it would itself be a species (naw') .

A species is a composite (rnurakkab)

of the genus, which it has in common with others, and the differentia
(fasl) which distinguishes it from others. This would mean that the
•
Eternal is made of matter, namely, its genus with which its form or any
other form (surah) may be combined , and of form which is uniquely its
•
own and is not shared by any other. Thus the Eternal is made of matter
and form .

But it has been proven that it is without mat ter and form ;

and this is a contradiction that cannot be possible .

Therefore, it must

be concluded that the Eternal has no genus .

10

Again, the Eternal is immune to corruption which is a change of
form but not of primary substance (al - hamil al -' awwal) .

This primary

substance, which is its existence (aysa) does not undergo any change .
The process of de cay in an object is not the result of re- creation of
its existence (ta •yr s aysiyyatihi).

,tl,ttettatioh · i n'""an ,..ob}e ct iss caused

by its nearest opposite with which it shares the same genus .
15

Heat, for

instance, is changed by means of the cold and not by dryness, sweetness,
length or anything else simply because these qualities are not the
nearest opposite to heat .
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are of the same genus .

Related contraries (al - addad al-mutaqaribah)

•

A decaying object has a genus .

decays, it must have a genus .

If the Eternal

But it has been established that it is
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without a genus .

This is an impossible contradiction.

We conclude,

therefore, that the Eternal is immune to decay.
Inasmuch as change (istihalah) is substitution (tabaddul), the

•

Eternal is immutable because it is never substituted by something else
and does not develop from a state of imperfection (naqs) to a state of

•

perfection (tamam).

For development (intiqal) is a form of change, and

the Eternal does not develop into a state of perfection because it it
5

is immutable.

That which is perfect is characterized by a condition

of constancy (~al thabitah) which is the basis of its excellence .
imperfect lacks this constancy and this excellence .

The

The Eternal cannot

be imperfect because it is impossible for it to develop into a condition
by which it attains excellence .

This ls so because it cannot possibly

change into any any state that ls more perfect or more imperfect .
necessity, the Eternal ls perfect .

By

Inasmuch as a body (jlrm) has genus

and species, and the Eternal has no genus, therefor

the E~ernal eatmot

be a body .
10

'W e can make the conclusive statement tha.t no eternal body or
anything else that has quantity (kammiyyah) or quality (kaifiyyah)
can be infinite in actuality (bi-alfi 1 1), and that which is infinite is
only potentially (fi al-quwwah) .· so .

(BASIC PREMISES)
This leads us to state several primary premises that are certain
and are intelligible without the medium (of sense perception):
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(a) All bodies (ajram) of which none ls larger than the rest are
equal (mutasawiyah).
(b) The distances (ab'ad) between the farthest ends of equal bodies
are congruent potentially and actually.
(c) That which is finite cannot be infinite.

15

(d) If a body is added to one of equal bodies it renders it larger

than the rest and larger than it was before the addition was made.
(e) If two bodies finite in size were joined, the resultant body would
also be finite in size.

This ls necessarily true also with

respect to any quantity or anything quantitative.
(f) The smaller of two bodies of the same genus is smaller only in
comparison with that other body or part of it.

(THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE)
115

If from an infinite body one were to take a body finite in size,
the remainder would be either finite or infinite in quantity.

ssuming

the remainder to be finite in size, if then the separated body, which
is finite in size, were added to it, the resultant body would be finite
in size.
5

But this resultant body is the same as the ori ginal one

before anything was separated from it which was infinite in size.

This

is an impossible contradiction.
Suppose now that the remainder were infinite in size.

If then

what was taken away from it were again added to it, it would either
become larger than what it was before the addition was made or equal
to it.
10

If it becomes larger than what it had been, it would mean that

an infinite body has become larger than an infinite body .

We know
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that the smaller of two bodies is maller in relation to the larger
of part of it.

Thus one of the two objects, both supposedly infinite,

is smaller than the other one or part of it.

If in size the smaller

body ranks second to the larger one, then it inevitably ranks second
to part of it.

The smaller body could be said to be equal to part

of the larger.
However, two bqdies~arecequal when the distances between the
periphery of their common features (mutashabihatuhuma) are equal. They
15

are consequently finite, for equal bodies which are dissimilar have,
nevertheless the same number of equal units (quantitative), although
their ends may differ in plurality (kat!lrah) or 1quality or both .
they are finite.

Thus

(According to our argument), the smaller of the two

bodies would have to be both infinite and finite, and this is an
impossible contradiction.

Therefore, we must conclude, that neither

of the two bodies (mentioned above) is larger than the other.
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Moreover, if the body does not become larger than what it had
been before anything was added to it, this would mean that a body has
been added to another body without resulting in any increase.

Thus

the total sum of the two is equal to the one, although the one to
which it was added is only part of the whole as well as part of of
the two parts that have been rejoined.
equal to the whole (al-kull).
5

Consequently, the part is

And this is a logical impossibility.

It has thus been demonstrated that a body cannot possibly be
infinite.

The same argument leads also to conclude that nothing

90

quantitative can be infinite in actuality .
(TIME , MOTION

D CHANGE)

Time ls a quantitative entity .

Therefore, it cannot be infinite

in actuality, for it has a beginning and an end.

All things that are

predicated by that which ls finite are necessarily fin i te .
10

Thus all the

categories implied in a body such as number, space, time - which is
divided by motion - and all that constitutes a body in actuality ls
also finite , because the body itself is finite .
(universe) is finite .

The body of the who le

The same may be said of all that it contains .

Inasmuch as it is possible by imagination (bi - alwahm) to increase
the totality of being continuously , namely , to imagine a larger universe
i ndefinitely, therefore the possibility (lmkan) of imagining a larger
universe can go on infinitely .

Thus potentially , the univers e (jirrn

al - kull) is infin i te , because potentiality (of it being so) and possibili 15

ty (of our imagining it to be so) are identical .
which is finite can be so only potentially .

In other words, that

Al that is inherent in what

ls infinite in potentiality is also potentially infinite .
to motion and time .
in potenti a lity .
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This applies

To sum up , that which is infinite is infinite only

Nothing can be infinite in actuality, as we have shown .

Because that is a logical necessity (i . e . the principle that infinity
cannot be an actuality) , it becomes evi den t that ti me cannot be infinite
in actuality .

For time ls the duration of the totality of being .

If
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time is finite, it is so by virtue of the fact that the existence
(inniyyah) of the universe is finite, for time itself has no independent
existence.
5

Moreover, there can be no body existing without time, because
time is the number of motion .

It is, in other words, a duration

measured by motion ( arakah) .

Whenever there is motion there is bound

to be time .

The absence of motion isthe absence of time .

Again, motion implies a body that moves.

There can be motion

only when there is a body, for without it there can be no motion .
Motion is a form of change .

This change may involve .the location of

any or all the parts of an object with or without its focal point(markaz) .
This is known as locomotion (al-~arakah al-mak§niyyah) .

The change of

location may also be the result of the movement of any or all of the
10

parts of a body away from , or nearer to, its focal point .
be identical with the processes of growth: (rub
(icJmihlal) respectively .

•

) and

This would

dissolution

If the change involves the predicative

qualities (al-kaifiyyat al - mahmft lah) of a body only, then it would be

•

identical with transformation (istihalah).

•

But if the change takes

place in its essence (jawhar), the process would be equivalent to
generation (kawn) and decay (fasad).
Every change marks the duration (muddah) of a

body .

In other

words, change and time are ontologically inseparable, and so are motion
and bodies, for wherever there is motion, there must of necessity be
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a body.

The existence of a body necessitates the existence of motion.

Without an

body there can be no motion (for there would be nothing to

move).
15

The postulated existence of an immoveable

body would mean that

motion ls an impossibility, definitely or indefinitely, or that it ls
a possibility.

If motion is a definite impossibility , then it would

mean that it is non- existent (laisat bimawjudah) while the body exists.
But (we know that) motion does exist; and this is an impossible contra118

diction .

hen there is an existing body, then the complete absence of

motion would be impossible .

Tfie i exist~ce : of ~a f body :ten:de:ts the ' x½stence

bf :motib~ a - pos s ibjlity, for motion exists in some bodies by necessity .
The possibility of a condition in a body may be postulated on the basis
of its actuality in other similar bodies .
5

Let us say, for instance,

that the ability to write is not an actuality in Muhammad .

But we can

assume its existence in him as a possibility because other men can
actually write .

Thus the fact that motion necessarily exists in some

bodies leads us to conclude that it must necessarily exist in bodies
in general.

Therefore , ~herever there is a body, there is inevitably

motion also .
10

It has been said that there can be a body without motion .

If this were true , it would mean that a body can be in motion and at
rest simultaneously .
contradiction .

But this is inconceivable (muijal) and an impossible

Thus we conclude that the existence of a body without

motion is impossible , and that wherever there is a body, there must
necessarily be motion also .
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(TIME, MOTION

~D COMING INTO BEING)

We may suppose that the universe was ori g inally at rest and
15

that it moved because it was possible for it to do so .

This sup_position

is necessarily false because 4f the universe were first at rest and then
moved, it must have come into be i ng out of nothing (kawn 'an laysa) or
existed eternally (lam yazal) .

If it came into being out of nothing,

then being (aysa) has come out of non- being (laysa) , and this is a process
of generation (kawn) which must involve movement .

This fact was stated

above when we described t he nature of motion and pointed out that genera119

tion was one of the forms of motion .

If the existence of the universe

did not precede the process of generation, it must itself by identical
with that process .

The generation of the world , therefore , could not

have possibly preceded motion .
It has been asserted that the universe existed first without
motion .

This means it was at rest, but (we have shown that) it did

not exist without motion .

This is an impossible contradiction.

Therefore,

i f the universe were generated out of nothing, it could not have possibly
5

preceded motion .
On

the other hand , if the lffliverse were eternal and, at rest (sakin

and then it moved because it was possible for it to do so, this would
imply that the eternal universe underwent a change (ista~al) from
actual rest to actual motion .

But that which ls eternal d;s , immutable,

as we have demonstrated earlier .

The universe is t hen mutable and
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inn:nutable, and this illogical and cannot be possible.
10

The universe

could not have been eternal and at rest in actuality and then moved
in actuality.

But the universe is in motion.

We must conclude that

the existence of the world did not precede its movement at all . Therefore, wherever there is motion there must also be a body (that is in
motion), and wherever there is a body there must also be motion .
It has been pointed out that time is ontologically not prior to
motion .

This means that time does not necessarily precede the universe

15 in existence because there can be no time without motion .
the universe and motion co- exist .
other.

Moreover,

There cannot be one without the

Similarly, it is inconceivable to have a body without duration

(muddah), for there can be a duration only of something that exists .
Fur thermore , the duration of a body implies motion , because a body and
motion are absolutely inseparable , as it has been shown .

The duration

of a body, wh ich is i nvar iably simultaneous with the existence of that
body , ls measured by the movement which i nevitab l y co- exists with it .
Thi s establishes the fact that the un i verse is not ontologi cally prior
20

to time .

We conclude that the universe , motion and time never precede

each other in existence .
120

The fact has been elucidated that time cannot be infinite for
the simple reason that a quantity (kammiyyah) or anything quantitative

(gnu kammiyyah) can never be infinite in actuality .
actually come to an end .

All time must

Moreover, corporealtey does not precede
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time .

The existence (inniyyah) of the universe cannot possibly be

infinite .
5

Of necessity, it must be finite .

universe cannot be eternal.

This means that the

And although this truth has been

delineated by what we have advance , we shall attempt to prove it in
another way in order to enable those who speculate in this field to
a cquire added skill (tamahhur) for penetrating (tawalluj) its frontiers .
To begin with , change may take the form of composition (tarkt b)
and assimilation v'til f) , that . is, the assembling (jam • ) and harmonious
arrangement (nazm) of things .

•

A body is a three- dimentional substance

having length , breadth and depth .

It is composed of the substance

(jawhar) which is its genus , and of the dimensions (ab ' ad) of length ,
br~dth and depth which constitute its differentia .
10

A body is made up

of matter (hayult) and form (~a rah) .
Furthermore, composition is equivalent to the change in a
condition which its e lf is not a compound .

I

other words, composition

is motion, for without movema~ t no composition can take place.
is a composite .

Without moti on there·, can be Ro bbodies .

body

Corporeal

bodies and motion cannot ontologically precede each other .
15

Again, time exists through the instrumentality of motion because
motion is change , and change marks the duration of that which is
changing .

Thus motion measures the duration of the change i n a body .

Time is a duration computed by by motion .
as we have stated earlier .

All bodies have a duration,

By this we mean the duration of t heir
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existence.

Corporeality does not precede motion, as we have already

explained.

Corporeal existences do not precede duration which ls

measured by motion.
20

We arrive at the same conclusion that corporeal

existences, motion and time do not precede each other ontologically.
They co-exist.

Therefore, if time were actually finite, the existence

of bodies will necessarily be also finite in actuality .
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This conclusion

ls inevitable if composition and assimilation were a form of change.

We would not have reached this conclusion if composition and assimilation were not a type of change.
We shall attempt now to show in a different way that time cannot
be infinite in actuality in both its past and future aspects.
5

Let us

proceed by assuming that each period of time ls repeatedly preceded
by another until a period of time 1s reached that ls not preceded by
any other.

In other words, we shall go back in time until a dis-

connected interval is reached which ls not preceded by another disconnected interval.

In our opinion, things cannot be otherwise.

For

the alternative -would be a sequence of time intervals that would
stretch into the past infinitely.

This would mean that we can never

determine the length of an exact interval stretching from a definite
10

point in time into the distant past because such an interval cannot
be designated if its far end ls in infinity.

And lf a period beginning

with a definite point in time and ending in infinity were measurable
and knowable, then that which is infinite is also finite.
impossible contradiction.

This ls an
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Moreover, if no definite period of time can be reached (in
the past) without finding that it is preceded by another and that
by still another and so on infinitely - and that which is infinite,
its distance cannot be crossed and its end cannot be reached, for
122

one cannot expect to cover infinite time and reach a definite period
of time - but (by empirical experience we know that) a definite time
can be reached .
be finite.
infinite .

Therefore, ti me is not infinite and must necessarily

By implication, the duration of tbrporeal bodies ds not
Likewise , a body cannot be without a certain duration

becau s e its existence is not infinite but finite.

Therefore, a body

can never be eternal~

5

Similarly, the future cannot be infinite in actuality, for as
we have demonstrated, if the past, up to a definite point in time,
cannot be infinite (the same would be true of the future).
of time do continue to follow each other repeatedly .

Periods

But if any · length

of time is added to a segment of time that ls already finite, the
total time resulting from this addition would also be finite.

If

this were the case, the alternative would mean that the addition
one finite quantity to another finite quantity results in an infinite
quantity (and this is illogical) .
10

Time is a linked quantity (kammiyyah rnuttasilah) .

•

By this we

mean that it has a part that is common to both past and future, namely ,
the present (al- nn), which marks the end of the past and the beginning
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of the future.
A definite period of time has two terminations, one at the
beginning and the other at the end.

If two limited periods of time

were joined together by a moment that is common to both, the other
15

end of each of them would still be definite and known .

It has been

argued that the total sum of the two periods would be finite .

This

would mean that the ends in question are simultaneously finite and
infinite , which is a contradiction that must be rejected .

Therefore,

if a limited period of time were added to another limited period of
time, the sum of the two cannot be infinite .

For whenever a limited

time is joined to another limited time, each of these two segments
of time will still have a definite end on one side .
20

the future cannot be infinite in actuality .

We conclude that
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CHAPTER

(EXISTENCE ,

III

~ss~ CE AND -CA

LITY)

Our preceding discussion may now be followed by an inquiry
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into the possibility as t o whether or not a thing can be the cause
( 'J1:llah) of its own generation (kawn dhatihi) .

We shall attempt to

argue that this is impossible , for a thing cannot be its own cause ,
tha t is, the cause of its own coming into being (tahaww1yhU~,
out of something else or out of nothing .
5

whether

Some would argue that in

cert ain situations, being (ka ' in) is generated out of some specific
t hing .

For a t hing , in the first place, may exist (aysa) and be without

essence (dhntuhu laysa) .

Then a thing may be non- ex i stent (yakan laysa)

and yet have an essence (dhatuhu aysa) .
essence may not have any existence .

Moreover , a thing and its

Finally , a thing may exist and

have an essence .
To begin with, if a thing had netther existence nor essence,
then that thing would be nothing (la shay') and its essence would also
be nothing .

This would mean that no cause- effect (la 'i llah wala ma'lul)

sequence is involved, for such a sequence is applicable only to existing
things.

In this case , therefore , a thing cannot be the cause of its own

gen er ati on ,
10

(?r , thet"e is absolutely (mutlaqan) no cause .
•

To argue

that a thing can be the cause of its own becoming ~oald be then illogical .
It is impossible for a thing to be the cause of itself when that thing
is nothing and its essence is also nothing .
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The same conclusion is reached if a thing had an essence but
without having a (concrete) existence, for in this case it would also
be non-being (laysa), nothing and as such it would be neither cause
nor effect, as we have shown earlier .
cause of its own being .
15

Therefore, it cannot be the

To assume that a thing can be the cause of

its own being would be an absurdity in the event a thing had an essence
without a concrete existence .
The same result applies when the essence of a thing is identical
with another object, for mutable existents may undergo a change in
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some of their parts only without the rest being affected .

Such a

change could dissolve the existence of a thing without having any
effect on its essence .

But when a thing ceases to exist then its

essence becomes other than itself .
identical with its essence .

However, we know that a thing is

Therefore, in this case a thing will have

to be both itself and other than itself .

This is self - contradictory

and is likewise an impossibility .
This conclusion isalso true if a thing exists but without its
essence .

This would be the case when its essence happens to be other

than itself .
5

uch a condition may be due to the fact that the existence

and essence of a thing undergo dissimilar changes .

This, however, would

be in conflict with the fundamental truth that a thing and its essence
are identical .

Therefore, the hypothesis of having an existing thing

without its existing essence must be rejected because it is a sheer
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impossibility.
We arrive at the same consequence when a thing has both
existence and essence.

Even under these circumstances, a thing cannot

be the cause of its o~m being for the simp le reason that otherwise
a thing would be generating its own essence.

This

ould mean that

a thing would be the cause and its essence would be the effect, but
10

the effect is invariably other than the cause.

Thus if it so happens

that a thing is identical with the cause and its essence is identical
with the effect , then it follows that the essence can no longer be
the thing itself .
identical .

But we know that a thing and its essence are

According to the present argument a thing and its essence

would have to be two different things while in reality they are the
same .

Both views cannot be correct .

Therefore , we conclude that a

thing cannot be the cause of its own generation when both it and its
essence are existing entities .
Obviously , a non- existing thing cannot be the cause of its nonexisting essence, for in this postulated instance the thing and its
essence cannot be identical, while in actu~lity they are the same .
15

Thus we have established as true the basic principle that a thing
cannot be its own cause .

It cannot bring itself into being .

(THE PROBL M OF M~NING)
Having demonstrated the above truth, we shall now proceed by
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stating that a word (lafz) may or may not signify a meaning (ma•na) •

•

That which is void of meaning cannot be the object of knowledge and,
therefore, is of no concern to philosophy which seeks to know that
which has meaning .
20

Meaningful words are either general (kullI) or particular (juz•t).
Philosophy does not seek to know particular things because they are
incomplete entities , and what is incomplete and fragmentary cannot
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be fully known .

Being the knowledge of the true nature of things,

philosophy inquires into the un i versal which is whole and whose real
nature is accessible to knowl edge .
The universal, the general, is either essential (dhat t ) or
non - essential (ghayr dhat!) .
5

By the essence of a thing we mean that

which constitutes its very substance (muqawwim dhat al- shai ' ) and that
by whose existence a thing comes into being and is maintained (thabat) .
Without an essence, a thing disintegrates and decays (intiqa9 wafasad) .
Life, for instance , is the essence of a living being (hay y), the very

•

core which makes it what it is .
in of corruption and dissolution .

The absence of life means the setting
Th s life is essential in all

living beings, and that which is essential is also called substantial
(jawhart) •

It makes the very existence (qiwam) of a thing possible .

Substance may be integrative (jami') or differentiative (mufarriq).
That which is integrative apples to many things giving each its name
( ism) and its definition (hadd) and thereby unifying it and making

•
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it whole .

The integrative which names and defines many things may

apply to individual entities (ash!!!a~) as individual men .

As such,

it is called form (surah), for all individual men have the same form •
•
15

The integrative may also characterize many forms such as the living
and thus applying to all forms of living beings as man and mare.

This

is called genus (jins), and the one genus is applicable to all these
forms .
The substance that is differentiative, however, accounts for , t he unique
fea~ares .in tb:e definitions .of things . · Tne ,rattonal - ~al~~a ~i q) , for
instance, differentiates the living beings from each other.

This is

what is called differentia (fasl) because it differentiates things and

•

sets them apart from each other .
20

The non- essential, on the other hand, is the very opposite of
what has just been described .
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Its existence depends on that which it

predicates (al - maw9u' lahu) and which is also the source of its continuance (thabat).
to exist .

It is inseparable from the substance for which its serves

as a predicate .
( 1 arad)

•

Without the subject which it predicates it ceases

It is for this reason that it has been called accident ·

•

An entity whose existence is contingent on the substance is

found in one individual thing, a characteristic of its own, distinguishing
5

from the rest such as the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey .

-

.

It is called property (kha~a·h) because it belongs to one specific

W4

thing .

The accidental may also appear in many things like white•

ness in paper and cotton .

It is called common accident ( ' ara9 '!mm!)

because it is c ommonly shared by many things .
A word that has meaning i s ei t her genus, form , individual,
10

differentia , pr oper ty or common accident .

All these may be classified

under two headings : substance and accident .
differentia are substant ial .
accidental .

Genus , form , individual, and

Property and the common accident are

Moreover , a meaningful word may also be universal (kull)

or part i cular (juz 'i ) , integral (mujtami ' ) or dis parate (muftari q ) .
Inasmuch a s we have discussed t hese concepts earlier , we s hall proceed
to investi gate the probl em of unity .

(THE NATURE OF UNITY)
What are the things in which the One or unity may be said to
15

exist?

The One (al - wahid) is found wherever there is continuity
•
( ' la kull mutta il) and i n those things that do not part ake of plurality

kathrah) .

This is equivalent to saying that unity may be descriptive

of diverse things as genus , form , individual, dlfferentia, property
and common accident and all what ha s been men tioned above .
The individual may be natural (tab l'iy) as an i mal or plan t
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and the like or it may be man- made (s l na ' iy) as house an d so on .

•

is a natural continuity about the house .

Its .

Its structure is

There
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continuous by accident, that is, by means of the occupation (of housebuilding).

The house is one as far as its natural parts are concerned.

Its structure is one by virtue of craftsmanship.

The house became one

by accidental unification (ittihad') (of its natural parts) .

•

But the

house itself is one by natural unification.

Unity may also be said of wholes and parts.

5

to everything and to some things.

It may be applied

It may be supposed that there is

no distinction between the "All" and the "every" , for "all"may be said
in connection with things that have similar or dissimilar parts .

We

say, for instance," "all" the water, and water has similar perts, and
"all" the body which is composed of bones and flesh .

It applies to

other things that have dissimilar parts as "all" the generation which
10

has different individuals .

"Every", on the other hand , is not applied

to things with dissimilar parts.
water .

One does not say, for example , r•every"

However, "every may be used with different things that are

accidentally assembled or that are unified by some meaning, even though
each individual thing may stand on its own, independent of the others.

"All", on the other hand, may be applied to any conglomeration of
things whatever the means of their unification .

15

Thus we do not say

''every" water because water is not made up of different things each
stan ding on its own by its very nature.

But we say "all'' the water

because water is a conglomeration of similar parts.
Likewise, there is a distinction between "part"(jui ' )

and "some"
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(ba'9).

" Part" is a designa tion of that which measures the whole,

dividing it into equal quantities (aqdllr mutasawiyah) .

''Som~ is t hat

which cannot be used as a measuring unit for the whole which it divides
into unequal quantities .

The "some", which divides the whole into

unequal portions, ls , nevertheless , part of that whole .
Unity, then, is ascribed to all the categories (al - maqalat) an d
5

all that is derived from them wheth er it is genus species, individual,
differentia, property, col'llllon accident, wh0½e, part, every (part) or
some (of the parts) .

(Unity is attributed to genus) because genus

exists in all its species, for it is a category consistently applied
to each of them . (The same is true of the) species which is present
10

in each of its i nd ividuals for it is invariably s a id of each of them.
Likewise t he individual which is a unity by circumstantial necessity
but which is itself divisible .
in essen ce.

15

non-existent .

Thus t he individual is not a unity

Its unity is accidental not ess ential and is in reality
That whic h is not in reality es~entiat in a thing must

of necessity be accidental.

Whatever .is acci dental in a thing is

caused by something other than itself .

The accidental in a thing is

an effect upon it (atb,ar f!h), and an ef f ect is relative (mu af)
and

is the result of a cause (min mu ' atb'!,bb).Therefore, unity (wa~da h )

in individual things is necessarily an ef f ect of a cause (athar min
mu'a,tht,hJr) .
The s pecies is descriptive of many thin gs which differ as
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individuals.

It is, therefore, a plurality because it comprises

many individuals and is also composed of things, for it nas genus
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and differentia.

An example of this is man whose constituent elements

are the qualities of living (9ayy),thinking (na~iq) and dying (mayyit).
Thus the species is essentially a plurality with respect to its
individuals as we ll as its structure (tarkib).

The unity (wahdah)

•

that characterizes it is circumstantial and not essential.

Therefore,

it does not possess unity in reality, for the unity that it has is only
accidental.

That which happens to a thing accidentally is caused by

some other agent.
5

Accident in a body is an effect upon it, and the

effect is relative (mud!f), for it is the result of a cause.

•

It

has, then, been established that unity in the species is necessarily
an effect of a cause also.
The genus covers many things that differ in their s pecies wh ich
is indicative of ~hat a thing is

(ma -iyyat al-shay•).

It is, therefore,

a plurality because it has numerous species each existing independently.
It is thus a plurality in this respect.

This means that unity in it also

does not exist in reality, for it appears in it only in an accidental
10

manner.

An accident in a thing has an external causation.

is an effect in a thing and is, therefore, relative.
result of a cause.

The accident

The effect is the

We conclude that unity in the genus is likewise

an effect necessarily caused by another agent,
The differentia embraces many things having different species whi ch
identify what a thing is (ayytyyat al-shat•).

The term comprises all
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the individuals of the species under which this differentia comes
indicating its classification .

Thus the dlfferentla ls a plurality

with respect to the species and the individuals that belong to these
15
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species .

The unity that ls apparent in it, therefore , ls not real .

Its presence ls only accidental .
the thing in which it occurs .

An accident has its causation outside

It ls, consequently , an effect in the

thing in which it happens, and that which ls effect ls relative, for
it ls the result of a cause .

It must be concluded that unity in the

differentia is also an effect of a cause .
Property is said of one species and of all the individuals that
belong to it .

It substantiates the existence of a thing which of

necessity must be particular .
5

Property is, therefore , a plurality

because it exists in numerous individual things , and because it is
motion which is particular .

Thus the unity present in property is also

not real, for it is accidental .
ls caused by another agent .

That which ls accidental in a thing

It ls, therefore, an effect which ls

relative and ls the result of a cause .

Consequently , unity in property

ls also an effect of a cause .
The common accident ls also said of many individual things.
Therefore, it is a plurality because it is found in many individual
10

entitles .

The common accident ls either a quantity which is disposed

to increase or decrease and is , therefore, particular . Or it may be
a quality (kay.flyyah) which has a propensity to assimilate that whi ch
ls similar or dissimilar, stronger or weaker.

Thus quality can
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accommodate contrariety (i!:!2tilaf) and is, therefore, a plurality.
This means the unity present in it is not real unity because it is
accidental.
cause.

Accident, as we have already shown, is an effect of a

It mus t t hen be concluded that unity in common accident is

likewise an effect of a cause.
"The all" (al-kull) applies to the categories (al - maqulllt) which
are composed of parts and this is true of all the categories .
10

Any

category (maqillah) to which the "allt1 is applied has also parts
because every category is a genus.
form has individual things .
it has many divisions .

The

11

This means it has forms, and every
all 11 , then, is a plurality because

The unity that it manifests, therefore, is

not real, for its is accidental and thus an effect, as we have
demonstrated before with respect to all that is accidental .
The same is true of "every'' (jam!'), for it is a designation
that applies to many assembled things .
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Therefore, it is a plurality.

The unity that is present in it is not real , for it is accidental
and, consequently, an effect of a cause, as it was pointed out above.
The particular is either essential or accidental.

5

of the essential may be similar or dissimilar.
parts is a plurality .

The parts

That which has similar

An example of this is water whose every part

is truly water and is itself divisible .

Every part of water , which

ls water in its perfect form, is a plurality .
has dissimilar parts is also a plurality .

The essential which

By "dissimilar parts" we
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different parts such as the animal's body which ls composed of
flesh, skin, nerves, veins, arteries, ligaments, dermis, diaphragms,
bones, brain, blood, gall, mucus and all that constitutes the body
10

of a living being.

All these are dissimilar, and each part of the

body which we have just enumerated is itself divisible .
The particular which ls accidental, on the other hand, is
implied in the particular which is essential.

An instance of this

ls the length, width and thickness ln the flesh and bones as well
as in the other parts of an organism, and to which we can add the
color and taste and other accidentals.

The particular that ls accidental

follows the essential in its divisions .

Therefore, it has parts and ls

a plurality .

15

We conclude that unity in the particular is also not real .

Both natural and accidental continuity have parts .

The natural

continuity of the house , for instance, lies in its form which has
sides .

Its accidental , that is, man- made continuity consists in the

assembling of the mater ial of which it is constructed as the stones,
mortar and the parts of its bulk .

Thus it is a plurality also .

Its

unity , then is not real.

As we have mentioned above, a thing may be said to partake of
unity in relation to another thing .
20

An illustration of this is the

mile which signifies unity when we refer to "one mile" as a whole or
general (measurement) for distances covered by a flung arrow (ghalwat).
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But in relation to the parasang (farsa~), the mile repres ents only
a part.

On

the one hand, the mile is continuous and unified because

the specific distan ces of a flung arrow (gb.alwat) are continuous and
unified in lt .
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On

Thus it ls a whole , an "all" (kull) for such distances .

the other hand, the mile is disconnected (munfafil) from other miles,

namely , the miles which add up to one parasang.

Therefore , the unity

present in it is not real also , for it is accidental .
To sum up , the categories we have investi gated do not i n~reality
partake of unity .
5

In each of t hem, unity exists accidentally .

Whatever

happens to a t h ing accidentally must have its cause i n something other
t han the thing itself .
causation .

It is the result , therefore , of some external

An accident , in other words , is an effect of some external

cause , and cause and effect are always inseparably related .
Moreover , whatever exists accidentally in an object must exist
essentially in another .
10

This fact must be un derscored that accidents

which appear in an object exist essentially in another.

Having demonstrated

the fact that unity is presen t in the categories only accidentally , we
must now draw the conclusion that unity in them is not particular , that
is , it is whole and general , not essentially but accidentally, and
inas much as as the accidental existence of unity in one thing must
necessarily be attributed to another in wh ich unity exists essentially,
it follows that the existence of the True One (al - waQid al - ~aqq) must
be postulated whose unity i s not an effect caused by another . Further
light needs to be shed on this reality .
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(THE ONE AND THE lvw\NY)

15

All predicables (maqulat), whether perceived by the senses
(al-hiss) or conceived by the mind (al - 'aql) must relate to unity

•

and plurality in one of the follow i ng ways: each existent can be
either (1) one or many , or (2) both one and many, or (3) one only,
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or (4) many only .

(1 . PLURALITY WITHOUT UNITY)
If the predicables were supposed to consist of plurality only,
then they could not possibly share in one common state or meaning .
But the truth of the matter is that they do share in one common state
and meaning.
5

Therefore unity (in them) co- exists wi t h plur ality .

have assumed that unity does not exist .

We

This means that unity ls

both existent (aysa) and non-existent (laysa), and this is an impossible contradiction .
Similarly, if the predicables partook of plurality to the
exclusion of unity, then plurality would have no contrariety at all
because such contrariety (~ilaf) can only be unity.

If the predi-

cables had no contrariety , they would necessarily have to be identical .
10

But in reality they are not identical, for Identity (lttlfaq) would
imply having one state or meaning in common .

But the predicables

cannot be simultaneously identical and non- identical .

This ls illogical.

Thus the existence of unity is inevitable.
Moreover, plurality without unity would imply that the predicables
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are dissi mil ar (la mutashabiha), for things tha t are similar must
necessarily have at least one thing in common.

Our supposition

of the existence of plurality without unity would rule out the possibility
of having one t h ing that is common to all of them.
the predicables are dissimilar .

15

This means that

But as a matter of fact they are

similar (in a negative way) in not having unity .

However , they cannot

at the same time be both similar and dissimilar .

This is an impossible

contradiction .

We conclude that it is inconceivable not to have

unity .
Again , plurality without unity would also mean that the predicables
are in motion inasmuch as the absence of unity would negate the
existence of one state of being .

This would imply that they cannot

be in a state of rest (sukOn), that is, without change (mutaghay.. y ir)
or motion (muntaqil) .
20

must be in motion .

And if they cannot be in a state of rest t hey

But plurality alone would likewise necessitate

the absence of motion because motion is a form of change of place(makan) or
quantity (bi - kam,

lit . change in the ''how much"), or quality (b- kayfa,

lit . change in the ''how") or substance (jawhar) .
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to becoming other than it had been .
is unity .
to change.

Change is equivalent

But a state other than plurality

Without t he possibility of unity, plurality would be i mmune
Our presupposition of the non- existence of unity would

mean that change of plurality is also non.existent and that movement,
consequently, cannot exist .

In other words , plurality without unity
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would lead to the conclusion that the predicables are without motion
and at the same time not at rest, as we have demonstrated before.
is contradictory.

This

Therefore, unity must of necessity exist in the

predicables .
5

Furthermore, plurality to the exclusion of unity would imply
that the predicables either have or do not have individual things

-- .

(ashKhas).

If they were composed of individual, then these individuals

.-,_ .

-

.

of plurality (ashkhas al-kathrah) are or are not single units (ahad,
lit. ones) .
10

If they were not single units, then they would have to

be an infinite plurality (kat.ll,rah bila nihayah) .

If a section is

separated from that which is infinite, notwithstanding the remainder
being larger than what was separated from it, this severed section
woul d have to be either finite or infinite in plurality.

If its

plurality were finite, and we have supposed it to be infinite, it
would mean that it ls si ultaneously finite and infinite in plurality .
15

This is a logical contradiction .

If, on the other hand, its plurality

were infinite, and we know that it is smaller than the remainder, the
implication would be that one infinity ls larger than another infinity .
This is also self-contradictory , as we have shown earlier .
The individual entities of plurality are, therefore , by necessity

.

ones (ahad), that is, single units.
individual ls one, that is, a unity.

Thus unity exists because each
To the earlier statement that

predicables partake of plurality only, we must now add t nat · they
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20

do not partake of plurality only. And yet unity is present in them.
This is contradictory.

We wou ld arrive at the same contradiction

if we supposed the predicables not to consist of individual entities
or of plurality, for plurality signifies assembled individual things .
Things cannot be simultaneously a non- plurality (la katllrah) and a
plurality.

Therefore , it is inevitable that unity must be present

in the predicables .
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Likewise, plurality without unity would result in the impossibi lity to define any of the individual entities of plurality .
definition (hadd) is one thing applicable to one meaning .

•

For
If there

were no oneness in plurality, no definition could be made because
there would be nothing that could be defined (rna~dud) .

But the

individual entities of plurality are defined for they are defi nable • •
Thus they are both defined and indefinable .
5

contradiction .

Again, this an impossible

We must here also assert the necessary existence of

unity in the predicables .
Plurality without unity would also mean that plurality cannot
partake of number since one , that is , unity is the beginning of number
and number , moreover , is a plurality compsed of ones (ahad).

•

exceeds another by the additional ones or single units it has.
fore, if there are no ones, there can be no number .
10

There-

Md if there

were a plurality without ones, it could not be numbered .
can be numbered .

A plurality

But plurality

Consequently, the ones or unity are present with

116

plurality.

Our assumption that plurality contains no ones or single

units is, therefore, a contradiction of empirical evidence.

Thus

it is impossible not to have ones, single units, that is, unity .
Once again , to have the many without the one or plurality
without unity would mean the impossibility of knowledge (ma ' rifah) .
This is so because knowledge involves description (rasm), the
15

description or pictur e of the known object in the soul of the knower
as that object exists in one particular state .

For if it were not

in one specific state, which would make it possible for the soul
of the knower and the picture of the known object to be united , knowledge
would be impossible .

But knowledge does exist and , therefore, the

one state also exists .

Consequently , unity is a reality .

Our

assumption that it does not·exist is a contradiction of the facts.
Unity cannot but exist .
Likewise, plurality without the one or unity would lead us
20

to argue that each predicable is either a thing or no- thing .
it were a thing , then it must be one .
plurality .

If

Thus unity co- exists with

We have assumed that the predicable is merely plurality .

This means that it is both a plurality without unity and a plurality
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with unity; and this is contradictory .

If the predicable were no- thing,

then neither can it form a plurality nor can itself be a plurality .
It was assumed to be a plurality .

Thus it is simultaneously a

plurality and a non- plurality, and this is illogical .

We conclude
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that the predicable cannot be without unity.

5

It has thus been demonstrated that it is impossible for some
things to partake of plura l ity only simply because nothing can be
mere plurality.

For an existent can be either some-thing or no-thing.

If it is some-thing, then it must necessarily be one.
then it cannot be plurality.

Thus an existent cannot be a plurality.

But the fact is that it is a plurality.
diction.

If it is no- t hing ,

This is an impossible contra-

Therefore, it is impossible for some things to partake of

plurality to the exclusion of unity.
10

Our investigation has shed light on the fact that the predicables
or things in general cannot be plurality without being also unity
simply because it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality
without also partaking of unity.

t the same time, it has also become

clear that unity cannot exist without plurality.

Without exception,

nothing can be a plurality without its being a unity .

(2. UNITY WITHOUT PLURALITY)

We shall now argue that if the predicables partook only of unity
without plurality, contrariety (mu addah)would have to be ruled out
because an opposite (<Jidd) is an opposite of another thing and "otherness"
(ghay.riyyah) involves at least t wo t h i ngs, and two things constitute
a plurality.

Thus the absence of plurality means the absence of

contrariety .

But if there ls contrariety then there must also be
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plurality.
exist.

Since contrariety exists, therefore plurality must~also

We have sup·posed it to be non-existent.

This would mean that

it is both existent and non-existent, and this is self- contradictory.
We conclude that it ls impossible not to have plurality .
Also, unity without plurality would mean the absence of except i on

20
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(istit,nna'), for exception applies to one or more things other than
that to wh ich the exception is made.
plurality .

In other words, exception implies

It is an empirical fact that both the exception and that

to which the exception is made do exist .
also .

Therefore, plurality exists

We have supposed it to be non- existent.

.

This would mean it is

both existent and non- existent , and this is an impossible contradiction .
Consequently, the existence of plurality is inevitable .
Moreover, mere unity without plurality would exclude the

5

possibility of difference (tabayun), for in order to have difference
there must be a minimum of two things .
a plurality .

Two or more things constitute

Without plurality difference is inconceivable .

If

there is difference , then there must necessarily be plurality .
matter of fact differ ence does exist .
also .

s a

Therefore , plurality exists

We have assumed its non- existence .

This would mean it is

simultaneously being and non- be i ng , and this is a contradictory
10

impossibility .

We conclude that plurality necessarily exists .

Furthermore, mere unity without plurality would rule out agree-
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ment (ittifaq) and disagreement (i!!!,tilaf) as well as continuity
(ittisal) and separation (iftiraq).
•

For these cbnd\ ions are possible

when there are at least two things, and two things comprise a plurality .
Without plurality there coul d be neither agreement nor disagreement .
15

But agreement and disagreement are empirical facts .
plurality exists.

Consequently,

We have assumed that it does not exist .

that at one and the same time it exists and does not exist .
illogical .

This means
This is

We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Again , unity to the exclusion of plurality would necessarily
eliminate the possibility of a beginning (ibtida'), a middle (tawassutt)
••
and an end (a!!lir), for these can exist only in things that have parts .
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The one has no beginning, middle or end.
and end do exist .

However, a beginning, middle

Therefore, things which have parts I!ltlst necessarily

exist and such things ere obviously more than one .
plurality exists in that which is more than one .
plurality to be non-existent.
5

Consequently,
We have supposed

This is self-contradictory .

We conclude

that plurality exists by sheer necessity .
Once again, mere unity without plurality would rule out the
possibility of a thing having a particular shape (_!hakl) .

hapes

(a§hkal) are composed either of curved or straight lines or of both .
They may also be formed by curved or straight surfaces or both.

Shapes

that are circular or spherical must have a focal point (markaz ) and
10

a circumference.

That which is composed of curved lines and curved
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surfaces or of straight lines and straight surfaces or a combination
of these two possibilities must necessarily have angels and ends and,
therefore , constitute a plurality.
there must also be plurality .

But shapes do exist .

plurality is an existing reality .
exist .
15

Thus wherever there are shapes
Consequently,

We have assumed that it does not

To say that it both exists and does not exist ls self - contra-

dictory .

e conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Likewise, mere unity without plurality would exclude the
possibility of both motion and rest in the predicables , for the
movement of an objec t is equivalent to a change of place, quantity ,
quality or substance , and all these constitute plurality .
is at rest is at rest in a specific place .
20

are elsewhere .

That which

Yet some of tt s parts

Thus both terms "place" and ''parts" imply a plurality

because "parts" are more than one part and "place" consists of top,
bottom, front, back, right and left.

By its very nature (bitib! ' ihi),

•

"place" necessitates the existence of plurality .
than the occupant (al - mutamakkin) .
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occupant .

For place is other

An occupied place implies an

height implies that which is high, diminution that which

diminishes , change that which changes , existence that which exists, and
decay that which decays .

Negation (nacy ) of all these entities would

necessitate the existence of plurality, for to refer to -a thing as ;
not existing , not decaying , not rising , not diminishing or not changing
would constitute a subject (maw~a•) and predicate (maQmul ) , a subject
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5

that is predicated by a negation of limited things.
if there is rest there is bound to be plurality.
there can be neither rest nor motion .
Consequently, plurality exists also .

Therefore,

Without plutality,

But rest and motion do exist .
We have assumed its non-existence.

This would mean that it both exists and does not exist , and this is
an impossible contradiction .

Therefore, plurality inevitably exists .

Thus it has been demonstrated that it is impossible for a thing
10

to exist without partaking of plurality, because without plurality
it can neither be in motion nor at rest .

But the fact is that nothing

perceptible (shay' min al - mahsusah) or anything related t o things

•

perceptible can neither be in motion nor at rest .

Therefore, not

a single thing can be without plurality .
Lik'E!Wise, unity alone without plurality would eliminate the
possibility of a part or a whole existing at all , for the whole is
the sum of the parts which are at least two in number, and two parts
constitute a plurality .
15

Thus without a plurality there can be no

whole, and without a whole there can be no part because the whole
and the part are inseparably related .
presupposes the existence of the other .
the other .

The one cannot be without

We are then led to say that things are not wholes and

that they do not have parts .
have parts .

The existence of the one

But empirically things are wholes and

This would mean that the whole and the part are

simultaneously being and non- being, and this is self - contradictory .
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The part is also one.
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there is unity.

Therefore, if there is a part, then

Similarly, the -existence of the part implies the

existence of the whole, for without a part there can be no whole .
And if there were neither part nor whole , then nothing could possibly
exist.

If nothing existed, then there can never be anything perceptible

(mahsus) or conceivable (ma'qul), and there can never be unity in

•

5

anything perceptible or conceivable.

If we assume that there is no part

and no unity, it follows that there can be no part and whole and,
consequently, no unity .

We have supposed that unity exists.

This

would mean that it both exists and does not exist, which is illogical.
Therefore, we conclude that plurality must inevitably exist.
It has thus been proven that none of the predicables mentioned
above could partake of unity wi t hout partaking of plurality also for
the simple reason that there cannot but be parts and wholes, as we
10

have shown.

The preceding i nvest i gation has also demonstrated the

fact that there can be no plurality without unity in any of the
predicables which were discussed.

Part of the discussion has also

shown that there can be nothing that partakes of unity without
partaking of plurality also .

(3. UNITY, PLURALITY AND CAU

LITY)

It has become clear, therefore, that unity and plurality cannot
exist separately and independently .

All the predicables mentioned
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15

earlier partake of both unity and plurality .

It is a sheer necessity

that the one and the many be present in all things such as we have
enumerated above .

Having established the fact that it is in the very

nature of things to be both unity and plurality, it must now be stated
that unity can be either distinct (mubayin) from plurality or the two
(unity and plurality) are interdependent.

If unity were distinct from

plurality, that is, if unity existed separately, we would have the
same contradictions whi ch were pointed out when the possibility of
unity without plurality was postulated.
20
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The same would be true of

plurality (if it existed separately).
The one alternative that remains is for unity and plurality
to be interdependent (musharikah), namely , co-existing in all perceptible
objects and all that is related to them.

In other words , anything

that partakes of plurality partakes also of unity, and wherever unity
is present, there one finds also plurality.
Having demonstrated the co-existence of plurality and unity in
5

all sensory objects and all that is related to them, it must now be
pointed out that this simultaneity or co-existence (ishtirak) (of
unity and plurality) can be due either to chance (ba~t), that is,
by coincidence (ittifaq) without a cause, or is the result of a cause.
If it were due to c ance, then we would have to assume that unity
and plurality had existed separately•

»ut

to tbl, ~ondltign (se~atate

~jstence ~{ Wlity -a _ plqr ·1ity) would be applicable all the contra-
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dictions (fnU.~alat)which we have encountered when we searched for
plurality without unity.

And how is it possible to have plurality

and unity simultaneously if they were distinct?
10

Is not the many

simply a plurality of ones, an assembled group of unities?
unity must exist with plurality .

Therefore,

Things cannot be otherwise .

More-

over , If they were distinct, how could possibly by mere unity, when
they are two things (unity and plurality), and two things constitute
a plurality?

e conclude that it is inconceivable for unity and

plurality to be distinct.
We could return to the possibility of attributing the cause
of the (assumed) distinctiveness (of unity and plurality) to chance .
But this distinctive features are existences (inniyyat) and to these,
15

too , apply the logical contradictions which we have encountered .
Therefore, unity and plurality could not have possibly been s eparate
and then have united ( i ttafaqat) by chance, that is , wtthout a cause .
Hence , the only possibility that rema ins would be to say that the
i nterdependent co- existence of unity and plurality must have been
the result of a cause and that this condition must have prevailed
f r om the beginning when they came into being .
Having established the necessity of a cause to explain their
interdependent simultaneity, we must go on to say that this cause
either be from within itself (internal) or other than itself , that

20

is , external and separate from it .

If we suppose the cause to be

can

12 5

from itself, it would necessarily have to be part of the self .

This

would be identical to saying that the part (as the cause) is ontologically prior to the rest (as the effect) .

ince the cause pre-

cedes the effect in existence, as we have shown in our Book on the
Differences (kit!b ' la al- mubiyanah), it follows that any sensory
object or that which isrelated to it, we mean all things , would have
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.

-

.

to be either mere unity (wahdah faqat) or mere plurality (kathrah
faq a t) or must be both unity and plurality simultaneously .

•

If it

were mere unity (or mere plurality) , the ensuing result (i . e . contradictions) would be similar to what was encountered earlier.

s

Con-

sequently, unity and plurality must eo ~ex i st interdependently .

This

interdependent co - existence must be the result of either chance or
a cause f rom within or from without .

If it were due to chance, the

same contradictions would follow which have already been indicated .
If it were self - caused, the consequence would be a chain of causes
that is infinite.
10

But it has been demonstrated that nothing can be

infinite in actuality .

Therefore , we must conclude that the inter-

dependent co- existence of unity and plurality cannot be self- caused .

(4 . FIRST CAUSE : THE TRUE ONE)
The only possibility that remains would be to attribute the
interdependent co- existence of unity and plurality (in predicables or
perceptibles in general) to a cause other than themselves (unity and
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plurality), a cause that is transcendent and nobler than, and ontologically prior to, both unity and plurality.

For the cause precedes

the effect in existence, as we have shown in our essays on Differences,
a cause that ls separate from both.

For simultaneity is a necessity

in co-existents, as we have shown earlier, and it ls caused by some
exterior agent .
chain of causes.
15

If this were the case, we would have an infinite
But infinity in causality ls an impossibility, as

we have demonstrated.

This ls so because nothing can be infinite in

actuality .
Moreover, this transcendental cause cannot be of the same genus
as unity and plurality , for nothing can be ontologically prior to
other things of the same genus .

For instance, neither the substance

of man's humanity (al-insaniyyah) nor that of the horse's animality,
which are both of the same genus, the living, could precede each
other ontologically.

The cause exists prior to the effect.

Therefore,

the cause that accounts for the interdependent co-existence of unity
and plurality in things that are many and one cannot be found in a genus .
20

If it (the transcendental cause) does not have a genus in common
with them (unity and plurality), it does not also share with them one
similarity.

For things that are similar are so with respect to one

genus, one species, such as redness, redness and shape, and shape and
so on.

Therefore, the cause of the interdependent co-existence of

plurality and unity in things that are many and one cannot be located
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in a genus or simi larity or form .

This is so because it is the

very cause of its (simultaneity of unity and plurality) being and
continuity and must, therefore, be higher, nobler and older than it .
143

It has th~s been demonstrated that all things have a First

Cause ('illah 'ula) which does not partake of any of their genera,
forms and similarities and has nothing in common with any of them.
This First Cause is higher, nobler and more ancient than all things .
It accounts for their coming into being as well as for their continuous
existence .
This Cause must itself be either one or many .

I f it were many,

then it compr ises unity, inasmuch as plurality is the configuration
5

of ones .

This would mean that t h is First Cause is both a pl ur ality

and a unity .

Consequently , we would have to say that the cause of

plurality and unity i s unity and plurality .
is the cause of itself .

In other words , a thing

But the cause must be other than the effect .

A thing is then other than i t self , and this is an impossible contradiction .

Therefore , we must conclude that the First Cause cannot

be a plurality or both a plurality and a unity .

Hence , the only

possibility that remains is that the First Cause must be One only
(wahid faqa~) without plurality in any way .
Thus we have delineated the fact that the First Cause is One.
The One (or unity) is found in all things tha t are caused .
10

We have

discussed above the variety of forms the one or unity takes in sensory

~8

objects and related things .

We must now elucidate the nature of

unity in the predicables as well as the nature of the True Unity

.

(al-wa hdah
al-haqq) and the meaning of unity allegorically (bi - al •
majaz) and in reality (bi - al - haqTqah) .

•

following chapter .

This is our objective in the
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CHAPTER

IV

We shall now discuss the type of unity that exists in the
predicables (al-maqulat) and the nature of the One in Truth (alwahid bi-al-haqq) and the One when it is used in the allegorical

•

•

(bi-al-majaz), rather than the real, sense.

(THE RELATIVE AND THE AB OLUTE)
15

Beginning with the necessary premises, the fact must be
stated that "the great" and "the small," ''the long" and "the short,"
"the many" and "the few" are terms used to describe things in a
relative (bi-al-Idafah) rather than absolute (qawl mursal) sense •

•

Thus a thing is described as "great" in relation to, or comparison
with, something that is smaller.

It is said to be "small" when it

is compared with something that is greater .
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Likewise, a matter

or affair is described as great in contrast to a matter that is
small or minor .

A mountain is depicted as small in relation to

another mountain that is bigger.
If the word "big" were applied in an absolute manner to that
to which bigness may be ascribed, and in the same way the term "small'',
we would be referring to something infinite that can never (battah)
exist in actuality (bi-al-fi'l) or in potentiality (bi-al-quwwah).
5

This would be the case because there could not possibly be anything
bigger than that which is described as big in an absolute manner .
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Thus the absolutely large cannot be infinite actually or potentially.
For if something other than it that is larger existed actually or
potentially, then it itself could not be said to be absolutely large
because the existence of something larger would render it comparatively
small .
10

If this were not the case, then that which is larger than it

would by comparison be either smaller than it or equal to it, and
this self - contradictory.

Therefore, we conclude, nothing could

possibly be larger, actually or potentially , than that wh ich is
absolutely large .
This argument means that a magnitude ( •az t m) exists

•

which cannot be doubled in actuality or in potentiality .

To double

a thing is to double its quantity (kammiyyah), and this doubling of
145

its quantity exists either actually or potentially .

Therefore, a

magnitude twice as large as the absolutely large exists in actuality
or in potentiality.

Thus the absolutely large can be doubled .

The

resultant double ( i'f) is a whole to that which is doubled , and
that which is doubled is equal to half the double, and the half
(nisf) is part of the whole .
•

This would mean that which is doubled

is part of the double .
This all adds up to the conclusion that the absolutely large
is both a whole and a part .
5

If the double of the absolutely large

is not larger than the absolutely large, then it will have to be
either equal to it or smaller than it .

If it were equal to it, an
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absurd contradiction (muhal ~an1•) would result, namely, the whole

•

would be equal to the part, and this is illogical.

more absurd

impossibility would ensue if the double of the absolutely large were
to be smaller than the absolutely large .
Inasmuch as the whole is larger than the part, it follows that
10

twice the magnitude of the large, which was thought to be absolute,
exceeds in size the iarge that is supposed to be the absolutely
large.

Now what is meant by the expression "the absolutely large"

is simply that magnitude which nothing can surpass in size .

Thus

we must conclude that ''the absolutely large" is not a magnitude that
is large absolutely .

Therefore , it is either not great at all or

it is relatively large, for the term "large'' cannot be used in the
absolute but rather in the relative sense .
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If the absolutely large is not large , this would be equivalent
to saying that being is identical to non- being (huwa
this is a contradiction of terms .

la

huwa) , and

Moreover , if the absolutely

large were equal to the relatively large, then the two words "absolute"
and "relative., would have to be synonymous (mutarildifan), applying
to one thing, a thing in comparison with which nothing could be
smaller .

For it has already been established that nothing can ever

be larger than the absolutely large, potentially or actually .
5

By the same argument (tadbtr) it could a1so be proven (yatabayyan)
that a thing can be described as small only relatively and not
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absolutely.
any quantity.

The terms "large" and "small" may be used to describe
The .terms "long" and "short", on the other hand, are

applied to describe a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah) to
•
which they strictly belong and not to any other kind of quantity.
10

But these terms are also used relatively and not absolutely.

The

proof (bayan) for this fact would be the same as that advanced for
the terms "large" and ''small ."

When we come to the words "few'' and

"many" we find that they are applied to a discrete quantity (kamrnlyyah
munfasilah).

•

What has been said of the terms large and small, long

and short, is also true of " many", namely, it may be used only in
a relative and not in an absolute sense.

This fact is proven by

what has been stated before inasmuch as the argument is the same.
15

As to the term "few'' (al-qaltl), it may be supposed that it
could be used in the absolute sense, namely, when tltwo" ls thought
to be the beginning of number and all numbers other than "two'' would
then be lager than the "two."

On

the basis of this supposition,

"two" as the smallest number would be, therefore, identical with
"the absolutely few,tt because it can never be

11

rnany" for there is

no number smaller than it.

(THE NATURE OF THE ONE)
If the "One" were a number, and there is nothing less than
the One , then it would be equivalent to the "absolutely few. 11
20

But

this conjecture cannot be true because if we considered the One a
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number, a considerable absurdity would necessarily follow.

For if

the One were a number, it would have to be a certain quantity; and
if the One were a quantity, then quantitative characterisitcs would
necessarily have to be attributed to it .

In other words, it would

have to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others) .
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If

thus the One had units, some equal to it, others unequal to it, then
the One will have to be divisible .

For the smaller unit must come

after the largest unit of after some parts of it.

This ,1ould mean

that the largest unit is equal to some units, and is, therefore,
divisible .

But the One is not divisible .

Its divisibility, then ,

exists and does not exist, and this is an impossible contradiction.
5

We conclude that the One is not a number .
Our saying "Oneu, however, should not be interpreted to mean
the material (hayulT) constituent of the One, namely, the substance
('unsur) which is found in the One and thereby becomes One .

•

the substance that exists and not the One (or oneness) .

It is

Likewise,

that which is formed of matter may be enumerated by number, but is
not a number itself .

For instance , when we say ''five horses," it

is understood that t he horses are enumerated by five which is a number
but which does not consist of matter.

The material is in the horses .

Thus our saying "One" should not be construed in such a way as to
lead to that which derives its oneness from the One (i . e . the material)
10

(al - muwahhad bi-al-wahid) .

••

Our saying ''One'' should be understood

to suggest oneness or unity <~•hdah) itself, and this unity is never

•
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divisible .
If One were a number and not a quantity, and the rest of
the numbers, namely, two and t he numbers t ha t follow it, also
constituted quantity , then the One would have to be class ified
under a category other t h.an quantity.

Therefore, the One and the

other numbers are all sai d to be numbers by virtue of the similar ity
of their names ra ther than t he ir natures.
number by name only and not by nature.
except in relaion to one thing.

15

Consequently, One is a

For numbers are not used

The various branches of medicine,

for instan ce, are related to the one science, medicine, and the
medical drugs (al - mubri'at) are related to the one process of healing
(al- .r').
But how can this hypothesis (ia nn) be true?

In other words,

if the One were a number, it would necessarily have quantitative
characteristics which are equal and unequal (to other quantities).
This would mean that besides the One there are other ones some of
which are equal to it while others are either more or less than the
One .
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But if this applies to the One, it must also be applicable

to all other numbers .

In other words, a number would have a

synonym (samY) that is equal to it and another synonym that ls
smaller and still another that is larger.

Number three, for instan ce,

would have other threes, some equal to it, others smaller and still
others that are larger .

This would be the case with each number .
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Now if this is not true of numbers about which we have no
doubt (that they are numbers) , it cannot also be true of oneness
5

(al- wahdaniyyah) .

•

If our saying that the characteristic feature

- ..

(khassah) of number as well as of anything t hat is quantitative
is to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others) means
that each number has another number similar to it and another number
that is dissimilar to it , namely, larger
would follow that two is not a number .

or

smaller than it , it

This conclusion is based

on the fact that there is no number less than two, but that there
are numbers larger than two .

If two were considered a number on

the basis that it has a number equal to it , namely, another two,
and that it has numbers unequal to it, namely , those that are larger ,
we would have to conclude that One ls also a number because it has
10

a number equal to it, that is , another One, and numbers that are
not equal to it, namely , t wo and all the numbers which follow .
this were true, then One wou ld have to be a quantity .
the other numbers wou l d then be quantita t ive .

If

The One and

Thus if t he One is

not a number by name, it must be a number by nature .
Again, the Une must be either a number or not a number .

If

it were a number , it would have to be an even (zawj) or an odd (fard)
number .

If it were an even number , it would have to be divisible

into two part that are similar (mutamathil) in their oneness .
the One ls indivisible.
20

But

To say tha t l t is both divisible and in-

divisible would be self- contradictory .

Furthermore , if the One
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contained single units, then it is a composite of such units .
means it is constituted of its own essence .
the same time units.

This

It ls thus One and at

But the One ls One only and not Ones or units.

To say that it is both One and Ones (unity and plurality) would be also
self- contradictory.
If the One were not an even number, it would have to be an odd
number .

Now an odd number, when divided into two, would have two

parts that are dissimilar in the number of their units .

This would

mean that the Cne is simultaneously divisible and indivisible, and
20
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that it is Ones and not just One, and this is an impossible contradiction.

Therefore, we must conclude that the One is not a number.

It must, however, be pointed out that this manner of difinlng
the odd number may be supposed to be legitimate only after the proof
has been established that One is not a number .

Otherwise, what

would prevent anyone, who considers the One a number, from defining
an odd number as the number whose division into two parts would have
5

two sections that are dissimilar in the number of their units?

This

definition would apply to the One which of necessity is indivisible .
If it has not been demonstrated by the previous discussion that
One is not a number, the following argument will then have to be
advanced:

The basic element which constitutes a thing ls not necessarily

identical with the t hing itself .

The vocal letters, for instance,

from which speech ls composed , are not equivalent to the speech itself .
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For speech is a harmonious sound meaningfully arranged to indicate
a certain thing with respect to time .
10

The letter, on the other hand,

is a natural sound whi ch does inob have · any compo~ents .

If that which

is generally considered a number were compos ed of Ones or single
units, then the One is the constituent element of number.
the One itself cannot be number .

Therefore,

Furthermore , the One has no con-

stituent element from which it is composed and which also becomes
the constituent element oft e numbers that are formed of groupings
of Ones . This would render the One a number whose basic substance
is also the substance of all the recognized numbers .

In this way,

the One could be considered a number .
It may be supposed that the One is the constituent element of
Two, and the Two the constituent element of Three, simply because
15

the Two ls contained in Three .

If Two, which is a number, is the

constituent substance of Threi,. the conclusion ls drawn that One,
which is the constituent substance of Two, must also be a number .
This supposition, however, is not true because Two , which is a
composite, if thought to be the const i tuent substance of Three,
has itself the One as its own constituent substance .

But the One ,

while being the constituent element of ~rn , is itself without a
constituent element .

The One ls not a composite .

Unlike the Two,

.

it is simple (bastt)
. The Two, on the other hand, ls a composite
'
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(murakkab) made up of the simple One .

But a number cannot be partly

simple, which constitutes its basic substance - and by "slmple11 we
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mean that which ls composed of nothing else - and partly composite
made up of that simPle element.
It may be believed, however, that this ls the case in composite
substance (al-jawhar al - murakkab) such as a body that is composed
5

of two simple substances, namely, matter (•unsur) and form ( urah) •

•

It has been argued that substance has three components: two are
simple, namely, matter and form, and the third is a composite of these
two, in other words, formed matter (al-'unsur al-musawwar), which ls

•

the body itself.

•

In a similar fashion, number is believed to be

composed of simple parts, the One, which is the constituent substance
of what are accepted as numbers, and of the recognized number itself,
which is a composite of the simple One.
This belief is not true, for this ls a converse comparison
10

(tamthtl

1 aksI).

The primary, simple substances (al-jawahir al -Gla

al-basitah,, from which a body is made, are m tter and form.

•

But

the body itself, even though it ls composed of matt~rr,anu· form, ~it
ls so composed only accidentally, for by nature it ls nothing but
a body, that ls, composed of matter and dimensions (ab 1 ad), which
are identical with its form.

Neither matter nor the dimensions,

which are the form, can separately become a body, which comes into
being only as the result of their union.
15

Thus the One, which is the basic substance that constitutes
what ls commonly known as number, cannot itself be number.

For
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number is the aggregate of Ones.

It is made up of Ones or units

in the same sense as the body is substances because it is composed
of substances.

Of course, nothing can prevent us from designating

names and giving definitions to the constituent parts which go into
the making of things, such as "the 11 ving" (al-hayy) in 11 ving beings
•
and "substance•• in substances, and what we have in mind here are the
20

essential and not the accidental names.

This discussion leads us to

conclude that the One is the constituent element of number, but itself
ls positively not number .
Thus it has been demonstrated that One ls not a number.

The

definition that is used of number is rather a comprehensive (muhTt)

• •
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description of number .

By this we mean that the number is a magnitude

( 'i zam) of units or ones (wahd~niyyat), a total sum of units and a

•

•

putting together of units.
Two, therefore, is the beginning of number.

Considered by itself

without thinking of the other numbers, Two would not by nature seem a
small number.

The quality of "smallness" or "few- ness" (al-qillah)

becomes its characteristic the moment it is considered in relation to,
or compared wit~a larger number.

It is then that it (the Two) may be

described as small or "few'' , because all other numbers are larger than
5 it.

Thus Two ls few or not many in relation to other numbers . However,

by its very nature, the Two is a doubling (tad'!f) of the One, a sum

•

of two Ones .

It is, then, made up of two Ones, and that which is a

a composite must have paDts and it is the whole or the total of its

140

parts.

But the whole is larger than the part .

Therefore, number

Two is not small by nature .
The terms "large" and "smallff, lflong" and "short,'' "many'' and
''few'' cannot be used in an absolute but only in a relative sense.
10

Each may be related only to another thing which has the same genus
and not to that of another genus. me wo,:d "largeness,'' for example,
if it referred to a body, could then be related only to another body
and not, for instance, to another surface (sa~l]), line (khatt),
space (mak

), time (zaman), number ('adad) or speech (qawl).

As

an illustration, one cannot say: ' a body larger or smaller than a
surface, line, ppace, time, number or speech' but rather 'a body

15 larger than (another)body . • The same rule applies to all the other
categories (mentioned above).

In other words , it is incorrect to

use the terms 'larger ' or •smaller' to compare t h ings of different
genera.
Nor could one say: •a surface larger or smaller than a line,
space, time, number or speech' but rather •a surface larger br2smaller
than (another) surface;' and not •a line larger or smaller than a
space, time, number, speech or line, 'but rather •a line larger or
smaller than (another)line;• and not •a place larger or smaller than
a time, number or speech,' but rather •a place larger or smaller t han
20

(another) place; • and not 'a time larger or smaller than a number , speech,
but rather •a time larger or smaller than (another) time; and not
'a number larger or smaller than a speech'but rather •a number larger
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or smaller than (another) number;• and not 'a speech larger or
smaller than any of the rest of qualities' but rather 'a speech
larger or smaller than (another) speech.'
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Likewise, it uould be incorrect to say: 'a body longer or
shorter than a surface, line, space, time, number or speech.'

One

would be utterly mistaken in making the statement that •a body is
longer or shorter than a surface, line or place.

If it is supposed

that the length of a body were longer or shorter than the length of
5

a surface, line or place , then the comparison would be referring only
to the length of each of these categories, and the length is only one of their
dimensions and this dimension is a line .

Therefore, when we say that a

body, surface, line or place is longer or shorter what we really mean
ls that the line of this is longer than the line of that .

For in this

case we would be having varieties of the same continuous quantity
(al - kammiyyah al-mutta~ilah) .
Time is also a continuous quantity .
10

But because time does not

have an overtly recognizable line, it could not, therefore, be saids
•a body longer or shorter than time .•

Obviously, length and shortness

cannot be applied to anything in comparison to another except if they
were of the same genus even though both may have length and shortness .
The two things will have to be either bodies, surfaces, places or periods
of

time

Length and shortness in themselves, however , cannot be

applied to number or speech except with reference to the duration of
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time in which they take place.
meaning in a long tlme.
15

Thus we can say: a long number,

Similarly, it may be said: long speech,

meaning of long duration, not that the qualities of length and
shortness can be applied directly to speech and number.
Similarly, the terms "many" and "few'' are used to designate
things of the same genus.

Take, for instance, number and speech.

It would be incorrect to say: "a speech more or or less than a number,"
and

''a number more or less than a speech."

It would be correct to say :

"a number more or less than (another) number," and "a speech more or
20

less t han (another) speech."

(THE NATURE OF THE: TRUE ONE)
153

What has been established in the preceding argument leads us
to conclude that the One cannot really be related to anything else
of a similar genus.
genus .

This would be possible if the One itself had a

But the True One (alwahid al - haqq) has no genus at all.

•

•

We

have shown earlier that whatever has a genus cannot be eternal (azalt)
and that the eternal is void of genus •• Therefore, the True One is
5

eternal.

The True One never multiplies itself in any form and cannot

be related to, or compared with, anything else.

It has neither matter,

which would render it divisible, nor form consisting of genus and
species.

That which has these (matter and form) multiplies through

its constituent elements.

Moreover, the True One is never a quantity

(kammiyyah) and also does not have a quantity .

That which is quanti -
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t a tive is a lso divisible, for every quantity or anyth ing quantitative
is prone to increase or decrea se.

That wh ich decreases ls divisible,

and what is divisible is capable of multiplying in some form.
10

It has

been said that plurality (kathrah) is present in all the predicables
(al-maqulat) an d anything that is implied in them, that is, genus,
species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, whole,
part an d all (the rest).

Likewise, the One may be said to be present

in all the numbers that follow it .

Therefore, the True One cannot be

one of these .
Motion exists ln any of these, that ls, in any body which ls
matter and form, for motion ls movement (naqlah) from one place
to another (locomotion), increase, decrease, generation, , decay or
15

transformation (isti~alah).

Moreover, motion partakes of plurality

because space is quantitative and, therefore, divisible .
in sections is divided by the different locations .
is a plurality .

That which

Consequently, it

Locomotion (al-~arakah al - makanlyyah), it must be

concluded, partakes of plurality .
Increase (rubuwi yyah) and decrease (naqsiyyah) also partak8 of

•

plurality, for the movement of the extremities (nihayat) of that which
increases or decreases is divided by reason of its taking place in
20

the different locations extending between the points before and after
the increase or decrease .
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The same may be said of generation and decay, for the processes
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of generation and decay, from their beginning to their end, are
divided by means of the intervals of time during which they occur.
5

Thus the movements of increase and decrease, generation and decay,
are all divided (into parts) .

Similarly, transformation of a thing

into its opposite (gidd)or toward perfection (tamam) is also divided
by means of the periods of time in which it occurs.
Thus all movements are divisible but are also unified (mutawaQQldah)
because every movement in its totality ls One.

This is so by virtue of

the fact that every absolute whole (al-kull al-mutlaq) partakes of
unity .

This is also true of any pa rt of the whole, for an absolute

part (al-juz• al-mutlaq) also constitutes a unity .

•

No if plurality

exists in motion, it must then be inferred that the True One is not
motion .
Inasmuch as all things that are perceived by the senses or

10

conceived by the mind must exist either by natur~ objectlvely(ft •ay,nihi) or
subjectively (fl al~fik~), or by accident in our speech or writing,
it follows that motion exists in the soul.

What ls meant by this

ls that thought (al-flkr) moves from the images (suvar)of some objects

•

to the images of other objects as well as from one of the soul's virtues
and passions to another such as anger and fear, joy and sorrow and

15

so on.

Thus thought is capable of partaking of both plurality and

unity.

Because each plurality consists of a whole and parts, it

can be measured.

What has just been described happens accidentally
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to the soul and thereby the soul paEtakes of plurality and unity .
The True One, therefore, cannot be a soul.
If the logical course of thought is traced back, it would
lead to the intellect (al-'aql).

The intellect contains the species

of thin gs, for a species and that which is prior to it (i.e. genus)
are conceivable (ma'qul).

- .

The individuals (al-ashkhas), on the other

hand, are objects of sensory perception.

By individuals we mean

particular things which do not determine the names and definitions
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of objects.

The fact that the species unite with the would ls an

evidence that they are conceivable.

The soul conceives in actuality

(bi-al-fl'l) when the species are united with it.

Prior to this

union (lttihad), the soul's conception was only in potentiality

•

(bi-al-quwah).

It always takes another agent to change anything from

potentiallw- to actuall ty.
potentially.

But this agent (mu!!!rlj, lit. producer) must itself be

in actuality.
5

Without this agent a thing ls a thing only

The rationality of the soul is turned from potentiality
'rt

into actuality by means of the univefsals themselves (al--kulliit
a•yanuha).

This process is identical with the unification of the

species and genera of things, which are their universals, and the
soul.

It is through this merger (ittihad) that the soul becomes
•

rational ('aqilah), that is, acquires an intellect ('ql).

To say that

the soul has an intellect ls the same as saying that it contains the
universals of things.

These universals, which by being in the soul

have moved from potentiality to actuality, are identical with the soul's
Acquired Intellect (al-'ql al-mustafad).

The Acquired Intellect had
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existed in the soul only potentially.

The universals are, therefore,

the ifficient Intellect (al-'ql bi-al-fi'l) which moved the soul
from potentiality to actuality.

Inasmuch as the universals are

multiple (mutakathirah), as shown above, it must be concluded that
10

the Intellect part~ies, of plurality.
Primary and multiple.

The Intellect may be considered

But somehow lt partakes of unity because it

is a universal, a whole, as hAs been demonstrated, and a whole ls
One and partakes of unity.

Thus 'Drue Unity (al- "hdah bl-haqq).

•

•

In our language, the synonyms (al-asma• al-mutaradlfah)

1 blade 1

and 'knife' are both used to designate the iron instrument of slaughter.
Synonyms are said of One thing.
thing.

The

blde' and the 'knife' are One

But this One ls also multiple because its substance (•unsur)

•

and its desigoattons _are- mulriplew
15

1

In this case, the iron instrument

of slaughter is the substance of the synonyms •sharp edge,' 'blade'
and 'knife,' and is itself divisible and multiple.
terms by which it ls identified are multiple.

Likewise, the

The True One, we must

conclude, cannot be synonymous with anything.
Moreover, there are in our utterances words that have a resembl ance
to names, such as the lion which ls called dog and the star which is
also called dog.
is 'dog.•

Both are One as far as the name is concerned which

The substance of this

and the star.

1 dog 1

ls multipl~,that is, the lion

Neither of these similar terms is the cause of the other,

for the star is not the cause of the lion, and the lion ls not the
cause of the star.

However, there are cases in which the things that
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share the same name can be the cause of each other .
this are the terms

1 the

1!:xamples of

.

written• (al - makhtut), 'the spoken' (al -

- •

malfuz) , ' the contemplated ' (al-mufakkar f l hi) and •the thing- itself '

•

(al-' ayn al - qa ' imah) .

The •written ', itself a substance (jawhar)

spells out that T.lhich is ' spoken ', which is also a substan ce; and
t he ' spoken ' , which ls a substance , expresses that whi ch l s • thought
about •, which is likewise a substance .
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Moreover , the ' contemplated ',

which ls substance , represen t s the ' thing- itself,' which ls also a
substance .

The One may be ascribed t o all of these , name l y , ' the

t hing- itself ' (al -' ayn fi <ibat i ha) , ' the idea ' (al - flk r ah) , ' the utterance '

- ..

.

(al - lafz) and ' the inscribed ' (al - khatt) .

The t h i ng- itself i s the

cause of the ' thing- in-t hought ' (al -' ayn fi al - fikr) , and the th i ngin-thought is the cause of the ' th i ng- in- utterance ' (al -' ayn fi al lafz) , and the thing- in- utterance is the cause of the

•

- ..

writing ' (al -'ayn fi al - kha t t) .
5

1 thing-

in-

This kind of One is also mul t iple

because it is used to designate many things .

Therefor e , the True

One cannot be One of mere resemblance of names .
One may be said of things whose substance is Qne . However, the
substance may un dergo change ei t her by act ion (fi ' l) , effect ( i nfl 1 al),
r elation (i~afah) or by some other way .

For example , the door and

the bed , which are made of one substance - wood or any other substance
of which things with vari ous f orms are made - and thus it is said that
the door and the bed are of One substan ce .

But these (the door and
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the bed) are also 'many' with respect to their substance, wh ich
10

is multiple and is made up of parts and 'many' with respect to the ir
forms.

Thus it is possible for things whose primary substance is

One to be multiple with respect to that substance simply because
it exists in numerous forms.
The expression ' One in substance' (wahid bi-al-'unsur) may

•

•

also be applied to things with reference to One specific thing in
them but which, by necessary implication, would refer to another
thing also .

An example of this is when we speak of decay as it

manifest in an object and, by implication, involves also generation
inasmuch as the decay of one thing may be at the same time the
generation of another.

T erefore , it may be said that the existent

(al-ka'in), in this case, is in actuality identical with that whose
substance is decaying .
15

This is another instance of multiplicity

because the one substance is used for several forms .
This kind of potential Oneness, namely the ' One in substance',
may be said of things which apply to One thing and imply another.
Growth (rubu), for instance, designates increase but also implies
decrease.

For that which increases has the potential to diminish .

Thus we may refer to the One process of increase-decrease .

In other

words, this dual process may apply to the one and the same thing.
But this One thing is also multiple with respect to substance because
the substance belongs to several forms due to the process of increase-
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decrease , expansion-contraction (al-rubu wa-al-damr). The True
•
One, therefore, can never be $Ubstance. None of the various things
that are One in substance qualify to be called "The One. 0
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'Ilhe One may be used to describe that which is indivisible,
as we have pointed out.

That wh ich is indivisible is so either

actually or potentially.

thing may be indivisible in actuality

.

due to its hardness (salabah) as it is the case with a diamond.

But

a diamond has parts by necessity because it is a body and, consequently,
is multiple.

A thing may also be indivisible by reason of its minute-

ness which eludes the action of a dividing instrument (al - alah al 5

qasimah).

It is indivisible simply becaus e there is no device that

can divide it .

But the fact remains that it has parts because it is

a magnitude (•i~am) and has been subject to diminution (al-,ia!!ar).
It is, therefore, multiple .
A

thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even

though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation
it does not digress from its basic nature.

Its definition and name

continue to be applicable to the separat ed part.

This is true of all

continuous magnititudes (al-a•zam al-muttasilah), namely, a body,
•
•
surface, line, space and time . Needless to say, a part separated
10

from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface is a
surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected
from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.
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share the same name can be the cause of each other .

£xamples of

.

this are the terms 'the written• (al - makhtut), 'the spoken' (al-

- •

malfuz), ' the contemplated ' (al - mufakkar flhi) and ' the thing- itself'
•
(al-' ayn al - qa ' imah) .

The 'written ', itself a substance (jawhar)

spells out that ~Ahlch is ' spoken ' , which is also a substance; and
t he ' spoken ' , which is a substance , expresses that whi ch i s ' thought
about •, which is likewise a substance .
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Moreover , the ' contemplated ' ,

which is substance , represents the ' thing-i tself, ' which is also a
substance .

The One may be ascribed to all of these , namely , ' the

t hing- itself' (al - 'ayn fl 4.hatiha) , ' the idea • (al - fik r ah) , ' the utterance '

- ..

.

(al - lafz) and ' the inscribed ' (al - khatt) .

The th i ng- itself is the

cause of the ' thing-in-thought ' (al -' ayn fl al - fikr) , and the thingi n- thought is the cause of the ' thing- in- utterance ' (al -' ayn fi al lafz) , and the thing- in- utterance is the cause of the ' thing- in-

•

- ..

wri ting ' (al-' ayn fi al - khatt) .
5

This kind of One is a l so mul t iple

because it is used to designate many things .

Therefore , the True

One cannot be One of mere resemblance of names .
One may be said of things whose substance is One. However, the
substance may undergo change either by act ion (fi ' l) , effect (infi ' al),
r elation (i9afah) or by some other way .

For example , the door and

the bed , which are made of one substance - wood or any other substance
of which things with various f orms are made - and thus it is said that
the door and the bed are of One substance .

But these (the door and

148

the bed) are also •many' with respect to their substance, which
10

is multiple and ls made up of parts and •many• with respect to the ir
forms.

Thus it is possible for thin gs whose primary substance is

One to be multiple with respect to that substance simply because
it exists in numerous forms.
The expression ' One in substance' (wahid bi-al-'unsur) may

•

•

also be applied to things with reference to One specific thing ln
them but which , by necessary implication, would refer to another
thing also .

An example of this is when we speak of decay as it

manifest in an object and, by implication, involves also generation
inasmuch as the decay of one thing may be at the same time the
generation of another.

Therefore, it may be said that the existent

(al-ka'in), in this case, is in actuality identical with that whose
substance is decaying .
15

This is another instance of multiplicity

because the one substance is used for several forms .
This kind of potential Oneness, namely the 'One in substance•,
may be said of things which apply to One thing and imply another.
Growth (rubu), for instance, designates increase but also implies
decrease.

For that which increases has the potential to diminish.

Thus we may refer to the One process of increase-decrease .

In other

words , this dual process may apply to the one and the same thing.
But this One thing is also multiple with respect to substance because
the substance belongs to several forms due to the process of increase-

149

decrease , expansion-contraction (al-rubu wa-al - damr) .

•

One, therefore, can never be substance.

The True

None of the various things

that are One in substance qualify to be called "The One."
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'llhe One may be used to describe that which is indivisible,
as we have pointed out.
actually or potentially .

That which is indivisible is so either
A thing may be indivisible in actuality

due to its hardness (salabah) as it ls the case with a diamond.
•

But

a diamond has parts by necessity because it ls a body and , consequently,
is multiple.

A thing may also be indivisible by reason of its minute-

ness which eludes the action of a dividing instrument (al - alah al5

qasimah).

It ts indivisible simply because there is no device that

can divide it .

But the fact rema ins that it has parts because it is

a magnitude ( • i~am) and has been subject to diminution (al-~½ghar).
It is, therefore, multiple .
A thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even
though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation
it does not digress from its basic nature .

Its definition and name

continue to be applicable to the separated part.

This is true of all

continuous magniti tudes (al-a•zam al-muttasilah), namely, a body,
•
•
surface, line, space and time .
10

Needless to say, a part separated

from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface ls a
surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected
from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.
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All these are never divided actually or potentially into anything
other than their species.

Each of them is permanently susceptible

to differentiation (tafsil) and multiplicity within its own species •

•

Furthermore , a body multiplies by means of its three dimensions
(ab ' Ad) and six ends (nihayat), a surface by means of its two
dimensions and four ends, and a line by means of its tl1o dimensions
15

and two ends .

Similarly, a space is multiplied or increases in pro-

portion to the dimensions and ends of its occupant .

Likewise, time

is increased by means of its ends which are the moments (anat) of
time that designate those ends .

This is similar to the points that

indicate the two ends of a line .
Moreover, the One may be said of anything whose parts are
similar .

Such a thing is indivisible because whatever is separated

from it retains the same definition and name .

But this also is

subject to multiplicity even though it is not divisible (in the real
20

sense) .

In other words, everything is permanently susceptible to

division .
Reference may also be made to what is indivisible actually or
potentially , for such a division would result in the loss of its
essence .

An illustration of this is "the One man" or man as a unity ,

such as Muhannnad and Sa 'td, and "the One horse," as 'al:- ra ' id ' (the
explorer) and 'dhu al -' iq4l'(the one with the hobbled hoofs).

The
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same may be said of all natural individual things tha t have magnitudes,
as well as of accidental things and of species, genus, dlfferentia,
property, common accident.

If any of these ls divided it ceases to

be what it is (lam yakunhuwa ma huwa) . But it ls multiple by virtue
of its components and its constant differentiation.

All these may

also be described as partaking of unity, for each constitutes a
continuity .
The One is ascribed to that which cannot be divided into anything

5
else .

That which ls indivisible because it ls not continuous applies

to two things&

First, that which is not continuous, not compound,

and has nothing in common with other things.

An example of this is

the numerical One (al - wahid al - 'adadi) which ls not a continuous

•

entity .

In other words, it has dimensions and ends .

But the fact ls

that it is a continuous thing and ls indeed indivisible and lndescrete
(la munfasil) .

•

At the same time, it ls also multiple with respect to

its components which we can count .
10

of all things.

This numerical One is the measure

The other thing (that is indivisible because it ls not

continuous) is the vocal letters (huruf al - aswat) which are not

•

continuous .

•

The causes which render the numerical One indivisible

cannot be set forth .

The num~rlcal One is a measure for the vocal

utterances only .
The One ls a designation that is said of that which ls indivisi ble .
It cannot be divided because it has no part that has any resemblance
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to it or to anything els e.
15

It is also common.

quality may be one of two kinds .

Whatever has this

The first of these is circumstantial

(lahu wad') such as the point of a line which constitutes its end •

•

It has no parts because it represents the termination of one dimension,

and the end of a dimension is not a dimension itself .

On the other

hand, this termination of the line is multiple by reason of being
subject to past and future and by being common to both.
The designation One ls also applied to that which as a total
entity (kulliyyah) cannot be divisible.

When one says 'One pound,'

for instance, it is implied that it ceases to be 'One pound' the
moment a portion is separated from it, that is, from the total
quantity of the pound .
20

be a whole ,

In other 1ords , the 'One pound' would no longer

It is for this reason that the One may be more appropriate-

- ..

ly ascribed to a circumference (khatt al - da 'irah) than to any other
line because a circumference is a complete whole .

The circumference

contains the whole circie perfectly and is a complete whole .
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Whatever

is constituted in this manner is also multiple by virtue of its
differentiation.

Among the things to which the One may be applied

as a designation, it is the indivisible which is the most qualified
to have Unity ascribed to it.
Our discussion has elucidated the fact that the One may be
One essentially or accidentally.

The term One may be used in an

accidental sense as in a conunon name, synonyms or a designation that
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5

contains many accidents.

This may be illustrated by saying:

the

writer and the orator are One, whether the reference is to one specific
man or to man in general; or the man and the writer are One and so on .
On the other hand, if the One is used in an essential sense, it would
apply to all the things mentioned above which partake of unity.

This

is so because in essence they are One, that is, they have the same
substance in common .

The essential may be differentiated primarily

by continuity when it is a substance, by form when it is a species,
by name when it is both substance and form, or by genus when it is
10

continuity .
That which is One by virtue of its continuity is One either by
substance or by amalgamation (ribat) .

•

or shape .

This is called One in number

That which is One in form applies to things which have the

same definition .

That which is One in genus refers to things whose

predicates are identical .

Things which have the same name are,

therefore, equal and necessarily One .

Things which ae One by reason

of their equality (musawat) are the things t hat have One common r ela t ion
15

such as medical things which are all related to medicine .
Each of these things we have just mentioned , namely , that which
constitutes Oneness in number , form , genus and relation follows (with
respect to unity and plurality) that which precedes rather than that
which follows it (in the order indicated) .

In other words, if a thing

ls One in number , it would be also One in form; and if it is One in
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form, it would be also One in genus; and if it is One in genus,
it would be also One in relation.
20

On the other hand, if a thing

is One in relation, it would not necessarily be One in genus; and
if it is One in genus, it would not necessarily be One ln form;
and if it is One in form, it would not necessarily be One in number .
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It has thus been established that over against unity stands
plurality.

Plurality characterizes all the varieties of existences.

A thing is said to be multiple either because it is not continuous,
that is , descrete (munfasil) or because its substance is divisible

•

into forms or its forms into genus or relation .
been elucidated that individual existence (
anything that owes its being to the One .

5

The fact has also

wiyyah) applies to

Individual existence,

therefore, is a designation of all that owes its identity to the
various forms of the One .
It has so far been proven that the True One (alwahid al - haqq)
•
•
is not one of the intelligibles (al - ma'qulat) .

It ls neither substance,

genus, species, individual, differentia, property, common accident,
motion, soul, intellect, whole, part, all, few nor ls it related
to anything else .
10

The True One is the Absolute One (wahid mursal) .
•

It is immune to multiplicity .

It ls not compound and is not •many •

It is not identical with any of the existences mentioned above even
though they partake of unity in one form or another .

Whatever is

is implied in their names does not apply to the True One .

All the
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.

things ~.,e have enumerated are the simplest (absat) manifestations
of the True One or, more correctly, its simplest descriptions, and
an intensified form (of their unity) would not constitute the True
One .

It follows that the True One is void of matter, form, quantity,

quality, relation and cannot be described by any other category.
15

has no genus, differentia and is not individual, property, corrnnon
accident or in motion .

It simply eludes any description that would

negate its being truly One.
Absolute Oneness (
pure Unity.
161

It

.

Consequently, the True One is solely

..

In other words , it is nothing but

hdah mahd) .

Any unity other than the True One is necessarily multiple .

Therefore, unity which is accidental in all things is other than the
True One as we have shotm before .
The True One is the One- itself, the One in essence which never
partakes of plurality in any way .

It is indivisible in any manner

within itself or with respect to anything else .
time, space, subject, predicate,
5

The True One is not

hole, part, substance or accident .

It is immune to any form of division or multiplicity .
found in all other existences is not identical with it .
is accidental, and whatever exisos accldentally
has its cause elsewhere .

This unity

things has its

For whatever i s found in things exists

accidentally or essentially .
The First Cause (awwal

in

The unity

No t hing can be infinite in actuality .

1 illah)

of the unity which is found in all

individual things is the True One whose unity is not derived from
any other source (than itself ) .

For the cause-effect sequence cannot
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10

be infinite at its inception.

Thus the cause of unity in all

individual beings and things is the Primary ~True One (al-wahid al-

•

haqq al-awwal) .

•

Anything that receives unity from a source other

than itself is an effect (ma'lul).

All Oneness other than that of

the True One is metaphorical and not real Oneness .

The source of

Unity in all objective existences is outside their own being .

This

implies that its plurality is not self- caused, for it ls a fact that
each existent is multiple and is not absolutely One or is not Unity
in the absolute sense.

The Absolute One never partakes of plurality.

Its Unity is nothing other than its own Being.
If unity and plurality exist simultaneously in all sensory

15

objects and anything that is related to them, and if unity in all
of these is an effect of a cause (athar min muathir), occurring in
them by accident and not by nature , and , moreover, if plurality is
nothing but the aggregate of unities (jama •at

i

~daniyyat), it

follows as a matter of sheer necessity (idt iraran) that without unity
••
there could never be plurality .

This leads to the conclusion that

the coming into being of any plurality is brought about by unity .
162

Without unity, plurality cannot possibly have any existence .

There•

fore , every existent (mutahawwi) is an effect (infi ' al) that is
brought into being out of non-being (ma lam yakun) .

Consequently,

the emanation (fayd) of unity from the Primary True One is equivalent

•

to the process of coming into being (tahawwi) of every sensory object
(mahsus) and anything that is related to it .

•

An individual thing
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comes into being when it acquires unity. · Thus the cause of generation is identical with the True One whose unity is not derived from
5

any other source because its very essence is unity or oneness.

The

cause of Being cannot be non-Being, and that which is not non- Being
(laysa lam yazal) must be a created thing (mubda'), namely, it owes
its existence to a cause.
created.

Thus that which is brought into being is

If the cause of coming into being is the Primary True One,

it follows that the cause of creation ( •alat al -i bda ' ) is the Primary
True One.

The cause which accounts for the beginning of motion or

that by which motion is initiated, namely, the (First) Mover, is the
Active

gent (al-fa'il).

Consequently, The Primary True One, being

the cause which sets the process of generation into motion which is
the effect, is itself the Creator (al-mubdi') of all that exists.
10

can be no existence (la huwiyyah) without unity.

In fact, acquiring

unity (tawahhud) and coming into being are the same thing.

••

the backbone (qiwam) of all that exists.

There

Unity is

The disappearance of unity

would mean the elfuultaneous (ma.tan) and immedia te (bila zaman) obliteration of all existing beings and things.

The True One is, therefore,

the Primary Creator (al-awwal al-mubdi') and Sustainer (al-mumsik)
of all that He has created.

Without His sustenance (imsak) and power

every existent would disintegrate .
As we have set out to do, we have explicated the distinctions
between the types of unity for the purpose

of

shedding light on

the nature of the True One, the (First) Cause and Creator, the

158

powerful Sustainer, as well as to understand unity in the metaphorical
15

sense .

uch a unity is derived from the True One, may He be exalted

far above the descriptions of the unbelievers .
We shall continue our discussion with what would naturally
f o llow .

This we shall attempt to do thr ough the support of Him whose

perfect Will is all-powerful and whose gracious bounty is inexhaustible .
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54

Al-Mu'tasim who ruled from 833 to 842 A. D. was al-Ma'mun's brother
'&
and successor
and, like him, subscribed to the Mu'tazilite doctrinal
position. The fact that al-Kindl, at the opening of his Treatise
on First Philosophy, addresses and dedicates this important work to
al - Mu'taslm may be regarded , as Or . Richard Walzer has shown (Greek
into Arabic, p. 176), as "external evidence" of al-Kindi's theological
kinship to the Mu•tazllltes. It is possible that Part I of this
.metaphysical work was written during the last years of al-Mu 1 tasim 1 s
reign and that the opposition of the succeeding caliph, al-Mutawakkil,
to the Mu•tazilltes might have made al - Kindl abandon his plans to
write Part II because of the danger to his life this would have
entailed .

.

55

Abu Rt dah, op. cit . P• 97 . Al - Klndi ' s description of philosophy as
an art (slna •at) and his definition of it as the knowledge of things
as they ;re ('llm al•a!.!1Ya ' bi-haqaiqiha) are in line with the
Hellenistic tradition which gave to philosophy the practical meaning
of an art, based upon s c ient i f i c principles (Cf . Seneca, Epistle 89).
The Arabic term ' ilm has a wider connotation than the English word
' knowledge . • Wlththe advent of Greek philosophy in the Islamic
world,~ acquired the meaning of •scientific' and thus it ls more
akin to the German term Wi ssenschaft. The definition of philosophy
a s ~ of things as they are , therefore , must be understood to
signify the methodical work of thought through which we come to know
reality . In his Treatise "On the definitions and Descriptions of
Things," al-Klndi llsts six definitions of philosophy that were known
to the ancients (al-qudama'): (a) Love of wisdom, (b) Imitation of
God in His works for the purpose of attaining perfection in virtue ,
(c) Elimination of lusts, (d) Self-knowledge, (f) l<nowledge of eternal,
t.miversal things - their existences, substances and causes (Abu Rtdah,
op. cit. P• 172f) . Cf . Aristotle, Metaphysics 1005b 6f where philosophy is conceived as the study of the nature of all substances .
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Ibid . , P• 97. Al-Klndl ' s division of ph ilosophy into theory ('ilm)
and practice (•amal) appears also at the beginning of his Treatise
"On the Five Substancestt which has come down to us in its Latin
translation "Uber de quinque essentltis . " (Professor ;\bu Rldah has
included this work and an Arab i c retranslation of it in Vol . II of
Rasa'll al-Kindl al - falsaflyyah, P• 8ff). In this work, al-Kindl
states that the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical
corresponds to the division of the soul into mind and senses, thought
and sensation (op. cit . p. 8) . Cf . Franz Rosenthal, "From Arabic
Books and Manuscripts, VI," Journal of the American Oriental Society,
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Vol . 76 (1956), PP• 27-31 . In this article, Dr e Rosenthal quotes
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practice are• the beginning of virtues" (awwal al - fada ' ll), al - Kindl
goes on to divide 'theory• ('ilm) into the physical ; mathematical
and theological divisions, and 'practice• ('amal) into ethics,
economics and politics . The theoretical subdivisions , as Dr e Rosenthal
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practical subdivisions appear in the later Aristotelian literature
but not in Aristotle ' s own writings .
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Al - Kindl seems to be in disagreement here with Aristotle who considered
theoretical contemplation (theorla) as the highest and noblest activity
of man . However, the distinction in objectives between "theoretical"
and "practical" knowledge which al - Kindl stresses echoes Aristotle's
statement that "the end of theoretical knowledge is truth , wh ile that
of practical knowledge is action" (Metaphysics 993b 20f) .
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Philosophy," Orlens, Vol. 3 (1950), P• 9), this argument of the
inescapable necessity to use philosophical knowledge has its origin
in Aristotle's lost work Protreptlcus which was imitated in the
Hortensius of Cicero. This work, in turn, influenced St . Augustine's
religious development. The same argument was used in similar
circumstances by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VI, 18 (p. 515, 3lff.
Stfthlin). Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (G6ttingen, 1948), P• 415; II
(1949), P• 200. Cf. also Aristotle's concept of "the necessary,n
_(Metaphysics 1015a 20•1015b 16).
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Abu Ridah, op. cit. p. 105. Al - Kindl must be referring here to the
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Christians. Cf. Ibn al-Nadtm, Fihrist No. 167-169; T. J. de Boer,
"Kindl wider die TrinltMt," pr ieiH:il1sc9:eaStucH;tt-: E'estschrift fUr
Theodor Noeldeke, Giessen (1906), Vol. I, pp. 279-281; and Yahya Ibn
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'Adi's Reply to al-Kindi (al-radd 'ala al-Kindl) in defense of the
doctrine of the Trinity (in Arabic), MS. Vat~ Arabo, 123 and 127, PP•
99-110, Blblioteka Apostolica Vaticana, Rome.
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Abu Ridah, op. cit. P• 106. Al-Klndi is most probably the only Muslim
philosopher who uses the term 11 wuj0d' to signify •cognition• and
'knowing •. The word is derived from the root •wajada, 11 •to find'•
Thus 0 wujudtt has the connotation of 'finding' (cf. the Arable dictionary
al-munjid which states that •wajada' (to find) is also used to connote
'alima (to know)). The later Muslim philosophers use •wujud ' for
'being' and •existence' as well as the •universe.• To determine
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Berkelelan sense (For George Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived,"
.!!!!. ,!!, perclpi - cf. his Treatise Concernin the Prine! les of
Human Knowledge - 1710 - sec. 33 would require further study of
al-Kindi •s epistemology. ' Al-wujQd a.1-burhani' (Abu Rldah, op . cit.
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Abu Ridah, op. cit. P• 106. Cf. Aristotle's De Anima, Book III,
Sections 3, 8 (427b 27-429a 9 and 431b 20-432a 13).
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~ • , P• 295ff. Imagination is considered by al-Kindl as a secondary
source of cognition. It receives the images of sense perception and
deposits them ln the memory for eventual use by the mind. The
imagination also registers the mental images of the mind and stores
them in the memory . The recollective function of the imagination
consists of reproducing both the sensory and mental images from the
memory and placing them at the disposal of the mind for its organizing
and synthesizing work. What al - Kindl says about the nature of dreaming
as a form of symbolic thinking and about the interpretation of dreams
might be of interest to psychoanalysis.
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In order to understand the place and importance of intuition as a
source of knowledge we must turn to al-Kindi's "Treatise on the
quantity of Aristotle's Books and what ls required for the attainment of Philospp~}"' (kammiyyat kutub Aristutalis wa-ma yuhtaju fl
ta9~fl al-falsafah), Abu Rfdah, op . cit. pp . 372-376. He:e he seems
to conceive of intuition as a radar-like function of the mind that
is capable of receiving hidden realities (al-umur al-khafiyyah alhaqqlyyahO, that is, transcendental truth. The contextin which
•
al-Kindl
deals with this matter ls quite significant. Into the survey
of the Aristotelean syllabus as it existed then, he injects rather
abruptly a discussion on the fundamental distinction between the
"human sciences" (al-' uliim al-insaniyyah) and ''divine knowledge0 or
theology (al-'ilm al -i lahi), the distinction, in other words, between
philosophic and religious knowledge. The former, as exemplified by
the works of Aristot le, al-Kindl points out, is attained through

P• 109

P• 109f. Al-Kindi's argument in refutation of the existence
of the Void does not differ from that of Aristotle's dealing with
the same problem in his Physics, Book IV, Section B (213a-214b).
That space is not perceived by sense but by the mind ls an argument
that appears in Plato's Timaeus (B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato,
New York: Random House, 1937, P• 32) . Cf. also Raphael Demos, "The
Receptacle," Philosophical Review, Vol. XLV (1936), P• 535ff .

• , P• 108

•, PP• 353-362, 293-311

166

systematic investigation and deliberate effort (talab wa-takalluf).
Much of religious knowledge, he goes on to say, ls attained by
reason but only through a long and weary detour of philosophic
inquiry. There are, however, certain transcendental truths of
religion which the mind can neither reach nor comprehend. These
truths are apprehended by intuttlon and without strenuous research
and time-consuming methods (blla talab wa-la takalluf wa-la blhilah
basharlyyah wa-la zaman) . But thfs avenue of cognition ls not.open
toall, according to al-Kindl. It ls limited to the prophets whose
religious knowledge is communicated to them without the human devices
(hlyal) of logic and mathematics and is received directly and immediate•
•
·1y.
The conditions which the prophets must meet to qualify and prepare
for the receptivity of these hidden truths are not intellectual but
moral and spiritual, namely, the purification (tathir) and illumination
(lnarah) of their souls. But this preparatory process takes place
through God's support (ta•yTd) and help (tasdid) and by inspiration
(ilham) and messages (rasa'il). Al-Kindl cites two tenets of Islam
which confronted the Greek mind with insurmountable difficulties,
namely, the resurrection of the body and the creation of the world
out of nothing . Certainty about such truths, he stresses, is directly
imparted by God to the minds of the prophets.

-

.
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Abu Ridah, op. cit. P• 111

91

~ • , P• 113. The term 'laysa• ls a composite of •1a• (not or none)
and •aysa• (to be, being). As Soheil Afnan says, al-Kindl has "a
passionate attachment" to these terms, aysa and laysa and words that
are derived from them such as aysiyyah, laysiyyah, ta•yis, mu•ayyis
and al - aysat (Phlloso hical Terminolo yin Arable and Persian, Leiden:
E. J. Brill (1964), P• 97f. The first appearance of the root aysa
is found in the Arabic translation of Aristotle 's Metaphysics which
was performed by Ustath for al-Kindl (Sohell Afnan , op. cit. P• 97).
Most probably, al-Kindl took the term from the Syriac ayth. Its use
after al-Kindl was short-lived.
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~ • , PP• 194-198
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.ill.2,•t PP• 201-207
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Ibid., P• 117. Cf. Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle
(New York: Random House, 1941), Physics 219b 2 . Al - Kindl does not
give the definition in its entirety and omits the words "in respect
of 'before• and 'after'•" Cf. also Aristotle's Metaphysics 986a 17
where reference is made to the Pythagoreans with respect to their
theory of numbers.
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Abu Rfdah, op. cit . pp . 214- 237 . This important Treatise opens
with the teleological argument for the existence of God . In the
phenomenal world we see the evidence (dalalah) for the planned
designing of a First Designer (tadbi r mudabbir awwal) . 1n the
course of his di scussion, al - Klndi refers a few times to his First
Philosophy and identifies God as al - Inniyyat al - Saqq (the True Being
or True Existence) who is never non- be i ng but is always Be i ng (p. 215) .
God is also called al- Hayy al- Wabid (the Living One) who is never
plurality . He is also al ' illat al-Olah (the First Cause) , the Efficient
and Final cause as well as the Creator of all things ex nihilo (almu •ayyis al-kull •an laysa)(p. 215, 219) . Only at thevery end of
his "Treatise on First Philosophy," al- Kindl equates the First Cause
with the True One (al-wahid al-haqq), bu Rtdah, op . cit . P• 161 . He
is the Primary cause of Creation and motion (p . 162) . In his essay
"On the First, True, Perfect Agent and on the imperfect (one) that
is an agent only metaphorically" (al - fa ' il al-haqq al - awwal , al-tamm
wa- ma al-fa'il al - naqis alladhi huwa bi - al-majiz) , he identifies the
First cause as the Creator (al - mubdi ' ) , the exalted One (p . 183) .

. -
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Abu Rtdah, op , cit e P• 118f
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Ibid., P• 120 . There is no general agreement as to the origin of
~term inniyyah. Abu al - Baqa', in his work al - kulliyyat (The
Universals), Cairo , 1903 , P• 76 , derives the word f r om Inna , the
Arabl e particle of emphasis which stresses the actual existence of
an object . Some mystics pronounced the word aniyyah and derived
it from ana, the first person singular . This is what 1Abd al - Karim
al - Djili (died about 1417 . D. ) does in his book al- Insan al - kamil
fi ma•rifat al-awakhir wa-al - awa ' il (The Perfect Man as conceived
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A GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

the future
effect
cause
assimilation, coordination, harmony
the eternal
existence, being

! priori, rational or first principles
to bring into being, to create, generate
generation , creation
what a thing is, identity
disparity, difference
' 0 ,,
""
<----«..::S"
,..,

research , investigation, inquiry, study

.,

o ,

~

chance

t~J
t:f.J'

bringing something out of nothing,
creation ex nihilo
the Creator
innovation
transformation, exchange
demonstration, proof
empirical evidence
simple
invalidity, nullity

0

j

dimension, distance
prove, delineate, explicate
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173

perfection, completion
perfecting, final (cause)
constancy, permanence, stability
, /

~u...~

(_ \I\

substantiation, confirmation, proving

"' '

0

.JL.:~ \
,,.

(,~ ') (~
J,;:,
o:,
c.3... .:,t>
. ' .s~.

'

exception

,J

""'

..,..,,. :,

<..f~
,,.

body, corporeal object
part, particular
divisible
body, organism
the all, totality of being, cosmos
integrative, collective
discursive reasoning
substance, essence
metaphorical
impossible, illogical

/

~Gs' y

inevitable

;,J~ 1

c()~
..,
/

transformation, alteration
proof, argument
definition

( .) ..:>_;...I>) ~
..>..:>~

definite, finite

(u\{~)~~

motion, movement

~~4

CJY '

locomotion
the mover

/

~

(u

I

~ I) u---~ I

\._.,.µ

sensation
sensory object, perceptible
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the truth
Primary Truth
reality, true nature (of things)
memorization, retention
memory
predicate, object
contingency, possibility

.,..

.... ....

'

~

Lt>

.s~,

~

l .s~ I
0

property
the void, empty space
the absolute void

,

~

contradiction, inconsistency
contrariety, the opposite
continuous, permanent, constant
realization, comprehension, apprehension
time , eternity, destiny
essence, self; essential, intrinsic
i s sential ·(non-essential~ contingent)
opinion, view, notion, proposal
divinity, lordship
theology, religious knowledge
synonymous
absolute
description, image
compounded, composite, complex
compound, composition
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basic element, constituent
0

/

~//

?e ~_/ '

u

symbolic, representative
mathematics

/

( Ul_p~I) U ~_;

time
immediate, instant
disappearance, cessation, vanishing
eternal, permanent
at rest, motionless
equality, equivalence
similar

.. .

{-liJ~_)

µ

d' ..

condition, provision
0

I

ri

participation, having in common

~9

(u--P ~ ') ~

individual, particular, specific

/ ,

(c.J~ 'J P

cJ~,

shape, form
truthfulness
verified, established, proven
form

"'

c,,

:,

0.,/~

_,,.

!,, /

..

.../j-.e.:J '

imagination
conceptualization, abstraction

~ l.p_i) '

correlation, relation

<--' ~

correlated, relative

..,,

I

opposite, contrary

.

c)~ I
/

necessity
disintegration, dissolution
nature, reality
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by nature, inherent, intrinsic
physics
first philosophy, metaphysics
problem, inquiry
assumption, belief
non-being, nonexistence, nothingness
accident, contingency
accidental, non-essential, contingent
knowledge
magnitude
,.

intellect, mind, reason
the acquired intellect
the apparent, visible or practical intellect
the potential intellect
the active intellect
intelligible, comprehensible
the opposite, antithesis
antithetical , inverse
cause
first cause
material cause

~..,/~,
.
/

formal cause

~w,

efficient cause

_: "':: I

..:::\..,"''""'"I
,,
,,

~ ,.>
/

.,.

u_;f' lli.,.

final cause
the cause of itself, self-caused
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caused, effect
knowledge of the nature of things,
knowledge of things as they actually are
known, intelligible
mathematical
matter
meaning, connotation
mutable, changeable
otherness, alterity
to assume
assumption, hypothesis
void, vacuum

difference, incongruity, disparity
differentiative
,,

/

__)~
~

-;-

0--;

( J- \....e.,) ~
c)~

cJ-:- \.!)

corruption, decay
different la
disconnected
agent

/'

~~
/

~

in actuality
philosophy
first philosophy, metaphysics
emanation, outflow
magnitude
premise
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/

~2
( UJ-') ~
~~

refutation, disproof
faculty, force, potentiality
in potentiality, potentially

0

t.c._;)

.

persuasion

/

( J~l) c_)~

proposition, statement, hypothesis

"'/

,;

( ~y~ ) c)_>-0--o

predicable
to constitute
constitution
existence, sustenance
plurality, multiplicity
many

whole, general, universal
coming into being, generation

creation ex nihilo
perfection, entelechy
quantity
quantitative
quality, modality, state

. . ..
.. .

u-,, L~
. f

- "'

/,

/

./

quall tative
ambiguity, equivocation

,~

~

( ~ ( ~ .,, ') cJ\.:..o,,
cJG
....

consequence, aftereffect
non-being, nothing, nonexistence
image, picture, model
symbolical, allegorical, representative
similar, homogeneous, resembling
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absolute, pure, genuine
duration, interval
sustainer, upholder

,,,

u½Jt u-f' LP

0~

(41)
~
( u@)
,,,
,,,
/'

01/

the past
space, place
occupant
possible, contingent

/

cu~~1) u\£.:,

possibility, contingency

.s..)A...L I

occupied or filled space

,!

,

/

·::...r

~
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~ Lo) ~/ L,.,
.
( u~l-o) ~ L-O
( 0
"'

impossible, prohibited
essence, substance

/

(~)~
(- ~ ) ~
/

school of thought
relation, proportion, affinity

/

~

(0~~) /

t;

~fa,~,
u~ifa1
"

essence, quiddity

""""""

.~

~
.....

speculation
speculator, thinker
the specu!ative science
analytical speculation
negation, nonentity
obliteration, disintegration
contradiction, inconsistency
flnitude, end
finite, definite, limited
infinity, limitless
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/
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being, existing
non-being, nothing, nonexisting

,

~~

/

species

existence, identity, he- ness, it-ness

"" ./
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..

coming into being out of nothing
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necessity
necessary, imperative, duty
cognition, knowledge, universe
sense perception
conception
the True One
unity, unit
oneness
the True Unity
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.,

/

./

~y
</~

_)~ 1

r ~l
( (_ ~/1) c;P:;
'

/

~~
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pure or absolute unity
union, unification, amalgamation
delineation, elucidation
circumstance, position, convention
subject
truth, certainty
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